To Karbala:

Surveying Religious Shi'a from Iran and Iraq

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This survey captures the attitudes and beliefs of religiously observant Shiites by surveying Iranians and Iraqis on pilgrimage to Karbala for the Shiite holy day of Arba'een. When we conducted this survey in the days leading up to and during the Arba'een celebrations of 2015, 22 million pilgrims reportedly participated in the ritual procession to the Imam Hussein Shrine in the southern Iraqi city of Karbala—over ten times as many visitors as the Hajj in Saudi Arabia that year. We sampled 2410 Iraqi pilgrims and 1668 Iranian pilgrims from governorates and provinces across Iraq and Iran, closely examining the opinions of practicing Shiites in these two countries. This gave us access to a politically and socially influential subgroup in the Middle East that remains largely understudied.

The unique context of the pilgrimage not only afforded us access to this politically relevant sample of people from two important countries with majority Shi'a populations, but also allowed us to ask sensitive questions about topics that would be difficult to address in traditional survey contexts. Our survey asked pilgrims their views on their respective governments, the United States, and the West; sectarian conflicts across the Middle East, including Syria and Iraq; Shi'a religious belief and religious practice; the rise of ISIS; and the agreement on Iran's nuclear program.

We also used innovative sampling techniques and experimental methods to elicit more representative and reliable responses to potentially sensitive questions. This allowed us to not only glean information on respondents' stated opinions and beliefs, but to also get at their implicit and latent preferences so as to better understand the Shi'a world today—including the roots of conflict and the possibilities for reconciliation.

As anticipated, the overwhelming majority of survey respondents self-declared as religiously observant. There were, however, clear differences between Iranians and Iraqis in their modes of religious expression. Iranians engaged in notably more communal religious practice than Iraqis and were considerably more likely to believe that religion should inform all political decisions. They also indicated very high levels of support for the current regime, though experimental questions pointed to some underlying concerns about corruption, as well as to a desire for change. Iraqis, on the other hand, exhibited pronounced frustration with

political authority, including religious political authority, largely claiming that no party was suitable to lead Iraq, and that Islamic political parties were no better than their secular counterparts. Yet, despite the years of instability and violence that have plagued their country, Iraqis were generally positive about democracy.

Iraqi and Iranian respondents showed more agreement on regional politics. The vast majority of respondents saw Iran as a guardian of Shi'a interests in conflicts across the region. Respondents strongly supported the provision of financial assistance to all Shiite groups mentioned, including the Houthis in Yemen, Syria's government army, Hezbollah, the Shiite volunteer groups in Iraq known as Hashd al-Shaabi, the Shiite opposition in Bahrain, and Afghan Shiite groups, highlighting the relevance of this population to conflicts across the Middle East. In the international realm, Iraqi and Iranian respondents were most likely to see the US favoring traditional Shiite enemies rather than Shiite allies. They also preferred minimal US involvement in the Middle East across a variety of conflicts, particularly in Iraq, even when non-military interventions were proposed.

Notably, Iranians valued their country's search for self-sufficiency over its integration into the international community, and many saw the United States and Iran as having divergent interests. Despite this, they favored increased interaction between the two countries, including peaceful exchange on tourism, journalism, culture, and sports. More than half of the Iranian respondents further supported military cooperation with the US in the fight against ISIS. While overwhelmingly in favor of developing nuclear energy for civilian use, Iranian respondents were divided on whether Iran should develop nuclear weapons, as well as on the religious implications of that decision. They were, however, supportive of Iran's nuclear agreement and optimistic about its successful implementation.

In addition to survey responses, varying levels of *non*response allowed us to better understand sensitive issues for Iranians and Iraqis. Iranians were less likely to respond to questions about democracy and the relationship between government and religion, while Iraqis were less likely to respond to questions that focused on regional politics and Iranian foreign policy involvement.

Throughout the report, we reference variation in responses based on gender, age, income, education and religiosity when these are significant at the 0.05 level once controlling for other factors in a regression.[1]

[1]See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the regression setup and interpretation.

RESULTS

Media, News and Social Ties: Over 75% of Iranians and Iraqis received the majority of their information from TV, and around 60% also mentioned friends and family. Overall, Iranians tended to get their news from a wider set of sources than Iraqis, with the second most popular news source being the mosque. Iranians were also significantly more engaged in local community-based activities and civil society organizations, both religious and secular. About half of Iranians and Iraqis used the internet at least a few times a month, with instant messaging/videoconferencing apps such as Skype, Whatsapp, or Viber being popular in both countries.

Sectarianism: This survey looks at both overt and latent sectarian attitudes among Shiites in Iran and Iraq, using a combination of experimental and non-experimental questions. When asked directly, the majority of Iranians and Iraqis were supportive of Sunni-Shi'a dialogue, but thought that Sunnis and Shiites had different interpretations of violence in Islam. Experimental questions, further suggested that respondents were heavily biased against Sunni neighbors or daughters-in-law, indicating that while respondents superficially accepted official policies that encourage positive Sunni-Shi'a interaction, they remain less personally supportive of the policy's underlying principles.

Religion: Consistent with our sampling expectations, respondents exhibited high levels of religiosity. Iranians, however, were significantly more likely to engage in communal religious practice, with religious Iranian women being over twice as engaged as their Iraqi counterparts. Emulation, or the practice of following the writings and interpretations of an established religious authority, continues to be an important part of Shi'a religious practice, with most Iranians emulating Khamenei, and most Iraqis emulating Sistani. Respondents showed significant variation in their attitudes towards religion and the state, with Iranians favoring more religious involvement in politics than Iraqis.

Gender and Women's Issues: The majority of respondents were very conservative in their beliefs about women and family, reporting that the children of working women suffer, that women need their husband's permission to work, and that having a job is not the best way for women to be independent. They were more liberal on questions about rights and opportunities, the majority believing that women should have the same rights as men and should be able to choose whom they want to marry. Most respondents thought that Iraqi

abaya or Iranian chador was the appropriate attire for women, but Iranians were overall less conservative than Iraqis in their attire preferences.

Human Rights and Democracy: Respondents from both Iran and Iraq were very divided on issues of democracy and human rights, with about half of respondents viewing different aspects of democracy at least somewhat negatively. Iranians exhibited significant faith in the current party and government system, with roughly three quarters believing that it is best-suited to lead Iran and that the last elections were fully free and fair. Iraqis, however, expressed deep dissatisfaction with the current regime, with around three quarters believing that no party was suitable to lead Iraq, and that recent elections were not free and fair. Yet, despite this frustration, support for the sovereignty and continuity of the Iraqi state was high, with the vast majority of the Shi'a Iraqis in our sample disapproving of the establishment of an autonomous Sunni region in Iraq or a separate Kurdish state.

Iran and Regional Conflict: Religious Iranians and Iraqis expressed nearly universal support for Shiite causes throughout the Middle East, including the Houthis in Yemen, the Syrian government army, Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq known as Hashd al-Shaabi, the opposition in Bahrain, and Afghan Shiite groups. About half of respondents thought Bashar al-Assad would win the war in Syria, with the second most predicted outcome being a negotiated settlement brokered by the international community– an unexpected show of confidence despite their failures to even reach a ceasefire. About a quarter of Iraqis, however, stated that they believed the war in Syria would not end, indicative of their own experience with drawn out conflict.

Attitudes toward the US and International Community: Respondents held overwhelmingly positive views of Iran's role in global affairs, conveying Iran as the protector of Shiite interests throughout the Middle East. Most Iranians believed that Iran was at least somewhat integrated into the international community, though participants primarily valued Iranian self-sufficiency over international integration and trade. There was also an understanding of the value of military and civilian cooperation with the United States, despite a recognition of the two countries' divergent interests. Iranian respondents were very supportive of the development of nuclear energy for civilian use, but remained divided on whether Iran should develop nuclear weapons, as well as on the religious implications of that decision. They, nevertheless, declared to be in favor of the nuclear agreement and optimistic about its successful implementation.

Contents

1 THE SURVEY 7

2 SAMPLING 22

3 MEDIA, NEWS AND SOCIAL TIES 46

4 SECTARIANISM 59

5 RELIGION 75

6 GENDER AND WOMEN'S ISSUES 103

7 DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 115

8 THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN IRAN AND IRAQ 122

9 REGIONAL CONFLICT 130

10 IRAN: NUCLEAR POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 136

11 ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 154

12 APPENDIX A: READING THE REGRESSIONS 160

13 APPENDIX B: SAMPLING TABLES 162

14 APPENDIX C: CONJOINT ANALYSIS 168

APPENDIX D (Detailed Non-Response) and APPENDIX E (Question-level heterogeneity) can be found online at:
$https://www.dropbox.com/s/cxk0fxnkht9g6xe/Appendices.pdf?dl=0$

1 THE SURVEY

Pilgrims along the Najaf-Karbala road

This is a public opinion survey focusing on political attitudes and behaviors among religious Shiites. Specifically, the survey is conducted in the context of an annual Shiite pilgrimage in southern Iraq with the intent to sample respondents who are practicing Shi'a from both Iraq and Iran. As such, it is not a nationally representative sample from the two countries, but rather a subsample of observant Iraqi and Iranian Shi'a. Travelling to Karbala from both Iraq and Iran is accessible to individuals across the socioeconomic spectrum, making this an opportunity to gain insight into religious Shia from diverse socioeconomic and regional backgrounds. Respondents offered their views towards their respective governments, the United States, and the West; sectarian conflicts across the Middle East, including Syria and Iraq; the rise of ISIS; and the agreement on Iran's nuclear program.

The project is both methodologically innovative and substantively relevant. On a methodological level, the survey uses new ways of sampling a religious subpopulation, which despite comprising a large and important part of the

underlying national population, is not easy to identify using traditional survey methods. The survey also employs survey experiments—including conjoint, endorsement, memory priming, and sectarian identity priming experiments—to get at difficult-to-measure issues where respondents may over-report socially desirable attitudes or are unable to accurately report their own hypothetical preferences. Such techniques were first introduced in political science in the context of American politics surveys to deal with sensitive issues such as race (e.g. Jamieson 1992; Mendelberg 1997, 2001; Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002; Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014). Yet these tools have been shown to be useful in places very different from the US, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they have been used to get at levels of popular support towards militant insurgency (e.g. Blair, Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro 2013; Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013; Callen et al. 2014).[2]

Pilgrims praying by the shrine of Imam Abbas in Karbala

On a substantive level, our survey provides access to the attitudes and opinions of a very influential and largely understudied population in the Middle East at a time of intense sectarian conflict in the region. Shi'a comprise roughly

[2]Our instruments were reviewed and approved by MIT's Institutional Review Board (COUHES). We also got feedback from political methodologists and scholars of the Middle East in top US institutions, as well as from Iraqi and Iranian scholars and practitioners.

20% of the world's Muslims, and are the largest group or the group in power in some of the most contentious areas of the Middle East, such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, with a notable presence also in Bahrain and Kuwait.[3]

Yet, existing work on Shiite politics tends to focus largely on Iran's theocratic regime or on Hezbollah's practices in Lebanon (e.g. Flanigan and Samad 2009; Berman 2009; Cammett 2014) leaving the broader question of Shiite public opinion largely untouched. Surveys of the Middle East and North Africa have been unable to properly cover Iran due to regime restrictions, focusing instead on Arab states in the region. Even within those Arab states, sizable Shiite populations are often either inaccessible due to ongoing conflicts (such as in Syria and Yemen) or likely under-sampled in places that lack recent official censuses because of political decisions associated with ethno-sectarian considerations (such as in Lebanon and Iraq). As a result, our understanding of Shiite public attitudes and opinions remains limited and distorted, based largely on portrayals by their elites or their rivals.

Evening prayer outside a pilgrims' tent in Najaf

The context of the annual pilgrimage to the southern Iraqi city of Karbala

[3]For more see: "Mapping the global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population", Pew Research Center, October 2009.

grants us access to both Iraqi Shi'a and Iranians from across their respective countries. In addition, it offers a rare opportunity to interact with both male and female respondents, as this pilgrimage is an occasion where women collectively engage in public displays of religious ritual that bring them outside the home and into a mixed gender context.

Though Karbala welcomes pilgrims throughout the year, it has a much larger number of visitors on two occasions commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein—Ashura and Arba'een—whose dates vary annually as determined by the Islamic Calendar.[4] For the days associated with the Arba'een pilgrimage in late November–early December 2015, when we conducted this survey, an approximate 22 million Shiite pilgrims, mostly Iraqi and Iranian, were estimated to have visited the shrine of Imam Hussein in Karbala.[5] This pilgrimage is currently the largest religious gathering in the world, attracting a significantly larger number of people than the roughly 2–3 million pilgrims who perform the Hajj to Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia each year.[6] Observance of the religious pilgrimage to Karbala was banned at several different instances during Saddam Hussein's reign. It was reinstated after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and has since steadily grown in numbers.

Despite its massive and public nature, this religious event is largely unknown to the Western world, as are the views of the observant Iraqi and Iranian Shi'a that attend it. This survey aims to fill the existing gap by capturing their opinions on a range of salient political issues at a pivotal time, when the US is fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria; working to enforce an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program; and combatting intense and violent intra-sectarian conflict and tensions in places like Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain.

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[4] There are also other smaller occasions, such as Prophet Mohammed's birthday, or the 15th of Shaaban (the 15th day of the 8th month on the Islamic calendar) that is considered the night of salvation, and the birthday of the twelfth imam, the Mahdi.

[5] There are Shiite pilgrims from other countries such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, Afghanistan and India that participate in the Arba'een pilgrimage, but Iraqis and Iranians are by far the two largest groups. See: "Shi'a pilgrims flock to Karbala for Arba'een climax," 14 December 2014, and "Arba'een: World's largest annual pilgrimage as millions of Shiite Muslims gather in Karbala," 3 December 2015, accessed on 22 July 2016.

[6] Saudi Arabia strictly monitors pilgrim inflows by setting annual quotas on the number of people from each country that can go on the Hajj. For more see: Benjamin Soloway, "Who Decides Who Gets to Go on the Hajj?", *Foreign Policy*, 23 September 2015, accessed on 22 September 2016. For statistics on the number of pilgrims on the Hajj from 1996-2015 see "How one of the deadliest Hajj accidents unfolded," *The New York Times*, 5 September 2016, accessed on 22 September 2016.

BACKGROUND[7]

The Sunni-Shi'a schism in Islam dates back to the disagreement that arose around the succession of Prophet Mohammed after his death in 632 C.E. The Prophet had not appointed a successor and Abu Bakr, one of his companions, claimed leadership of the caliphate despite tense disagreement from those who felt that the family of the prophet (Ahl al-Bayt) possessed the divine right to rule. Under this latter succession rule, the line would start with Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law married to the Prophet's daughter Fatima, and would continue with a divinely ordained Imam from each generation of the Prophet's progeny. This leader would have both religious and political authority over his followers.[8] This line of Imams ended with the twelfth Imam, who disappeared into occultation in the ninth century and is expected to make a return in the years leading up to the Day of Judgment.[9]

The Prophet's succession remained a contentious matter for decades after his death. Abu Bakr, whose rule only lasted two years, nominated Omar bin al-Khattab as his successor. Omar ruled for a decade until his assassination and was succeeded by Othman ibn Affan, who rose as caliph through council elections and ruled for twelve years until he in turn was killed. Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son in law, was then elected as the fourth caliph but faced a tumultuous five years in power before he was assassinated. Ali was succeeded by Muawiyah, the first Umayyad caliph, who made the caliphate hereditary. Sunni-Shia tensions

[7]For more background see Nakash, Yitzhak. *The Shiis of Iraq*. New Jersey. Princeton UP, 1994; Fouad Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and the Shi'a of Lebanon*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1986; Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism: The Idea of Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1981; Davis, Eric. *Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq*. London: University of California Press, 2005; and Nasr, Vali. *The Shi'a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006.

[8] Imam Ali, was assassinated in the Great mosque of Kufa in the seventh century, and was buried by his sons Imam Hassan and Hussein in Najaf, in an area close to the resting place of prophet Noah. This location is known as Imam Ali's shrine and a revered place of pilgrimage in its own right. It has been attracting millions of visitors annually since the fall of Saddam Hussein. For more see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Al-Najaf: Its Resurgence as a Religious and University Center," *Middle East Policy Council*, Spring 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 1.

[9]In addition to the main Shi'a group, the Twelver Shi'a, there are also other smaller branches of Shi'a Islam such as the Zaidi and the Ismaili.

Entrance to the shrine of Imam Abbas in Karbala

peaked when Yazid, who succeeded his father Muawiyah as caliph, precipitated the Shia–Sunni confrontation in the Battle of Karbala, where the third Imam, Imam Hussein (son of Ali and Fatima and grandson of the Prophet) was killed. Hussein was on his way to Kufa in response to a plea from locals in southern Iraq to act as their ruler. Yazid asked Hussein to pledge allegiance to his caliphate or face battle. Hussein opted for battle despite being vastly outnumbered in the battlefield. The massacre that ensued is at the core of Shiite ritual, signifying the act of resistance, and the choice not to bow down to an illegitimate ruler, but rather to fight injustice with sacrifice. The Karbala massacre is remembered during the Ashoura rituals, as well as during the commemoration of Arba'een forty days later. Hussein is celebrated as a hero for his martyrdom and considered the Prince of all Martyrs (*Sayyid al-Shuhada*).

Shiites, much like the followers of Sunni Islam, see as core tenets of their faith the unity of god (*tawhid*), the recognition of Mohammed as his Prophet and the expectation of life after death. For the Shi'a, however, devotion to the Imams is also central to their belief and religious practice. An expression of one's piety and devotion to the Imamate involves visits to shrines of Imams and their offspring.[10]

[10]In Iraq, there are shrines associated with the Shi'a Imams in Karbala (for Imam Hussein and his

The Hajj, one of the five pillars of Islam, requires that all believers, if able, visit Mecca at least once in their lifetime at a specific time of year in the month of Thu Al Hujja.[11] While this is the most important pilgrimage for Muslims, Sunni and Shi'a alike, Shi'a scholars have also written extensively on the importance of visits to imams' shrines. Unlike the Hajj, those are not considered obligatory.[12] The Shi'a tradition of visiting a shrine of a prophet, imam or his companions is called *ziyara*, or visit.[13] In this act of piety, the believer asks for help or forgiveness, thanks the imam, and prays for guidance in this life and redemption in the afterlife. The spiritual rewards associated with the visit to Imam Hussein's shrine are often compared to that of the Hajj, highlighting its importance for this life, as well as the next.[14] In addition to the personal experience, which is a demonstration of both spirituality and status, the visit is meant to convey solidarity among the Shiites.[15] These visits can happen at any time of year and not just at prescribed occasions such as Ashura and Arba'een, though they have a distinctly communal experience when associated with these rituals.

half brother Imam Abbas), in the Kadhimiya neighborhood of Baghdad (for Imam Kadhim and Imam Taqi) and in Samarra (for Imams Hadi, Askari and Mahdi). These visits are considered to have started soon after the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. According to Nakash (2003), in the late 1800s there were over 100,000 Iranians and Indians traveling on foot for months to reach the shrines in Iraq. Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shiis of Iraq.*(Princeton University Press, 2003). In Iran they also have thousands of shrines known as *imamzadeh* for descendants of the twelve imams. For more see: Chelkowski, Peter J. Ed. *Ta'ziyeh, Ritual and Drama in Iran.* New York: New York UP and Soroush Press, 1979.

[11] Umrah visits constitute a pilgrimage to Mecca at any time of year other than the Hajj.

[12] According to Hamdan (2012), Sheikh Al-Kulayni, and Al-Tusi, as well as Sheikh Jaafar bin Quluwe Al-Qomi, are some of the Shi'a scholars that have written extensively on the matter. Faraj Hattab Hamdan (2012). "The Development of Iraqi Shi'a Mourning Rituals in Modern Iraq: The 'Ashura Rituals and Visitation of Al-Arb'ain," *Master Thesis*, Arizona State University, p.17.

[13] We use the term visit or pilgrimage interchangeably in this report to convey a religious visit. In the Muslim tradition, the word pilgrimage tends to be used exclusively for the Hajj, referring to religious trips to Imam shrines as visits or visitations.

[14] See Appendix for references. These writings also offer advice on how to practice the visitation, how to praise and honor the imam, even if circumstances don't allow it because one is too far from Karbala or of ill health etc.

[15] Those who have gone on the Hajj are called Hajje or Hajjeyah (for male and female respectively), while those visiting Imam shrines are called Zayer or Zayerah. In Iran, when one visits Imam Hussein's shrine, he is called Karbalaee. For more see: Faraj Hattab Hamdan (2012). "The Development of Iraqi Shi'a Mourning Rituals in Modern Iraq: The 'Ashura Rituals and Visitation of Al-Arb'ain", *Master Thesis*, Arizona State University, p.176.

Pilgrims carrying banners along the Najaf-Karbala road

Ritual

Arba'een, the religious occasion that served as the backdrop for our survey, is a collective mourning ritual involving a pilgrimage on foot to the shrine of Imam Hussein in Karbala. It is also known as Marad al-Ras, as Imam Hussein's head was taken on a spear to the caliph in Damascus after the Battle of Karbala and was only reunited with his body after his surviving family members were released from prison in Damascus and returned to Karbala.[16] This event is commemorated forty days after Ashura, the ritual that mourns imam Hussein's martyrdom. Arba'een has attracted more visitors than Ashura since its reinstatement in 2003, and is therefore the ideal context for a Shiite pilgrims' survey.[17]

There are official religious norms associated with these visits reflected in one of the Shiite book of prayers *Mifatih Al-Jinan* (The Keys to the Heavens) along with an array of rituals and unofficial cultural norms. For the mourning rituals of Arba'een, the book suggests, among others, the completion of a visit to Imam Hussein's shrine. Walking is what distinguishes this particular visit as people set out days or weeks ahead depending on their distance from Karbala, in order

[16]TM Aziz, "The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr in Shii Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25, no.2 (May, 1993).

[17] There are direct references to the Arba'een ritual in one of the four books of Hadith for Shiites."It is told about Hassan Al-Askari (the 11th Shi'a Imam) that he said there are five signs to a true believer Mu'min: praying, making the Al-Arba'een visit, wearing the ring on the right hand, increasing prostration, and pronouncing loudly in the name of God." Mohammed bin Al- Hassan Al-Tusi, Tahtheeb Alahkam, Ed. Mohammed Jaafar Shamsaldeen, Vol. 6, (Beirut: Dar Al-Ta'rof, 1992) as cited in Faraj Hattab Hamdan (2012). "The Development of Iraqi Shi'a Mourning Rituals in Modern Iraq: The 'Ashura Rituals and Visitation of Al-Arb'ain," *Master Thesis*, Arizona State University, p.20.

Pilgrims by the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf

to walk to Imam Hussein's shrine in time for the celebrations. This walk is a collective ritual, with groups walking from places as far as Basra (roughly 500km away) and Baghdad (roughly 120km away). The most frequented route is from Najaf to Karbala, a distance of approximately 80km.

These processions involve communal rituals with recitations, lamentations and re-enactments of the return of the surviving members of Hussein's family to Karbala forty days after his martyrdom, a way of mourning the loss of a leader that was meant to reinstate the Prophet's line of power in Islam. People walk carrying black, green, red or yellow flags for Imam Hussein, wearing black clothes to signify mourning and green bands on their heads or around their necks. There are also posters of Hussein and loudspeakers broadcasting religious poems or sermons. Along the sides of the road, there are tents that offer food and shelter to the pilgrims on the road.

When people enter the shrine to pay their respects, they touch or kiss the large, wood-paneled doors, a physical act meant to bring them closer to the Imam. Once inside the shrine, there is a short prayer and a reading that is meant to signify loyalty to the Shi'a Imam. The Imam, as a descendant of Mohammed, serves as an intermediary between the pilgrims and God, petitioning for answers to their

Pilgrims in Karbala

prayers. The room with the Imam's tomb is layered with Persian mirrors and crystal, and the shrine itself is covered by a silver grid and golden arches. The pilgrims circle around the tomb, touching the silver grid and praying, often tying green pieces of cloth to communicate their wishes to the Imam. They also spend time praying and resting in the big courtyard in front of the shrine.[18] These rituals include pilgrims of both genders. Women often travel in all-female groups or with their families and children. They are involved both in the procession and in the shrine rituals, as such gender-mixed public rituals have been used as a means for expanding women's social roles and sense of empowerment.

History of the Pilgrimage

Some renowned scholars of Iraq have studied the history of the Karbala pilgrimage during Ashura and Arba'een through the years (Fernea 1970; Warnock-Fernea 1965; Nakash 1994; Jabar 1985 among others). One of the few recent works on the pilgrimage after the fall of Saddam's regime, and the only one we know of in English, is a Master thesis by Hamdan (2012) that

[18] Augustus Richard Norton, "Al-Najaf: Its Resurgence as a Religious And University Center," *Middle East Policy Council*, Spring 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 1.

relies on participant observation to examine Shi'a mourning rituals as the author experienced them on his visit to Karbala in 2012. These religious rituals in Iraq have remained largely inaccessible for a large part of the twentieth century, most recently due to the decades-long ban that Saddam's regime had imposed on the collective expressions of Shiite faith.

The pilgrimages, however, do not only hold spiritual significance. These events present massive opportunities for mobilization, and politicians and clerics alike have leveraged them into political power by organizing protests against the Baathist regime. One such Shi'a uprising was the First Sadr Revolt during the Arbaeen commemoration of 1977, known as the Safar Intifada/Marad al-Ras Intifada.[19] The regime started imposing restrictions on these rituals in the early 1970s, and when they tried to prevent the walk of Shi'a pilgrims from Najaf to Karbala in 1977, it prompted demonstrations demanding Saddam's resignation. The protests were immediately shut down, and led to the regime's ban of all Baath party members from participating in such rituals. The formal ban on such ceremonies came soon after the Iranian revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war. In the years that followed, Iraqi Shi'a saw their position deteriorate as concerns were raised about their loyalty to the Iraqi regime.[20]

It was not until the US invasion of 2003 and the fall of Saddam that the pilgrimage to Karbala was fully re-established. Mere days after the regime's collapse, Iraqi Shi'a marched to Karbala for Ashura and thousands more followed for Arba'een, forty days later. Though these religious festivals have attracted some anti-Shi'a violence since 2004, participation has nevertheless risen steeply. The new Iraqi government opened the borders for Shiites from around the world to come on religious visits, and in 2004, over two million pilgrims went to Karbala for Arba'een, including 100,000 Iranians.[21] Ten years later, and despite the ISIS takeover of Mosul, the pilgrimage in the fall of 2014 welcomed a reported 17 million pilgrims, including over a million Iranians who were able to enter as a result of the lifting of visa restrictions for the pilgrimage. [22]

These mass religious rituals in post-Saddam Iraq still capture important

[19] TM Aziz, "The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr in Shii Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25, no.2 (May, 1993).

[20] Augustus Richard Norton, "Al-Najaf: Its Resurgence as a Religious And University Center," *Middle East Policy Council*, Spring 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 1.

[21] Jonathan Steele, "Iraq: After the War: Religion and Politics Resurface as the New Voices of Iraqi Freedom," *The Guardian* (London), April 22, 2003.

[22] "Shi'a Pilgrims Flock to Karbala for Arba'een Climax", *BBC News*, December 13th, 2014.

Man with chains, reenacting the captivity of Imam Hussein's family

dynamics around collective action and Shiite politics. Now that Shi'a are the dominant force in Iraqi politics, these rituals have become a way to reassert Shi'a identity and leadership, create a collective medium against historical subjugation, and demonstrate opposition to American policies in Iraq.[23] The Sunni opposition has used these pilgrimages to target pilgrims and fuel sectarian violence.

Beyond the political effects, the pilgrimage has also had a clear economic impact, contributing to the development of Shi'a centers such as Karbala and Najaf. They are also thought to have increased the power of religion over social and economic life.[24]

Iranian Pilgrims

Iranians are the second most numerous visitors to the shrines after Iraqis. Iran has a long history of involvement and support for the shrines, and its leaders have

[23]Cockburn, Patrick. *Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, The Shi'a Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq.* New York: Scribner, 2008, p.22.

[24]This includes the building of an airport in Najaf and of a visitor's city in Karbala. For more see: Marsin Alshamary, "The Political Undertones of Shi'a Pilgrimages," *MIT Second Year Paper*, May 2016.

Pilgrims in Karbala

used these religious visits as a way to highlight Iran's leadership over the Shiite faith.[25]

For much of the 20th century, however, Iranian visits to the shrines in Iraq were not possible. Reza Shah Pahlavi, who came to power in Iran in 1925, pursued a modernization strategy that promoted national identity over religion. As part of his secularization policies, he actively tried to curb the practice of religious visits to Karbala and Najaf.[26] The rise of Saddam Hussein, the Iranian revolution, and the subsequent Iran–Iraq war practically barred Iranians from visiting the shrines in Iraq. Iranian visits started again in full force after the fall of Saddam in 2003, and were celebrated as a victory not just against Sunni Islam, but also against nationalism and secularism.[27] Millions of Iranians come to Iraq every year on pilgrimage. The visits to Karbala during Arba'een, among other occasions, are not

[25]For more see: Nathaniel Rabkin, "The Iraqi Shiite Challenge to Tehrans Mullahs," *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2014, Volume 21: Number 1.

[26]For more see: Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003, pp. 170-1.

[27]A few months after Saddam's fall, Iranians were back visiting Najaf. For more see: Nathaniel Rabkin, "The Iraqi Shiite Challenge to Tehran's Mullahs," *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2014, Volume 21: Number 1.

Free rice for Arba'een pilgrims

only encouraged, but also subsidized and organized by the Iranian government, who sees this practice as a way to solidify support from their constituents and indirectly influence the workings of the shrines and the surrounding economies in Iraq. The Central Company of Pilgrimage Service Providers (*Sharekat Markaziye Dafatere Khadamate Zeyaratie Sarasare*) offers all-inclusive tours approved by the government's Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization, which is a branch of Iran's Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. This organization reviews all applications for tourist and guide permits, highlighting the Iranian government's investment in these religious visits.[28]

[28]For more see: Nathaniel Rabkin, "The Iraqi Shiite Challenge to Tehran's Mullahs," *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2014, Volume 21: Number 1.

Organization of Report

The results presented in this report are organized thematically. We begin with a discussion of our sampling strategy and the demographic makeup of our respondents. We then discuss findings on media, news, and social ties; followed by results on sectarianism; a nuanced analysis of religion, including a discussion of religious practice and emulation; findings on gender and women's issues; a discussion of human rights and democracy; and questions on Iran and regional conflict. We close with an overview of respondents' attitudes toward the US and the international community, including the nuclear agreement with Iran.

Within each section, we start by highlighting primary findings. For topic areas where background is necessary, we provide a brief overview of the issue. We then follow with a detailed discussion of results. For each topic, we present a graph that breaks down Iranian and Iraqi responses with error bars representing 95% confidence intervals, as well as a regression with the covariates of age,gender, income, education, religiosity, news interest, and internet use. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of included covariates and how to interpret the regression analysis and results. We then include a paragraph on general findings, followed by a discussion that breaks down the findings between Iranian and Iraqi respondents. In the text, we only discuss heterogeneity based on covariates that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, once controlling for other factors in the regression. When differences are statistically significant, we explicitly state this.

A full listing of response heterogeneity by each covariate included in the regression can be found in Appendix E. Appendix B offers a detailed listing of our enumerator teams; Appendix C a discussion on how to interpret conjoint experiments for those with not much prior exposure to such survey experiments; and Appendix D more detail on the question-level non-response by survey participants.

2 SAMPLING

The intent of this project is to get at attitudes and beliefs of religious Shi'a from Iraq and Iran, a subset of the population in their respective countries that is considered demographically important, as well as politically and socially influential. In recent years, Iran and Iraq have been the two most politically relevant majority Shi'a countries in the world, and devout Shi'a form a core base of support for their respective governments. The political dynamics of these countries affect not only their own domestic politics, but also regional and international affairs.

Despite the importance of devout Shi'a, there exists no data on their prevalence or geographic distribution. Survey data is generally limited in Iraq and Iran, and where it exists, questions about religious belief or practice are rare. These challenges alone would make it difficult to construct a nationally representative sample of the devout, even with unlimited access in both countries.

One alternative might be a clustered sampling strategy that conducts surveys at places of worship, rather than contacting subjects individually. Such an approach would, however, require national data on mosques, including membership and endowments, that is not often shared by the relevant government agencies. This strategy would also under-sample important groups such as women, who often pray at home, and individuals that choose to worship in unofficial meeting places. Most importantly, security concerns and government restrictions in Iraq and Iran mean that actually implementing such a design is practically impossible.

SAMPLING DESIGN

We instead chose to exploit a massive, publicly accessible religious event that attracts religious Iraqis and Iranians of both genders. The annual pilgrimage of Arba'een revolves around the shrine of Imam Hussein in the southern Iraqi city of Karbala. The commemoration of Imam Hussein, forty days after the anniversary of his martyrdom, often has his followers set out from a point of origin several days before the holy day of Arba'een to reach his shrine on foot. We therefore surveyed respondents from 17 November to 12 December 2015, a 25-day window broadly associated with the 2015 Arba'een celebrations.

Pilgrims walking past mawakib

There is no available pre-existing data on the Arba'een pilgrimage that would allow us to capture a representative sample of the pilgrimage group based on region of origin, socioeconomic status, or other demographic factors. More importantly, the intent of our survey is not to estimate the beliefs of an average pilgrim. Rather, we seek to understand how religious individuals from across Iraq and Iran perceive a wide variety of issues, and what sort of variation there is within these countries based on gender, province of origin, age and other factors. Our sampling decisions—described in more detail below—are aimed for respondents resembling this broader population, rather than for the specific group attending Arba'een.

Our task was made more difficult by the relative scarcity of publicly available, nationally representative surveys in Iraq and Iran. War-torn Iraq has not held a census since 1997, and limited data on ethnicity and religion is of questionable use today after repeated conflict and cleansing. Census data on sect, considered a sensitive question, is unavailable—making it impossible to distinguish the Shi'a subpopulation, let alone the devout among them.

In the absence of relevant census or other survey data, we attempted to sample pilgrims according to the distribution of Shi'a politicians in the Iraqi

parliament, known as the Council of Representatives (COR). The COR has a total of 328 seats across Iraq's 18 governorates. The allocation of seats is based on each governorate's estimated population size. We identified the sect of the parliamentarians holding these seats, and used the Shi'a seats as a metric for the Shi'a proportion of the population in that area.[29] Some governorates are almost purely Shi'a. This includes Dhiqar, Najaf, Wasit, Karbala, Qadisiyya, Missan and Muthanna. Other governorates, such as Baghdad and Basra, are Shi'a majority; still others, such as Deyala, are split between Sunni and Shi'a representatives. Salaaddin, Ninewa, and Kirkuk are primarily Sunni, and Anbar is exclusively Sunni. Erbil, Suleimania, and Dhuk are Kurdish governorates with very limited Shi'a representation.[30]

Data availability is better in Iran. Because the majority of the population is Shi'a, we use the regional population breakdown as a proxy for Shi'a residents.[31] We aimed to sample Iranian regions according to their 2011 census population.[32]

While the *number* of Shi'a in different regions of each country can be measured or at least approximated, it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify how Shi'a *religiosity*, or piety, varies by region. In order to extrapolate from our sample to the opinions of devout Shi'a across Iran and Iraq, we make two simplifying assumptions: First, that the proportion of Shi'a who are devout is roughly the same across regions, and second, the breakdown of religious piety among pilgrims from various regions is roughly the same. Realistically, these assumptions are an imperfect representation of a more complex world. For our general findings to be severely affected, however, both assumptions would need to be simultaneously violated to a substantial degree.

We examine the plausibility of these assumptions by proxying for respondents' religious devoutness with a composite of self-reported religious practices and beliefs (following Pepinsky, n.d.), and we find that there are regional differences

[29]The sect of parliamentarians was identified using the party that they were members of as well as their name.

[30]See Appendix C. Note that some areas across certain mostly Sunni or mixed Iraqi governorates are presently occupied by ISIS, and to the extent that we could locate Shi'a pilgrims from those areas for our sample, they were recently displaced people walking to the shrine of Imam Hussein from other Iraqi areas that are under government control.

[31] The most recent 2011 census data from Iran indicate that 99.4% of the population is Muslim. Though they do not differentiate by sect, Muslim Iranians are overwhelmingly Shi'a. There are also some Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Christian residents. See Appendix B.

[32] See Appendix B.

in the specific type of practices embraced, but summing over the different types of practice we find limited difference between regions. While it might seem that the cost of the pilgrimage would deter less-devout Shiites from far-away parts of Iran, in practice, substantial government subsidies largely offset the difference in costs.

We also sought to survey, to the degree possible, roughly equal numbers of male and female respondents. Iraqi and Iranian women are very active participants in religious festivals, and this pilgrimage poses a rare opportunity for accessing these religiously observant women outside their home. For both genders, respondents were chosen among pilgrims between 18 and 60 years old, with roughly half below the age of 35. This range contains most politically engaged citizens in Iraq and Iran.

As discussed in more detail below, we also check how our sample compares to those from other surveys—the 2009 Household and Expenditure survey from Iran, the 2012-2104 Arab Barometer data from Iraq, and the World Bank household data from Iraq. Though these are not necessarily representative surveys for our purposes, they are the only ones we know to be reliable and available, while also arguably relevant.

The Survey Process

The Arbaeen commemoration is a collective procession, with groups walking from all over Iraq, carrying flags and banners for Imam Hussein. To ensure that we surveyed pilgrims according to the above target distribution, we built our sampling strategy around the logistics and rituals of the procession.

The pilgrimage starts several days ahead of Arba'een so people can reach Karbala in time. The exact start date depends on the distance to Karbala from their point of origin. We began surveying two weeks in advance of the celebration, working from the heavily trafficked cities of Karbala and Najaf. The 80-kilometer section between these cities is the most frequented route of the pilgrimage, as many Iranians and Iraqis begin their walk from Najaf in order to visit the shrine of Imam Ali (Imam Hussein's father) before heading to Karbala. This route is especially popular for pilgrims from South Iraq and for Iranians. On the northern side of Karbala, we also sampled pilgrims walking along the Baghdad–Karbala route, often frequented by pilgrims from the capital and from Northern Iraq. In

Enumerators setting out for a day of surveying

total, we surveyed 2410 Iraqis and 1668 Iranians.[33]

The sides of these routes are dotted with clusters of service tents, known as mawkib(singular)/mawakib(plural), which offer food and shelter to pilgrims. Mawakib tend to have a specific regional identity, hosting people from different governorates and provinces in Iraq and Iran, with separate tents for men and women. Travelers stop for long periods of time, not only to dine or drink water and tea, but to also recharge cell phones, repair shoes, or even get weary feet and legs massaged by local volunteers. Mawakib are also full at night, when pilgrims use them to sleep.

Our enumerators were students of political science from the University of Kufa, the most established university in southern Iraq. Our liaison with the University of Kufa, Professor Hassan Nadhem, who holds the UNESCO Chair for

[33]While we originally planned to survey 1500 Iranians and 1500 Iraqis, we had more Arabic-speaking Iraqi enumerators than Iranian enumerators. As the goals of this survey involved not only collecting the highest quality data possible, but also building capacity for future surveys by training and employing competent young Iraqi enumerators, we chose to survey more Iraqi respondents as an important step toward fulfilling this mission.

Enumerator conducting interview in a mawkib

Inter-religious Dialogue Studies in the Islamic world, identified highly motivated and well-suited students for survey training.

The students were trained in the survey instrument, including the process of gaining informed consent. Enumerator teams were selected after (1) a test of candidates' classroom command of the instrument and (2) an evaluation of their performance during a field test, held prior to the start of the survey. We trained both male and female enumerators, who surveyed only pilgrims of their own gender. A total of 30 enumerators carried out the survey in Arabic, with one team of nine (5 men and 4 women) working in Karbala and another team of 21 (9 men and 12 women) working in Najaf and along the Najaf-Karbala road. A total of 21 enumerators (11 men and 10 women) carried out the survey in Farsi.[34] Farsi enumerators were all Iraqi citizens who had grown up as children in Iran and whose families returned to Iraq after the collapse of Saddam's regime. Though bilingual in Farsi, they were immediately distinguishable as Iraqis based on their name, look and dress. We assessed that for a survey taking place in Iraq, Iranian respondents would find it more natural to interact with local enumerators. The survey was administered via Qualtrics using Lenovo tablets, and it was conducted

[34]Please see Appendix C for the names of all enumerators who participated in the survey.

Figure 1: Enumerator Teams and Areas



LOCATIONS IN NAJAF: *1- Bus station Najaf, 2- Sayed Sadr shrine called Najaf-Karbala street; 3- The graveyard of Wadi Assalam, Najaf; 4- Souk Alkabeer near Imam ali shrine, Najaf; 5- Kumail Bin Zeyad shrine, Najaf; 6- Hannana mosque, Najaf; 7- Abuskhair street adjacent to southern bus station (Al garage al janubi), Najaf; 8- Imam Ali Shrine, Najaf; 9- Al Ashreen Road Area, Najaf; 10- Center of ministry of youths and sports in Najaf.* LOCATIONS IN KARBALA: *11- Maitham al Tamar road east of Karbala; 12- Bab Toyridge east of Karbala; 13- South Karbala near al Kafeel hospital; 14- Bab Baghdad area in Karbala; 15- Shrine of Imam Hussein, Karbala; 16- Shrine of Imam Abbas, Karbala.* LOCATIONS OUTSIDE NAJAF AND KARBALA CENTERS: *Kufa mosque, Kufa; Maamal street, Najaf; Sahla, Kufa; Abuskhair street adjacent to ghammas crossing; Karbala street, Najaf; Center of ministry of youths and sports in Najaf; Khan Alnus, between Najaf and Karbala.*

in Arabic for Iraqis and in Farsi for Iranians.

The Karbala and Najaf teams were tasked to survey people from different Iraqi governorates, with breakdown of teams by governorates indicated in Table B5 of the Appendix.[35] The Karbala Arabic-language team surveyed mawakib in four areas: Bab Baghdad, or "gate to Baghdad," the main entrance point into Karbala from Baghdad; the Maitham al-Tammar road east of Karbala; around the Imam Hussein shrine; and south of Karbala near al-Kafeel hospital.

The Najaf Arabic-language team had half of its twenty enumerators in the Thawrat al-Ashreen square area of Najaf, where several large mawakib were located. Five enumerators surveyed in the area around Sayed Sadr's shrine; two worked in the Ataba Alaweya area, around Imam Ali's shrine; another two were

[35]See Appendix C for breakdown of governorates for the Iraqi survey teams in Karbala and Najaf.

assigned to mawakbi around Najaf's bus station; and one enumerator surveyed in a large resting area for pilgrims by the Wadi Assalam graveyard, the largest Shi'a cemetery in Iraq. On the third day before Arba'een, as many pilgrims left Najaf, these enumerators moved to mawakib around the Khan Alnus area, on the road from Najaf to Karbala. In the final two days leading up to the celebrations, the enumerators worked in Karbala, both in the Bab Baghdad area and near the shrines of Imam Hussein and Imam Abbas.

The Farsi-language team worked out of the larger Najaf region. The geographic targeting of Iranians was made more difficult by the fact that Iranian-frequented mawakib tend to have looser regional identities: While mawakib generally served Iranians from either the north, center, or south, it was not possible to target specific census regions as for Iraq. To gain as much regional diversity as possible, we focused on sampling from a wider range of locations where Iranians congregated.

The distribution of Iranian enumerators was as follows: one Iranian enumerator surveyed in the area around the shrine of Sayed Ibraheem, which was set up to host Iranian pilgrims; seven worked in the Ataba Alaweya area, around the shrine of Imam Ali; two enumerators were assigned to areas surrounding the Kumail bin Zeyad shrine and Hannana mosque; three enumerators were in the areas around the Kufa mosque, Maamaal Street and Sahla; two enumerators were placed on Abuskhair Street by Ghammas crossing; one enumerator was in the southern bus station of the city; one in the rest areas by the main Najaf bus station; one enumerator was in the mawaqib on Karbala street in northern Najaf; and two other enumerators in mawaqib set up to host Iranian pilgrims by the Ministry of Youth and Sports. Similar to the Arabic-language Najaf team, in the last two days leading up to the Arbaeen celebration, the Farsi enumerator team also surveyed pilgrims in Karbala in the Bab Baghdad area, as well as in the surrounding areas of the Imam Hussein and Imam Abbas shrines.

Sampling Targets and Outcomes

The survey was administered to a total of 2410 Iraqi and 1668 Iranian pilgrims. To test whether we achieved our sampling target of a regionally representative, as well as age and gender-diverse group of Iraqi and Iranian pilgrims, we compare our sample to the overall distribution of Shiite Iraqis and Iranians.

For Iran, residents of Esfahan and Tehran are the most frequently observed in our sample; they are also slightly over-represented, relative to the national

Figure 2: Sample Gender and Age: Iran and Iraq



population. These are respectively the third and first largest cities in Iran, and it is unsurprising that their more urbanized citizens would be more heavily represented during the pilgrimage. East and West Azerbaijan, on the other hand, are under-represented in our sample; these are culturally and linguistically distinct regions, which made sampling respondents more challenging.[36]

For Iraq, by design, our sampling mirrored the distribution of Shi'a-held seats almost exactly. For all provinces, the absolute difference between the region's proportion of Shi'a-held seats and their proportion in the sample was no more than 0.5 percentage points.[37]

Table B1 for Iran and Table B4 for Iraq in Appendix B compares our sample to targets in Iran and Iraq.

While our goal was to get an evenly split sample between men and women, women are slightly over-represented in our Iraq sample and under-represented

[36] Specifically, 19% of our respondents were from Tehran, as opposed to 16.2% of the Iranian population as a whole; 12.2% of our sample was from Esfahan, versus 6.5% of the population as a whole. Conversely, 1.6% of our respondents were from West Azerbaijan, versus 4.1% of the Iranian population; and 2.3% of our respondents were from East Azerbaijan, as opposed to 5% of the total population.

[37] The greatest over-representation was in the province of Ninewa, where we surveyed by 0.3 percentage points more than intended, and the most under-represented was in Najaf, which comprised 6% of our sample versus 6.4% of Shi'a-held seats.

for Iran (see Figure 2). In Iran, we under-sampled women by 9.5%; in Iraq, we oversampled women by 8.2%. This is in large part due to the gender balance of our enumerator team—we had 16 female and 13 male Arabic-language enumerators for Iraqi respondents, whereas we had 9 female and 12 male Farsi-language enumerators for Iranians. We were aware of this imbalance during enumerator selection, but because a secondary goal of the project was to build capacity for future surveys by training the largest possible pool of high-quality enumerators, we assessed that it would be preferable to oversample certain nationality-genders rather than discard excess enumerators to ensure gender balance.

Finally, our age distribution largely followed our goal of sampling respondents between the ages of eighteen and sixty, with about half above the age of thirty-five and half below it (see Figure 2).[38]

DEMOGRAPHICS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

Iranian respondents were both wealthier and better educated than their Iraqi counterparts. This difference is representative both of the underlying differences between the two countries, as well as of the different meaning and commitment that the pilgrimage requires for Iranians versus Iraqis. The voyage from Iran is substantially longer and more expensive, and thus requires a higher level of dedication from Iranians than from Iraqis of similar income. Though fundamentally a religious experience, for Iraqi respondents the pilgrimage also has a very strong sectarian dimension, underlying the Sunni-Shia tensions in Iraq, and arguably adding a distinct identity experience. This suggests a potential selection effect on who chooses to go on pilgrimage, with Iranian pilgrims being on average more religious than Iraqis.

Iranian respondents were significantly more educated than Iraqi respondents (see Figure 3). Only 9% of Iranians lacked any formal education, as opposed to 26% of Iraqis. 69% of Iranians across all age groups had completed at least a high school education, as opposed to only 20% of Iraqis. Iranian pilgrims were not only better educated, but also more prosperous than Iraqi pilgrims. Around 65% of Iranian pilgrims stated that their household income covered their expenses, with over 20% stating that they were also able to save. Only 45% of Iraqi respondents stated that their household income covered their expenses. These differences are statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level.

[38] We sampled 7 respondents below the age of eighteen and 72 respondents above the age of sixty. Removing these respondents from our final sample does not affect results.

Figure 3: Education



Less than 50% of Iraqi pilgrims had a job, as opposed to 60% of Iranian pilgrims. This result is primarily driven by lower employment among Iraqis below age 30, who are 10% less likely to have a job than their Iranian counterparts. Less than 4% of Iraqis and Iranians stated that they received any income from remittances at all. These differences are again significant at the $p < 0.01$ level.

Iranians were also wealthier when measured in terms of material possessions. Iranians were more likely to have a computer, smartphone or tablet (64% of Iranians versus 53% of Iraqis). Despite the widespread dissemination of cellphones, 13% of Iraqi pilgrims lacked a cellphone, versus only 5% of Iranians. 73% of Iraqis surveyed did not have a car, as opposed to only 46% of Iranians. The starkest difference was the proportion holding a bank account: Only 5% of Iraqis had bank accounts, as opposed to 75% of Iranians, probably suggesting not just lower likelihood of savings but also lower faith in the Iraqi financial system given years of war. These differences are also significant at the $p < 0.01$ level.

Figure 4: Work, Income, and Possessions



Comparison to other Data Sources

In order to examine how our sample of Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims compares to the population as a whole, we compare our sample to other data sources available in Iran and Iraq. In Iran, we use primarily census data, which is valuable for its completeness.[39] In Iraq, where census data is not available, we compare our sample to the ArabBarometer data and to a World Bank household economic

[39] We are truly grateful to Atiyeh Vahidmanesh from the Virginia Tech Economics Department for her generosity in sharing her cleaned version of the data originating from the Statistical Center of Iran (SCI).

survey to triangulate where our sample falls both in comparison to other samples as well as (indirectly) to the country as a whole.

COMPARISON: IRAN

Figure 5



The age distribution of our sample follows that of the Iranian population very closely, apart from our age cutoffs at 18 and 60 (see Figure 6).

Our average respondent appears to be wealthier than the average Iranian, and is more likely to own a car, with only 42% of census respondents versus 53% of pilgrims owning one. The difference is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level.

Our sample is also better educated than Iran as a whole. Only 8% of our sample has no formal education, compared to 13% of the Iranian sample. 48.2%

Table 1: Iran Comparisons

		Our Sample	2011 Census Data
GENDER	Percent Male	59.60	50.1***
AGE	18-30	36.40	38.6***
	30-49	45.60	38.8***
	50+	15.80	22.7***
EDUCATION	None	8.20	13***
	Primary	9.20	21.6***
	Middle School	11.60	16.5***
	High School	39.80	23.2***
	College and Above	25.80	24.4***
INCOME	Significant Difficulty Meeting Needs	7.00	Unavailable
	Some Difficulty Meeting Needs	23.70	Unavailable
	Covered Expenses and no Notable Difficulty	41.10	Unavailable
	Covered Expenses and Saved	21.30	Unavailable

*t-test p-value of difference with our sample: *0.1 level, **0.05 level, ***0.01 level*

Figure 6: Comparison to Census



of the general population has at least a high school education, compared to 69% of our sample. However, the gap in college education is smaller—24.8% in census data and 27.3% in our sample. All differences are statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. While income is undoubtedly a constraint for Iranian participation, we show that the pilgrimage nevertheless attracts individuals from across the socio-economic spectrum.

COMPARISON: IRAQ

In Iraq, the most recent census was taken in 1997. Given the tremendously destabilizing events that have occurred since then, including large-scale migrations, it is unrealistic to use this as a reference point.[40] We thus compare our sample to other data sources, namely the ArabBarometer Survey and the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS). Neither of these surveys contain sectarian information—which is why we use Shiite COR representation to define our target sampling distribution. We are, however, interested in seeing how our geographically diverse Shiite sample compares to those sampled in other Iraqi surveys, which include Sunnis and Kurds in addition to Shi'a.

The ArabBarometer survey seeks to provide data on political attitudes in the Middle East. The most recent wave occurred in 12 countries in the Middle East: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. We use both the Iraq specific data and the 12-country data as different points of comparison against our sample.

The World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) partners with national statistical offices to design and implement multi-topic household surveys. In 2012, the World Bank implemented a household socio-economic survey in Iraq, which we use as an additional point of comparison.

[40]For the sake of completeness, we offer the comparison to the 1997 data in Appendix B.

Table 2: Iraq Comparisons

		Our Sample	ArabBarometer	World Bank
GENDER	Percent Male	45.90	50.00***	49.6***
AGE	18-30	43.70	45.30**	42.6***
	31-49	42.50	37.90***	40.2***
	50+	14.80	16.80***	17.2**
EDUCATION	None	26.00	8.60***	16.5**
	Primary	30.70	28.10***	52.2***
	Middle School	23.20	26.10***	14.7***
	High School	16.00	23.20***	12.6***
	College and Above	4.00	12.20***	3.9***
INCOME	Significant Difficulty Meeting Needs	16.80	20.30***	Unavailable
	Some Difficulty Meeting Needs	34.60	32.70***	Unavailable
	Covered Expenses and no Notable Difficulty	37.80	34.70***	Unavailable
	Covered Expenses and Saved	10.80	9.70***	Unavailable

*t-test p-value of difference with our sample: *0.1 level, **0.05 level, ***0.01 level*

Figure 7: Comparison to ArabBarometer



Figure 8



The age distribution of our Iraqi sample is similar to that of the ArabBarometer survey, with the exception that we tried to survey people under the age of 60 (see Figure 8).

Our sample is significantly less educated than Iraqi respondents in the ArabBarometer survey (see Figure 7 and Table 2, with 26% of Iraqi pilgrims having no education as compared to 8.6% of ArabBarometer respondents. Pilgrims are much closer to the World Bank survey, where 16% of respondents have no formal education, and 3.9% of respondents have a college education (4% in our sample). However, we have more respondents with at least a middle school education.

Figure 9



Because the ArabBarometer covers twelve countries in the Middle East, we are able to compare our sample to other Middle Eastern nations. ArabBarometer asks a nearly identical question about the sufficiency of income. Despite discrepencies in education, the income level of individuals (as measured by whether income is sufficient to cover needs) was comparable between Iraqi pilgrims and ArabBarometer respondents. Iranian pilgrims were not only wealthier than Iraqi pilgrims and Iraqi ArabBarometer respondents; on average, they were also wealthier than respondents from other Arab countries in the ArabBarometer survey. The average survey respondents across other ArabBarometer countries were slightly poorer than Iraqis from either survey, and significantly poorer than Iranians from the pilgrims survey.

Enumerator Effects

During the training of enumerators, as well as during the survey process, care was taken to ensure that enumerators acted as consistently as possible. The training included a focus on how to deal with and code non-response, as well as optimal approaches to asking sensitive questions.

We also ensured that our enumerators were dressed in a similar professional manner well-suited to the context, as research has shown that respondents are sensitive to enumerator dress in other Middle Eastern contexts (e.g. Blaydes and Gillum 2013). Our female enumerators wore Iraqi abayas, all-enveloping black shrouds that are the norm during the pilgrimage.

Because interviewers were assigned to regional tents, we expected and found systematic variation across enumerators in respondents' region of origin as well as other attributes associated with region, including education, income, and non-response rates.[41] Analyses of average question responses, however, show no statistically significant interviewer effects. Figure 10 shows the average variation in standardized question means across enumerators. No enumerators had averages more than 0.2 standard deviations from the mean, and enumerator-level standard errors indicate that none of these deviations were statistically significant.

We also analyzed the average age, education level, income level, survey duration, and non-response by enumerator. As expected, mean age, education, and income is not consistent across enumerators, as seen in Table B8 and Figure B1 in Appendix B. Reflecting underlying sampling distributions, Iranian enumerators surveyed wealthier and better educated respondents.

We also anticipated that non-response would vary by enumerator, as this was correlated with region surveyed. As detailed in Figure B1 in Appendix B, substantive differences were small, with the largest difference between enumerator average and overall average being four percentage points and the standard deviation of overall enumerator averages being 2.1%. When we analyzed variation in response time by enumerator, 90% of enumerators were within one standard deviation of the enumerator response time mean. When we rerun our results with enumerator fixed effects, we find minimal impact on overall results.[42]

[41] Previous work has shown regional variation in non-response rates. For more, see Jowell et al (2007), Chang and Krosnick (2009), and De Vaus (2013).

[42] We, however, cannot make gender, country, and many regional comparisons when including enumerator fixed effects due to power issues.

Figure 10


Standardized Question Means Across Enumerators
Standardized Question Means
0.5
0.0
−0.5
0
20
40
Enumerator Number
Respondents Surveyed
0
50
100
Country
Iran
Iraq

Consent and Duration

The most common reason for non-consent was that the pilgrims did not have enough time to take the survey and maintain the necessary schedule for the pilgrimage. Iranians were slightly less likely to consent than Iraqis, as they were often traveling in designated groups and were unable to set their own schedule. Non-consent was almost nonexistent among pilgrims who were approached after noon prayer, when they were already stopping for lunch and rest in the mawakib.

Overall consent varied by location. Roughly 15% of Iraqi men in Karbala declined to participate, typically stating that they did not have the requisite time as they needed to return to the shrine. The rejection rate was slightly higher for Iraqi women in Karbala, but less than 20%. In some instances, despite their willingness to participate, their husbands did not allow it because of the length of the survey. These figures are estimated from enumerators' and supervisors' notes, as much of the non-participation was informal and occurred before the recording of consent in the survey. The true nonresponse rate that would have occurred if pilgrims were randomly approached is difficult to gauge, but almost certainly higher, as enumerators approached those who appeared to be available for conversation.

In the Najaf team, roughly 20% of approached Iraqis refused to participate. The most common reason among those declining was that they needed to get back to the walk to keep up with others from their group. Among Iraqis approached in Najaf, women were less likely to decline than men—a non-participation rate of 15%, versus roughly 25% among men—as they would typically take longer stops to rest.

About 20% of Iranian men surveyed by the Farsi team declined to participate, as opposed to 30% of Iranian women. Enumerators found that Iranians were best approached during the break for noon prayer, as they were mostly traveling in designated groups and could not stay behind to complete the survey unless the entire group was resting.

Survey time was an average of 47 minutes with the median being around 35 minutes.[43] When we run our results excluding outliers in survey time, we do not

[43]The average survey time for Iranian men was 45 minutes, and the median was 34 minutes. For Iranian women, the mean was 50 minutes and the median was 33 minutes. For Iraqi men, the mean was 44 minutes and the median was 35 minutes. For Iraqi women, the mean was 49 minutes and the median was 34 minutes.

see any significant changes in our findings.

NON-RESPONSE

Out of the 2410 Iraqi respondents and 1668 Iranian respondents in our data, non-completion was very low, with only 16 respondents answering less than fifty percent of the questions. Among this group, 13 were women and 3 were men and all were from Iran.[44]

However, non-response on individual questions showed significant variation, indicating different sensitive topic areas for Iranians and Iraqis. The mean for question-level non-response for Iranian respondents was 12.9%, with a median of 9.1% and a standard deviation of 11.9%. The mean for Iraqi respondents was 13.8%, with a median of 6.4% and standard deviation of 18% (difference between Iran and Iraq significant at the 0.01 level). Questions with high levels of non-response included those that asked about the opinions of older generations, such as their fathers, on religious, political and gender issues (non-response rate of 34% in Iran and 45% in Iraq); in Iran, questions about democracy and the relationship between government and religion (non-response rate of 25% in Iran and 9.3% in Iraq); and in Iraq, questions that focused on regional politics and Iran's foreign policy involvement (non-response rate of 9% in Iran and 28% in Iraq).

Disaggregating non-response by gender provides additional insight into topical sensitivity in Iran and Iraq. Overall, Iraqi women had the highest average non-response rate, at 7.4%, followed by Iranian women at 6.6%, Iranian men at 5.3%, and finally Iraqi men at 4.9%. Yet once we adjust for national origin, women showed lower rates of non-response than men for questions that dealt with gender (in Iran as well as Iraq) and religion and regional politics (in Iran only).

These gender differences are especially pronounced when disaggregating non-response into specific categories—"don't know" versus "no response". In general, Iranian men were more likely than Iranian women to state that they "don't know." On specific issues, Iraqi women were more likely to state that they "don't know" to questions about democracy, regional politics, and the United States; Iranian women were more likely to state they "don't know" to questions relating to the US.

[44]These individuals left the survey to join their groups, which were gathering to continue on the walk.

While the distinction between these categories is not always observable, enumerators sought to gauge the nature of non-response by either probing directly or making their best assessment. Broadly speaking, a "don't know" outcome is relatively more likely when participants genuinely did not know a response, though it could also be due to sensitivity. A "no response" answer was more likely to reflect sensitivities around the question, when participants wished to avoid discussing it.

As elaborated in Figure 11, men were much more likely to state that they did not know in response to questions about gender. This highlights the role of women in both Iran and Iraq as gatekeepers on gender issues, rather than blind followers of male dogma.

Non-response relating to religion and regional politics follows findings from the rest of the report, which show that Iranian women are often more active than their male counterparts in religious activities, especially educational activities, and thus less likely to state that they "don't know" in response to a religious question. Iranian women also show harder line stances on a range of issues, possibly reflecting less social desirability bias in their responses in addition to genuinely more extreme beliefs. This is demonstrated in lower standardized "no response" rates among Iranian women in questions dealing with regional politics, which were often sensitive and dealt with Iran, ISIS, and ongoing conflict. Iranian female respondents were more extreme on these issues than their male counterparts, and according to this non-response data, less sensitive to potentially divisive questions.

Figure 11


Non−Response:
Gender, Country, and Topic
Iraq
Iran
Democracy
Demographic
DomesticPolitics
Gender
Region
Religion
Sectarianism
US
Standardized Non−Response Rate
All
Don't Know
No Response
Type of Non−Response
Gender
Men
Women

3 MEDIA, NEWS AND SOCIAL TIES

HIGHLIGHTS

- Iranian and Iraqi respondents were asked a variety of questions about how they engaged with current events. Questions focused on where they got their information and with whom they discussed it.
- Over 75% of Iranians and Iraqis got the majority of their information from TV. Friends and family were the second most popular news source, with around 60% of Iranians and Iraqis getting news from friends and family at least a few times a month.
- Iranians tended to get their news from a wider variety of venues than Iraqis, with the third most popular regular news source being the mosque, followed by the internet, newspapers and magazines, and the radio.
- Iranians engaged significantly more than Iraqis with a variety of local community-based activities and civil society organizations. This extended across both religious and secular organizations. Most popular organizations were youth, cultural, and sports organizations, followed by humanitarian organizations, and then family and tribal organizations.
- About half of Iranians and Iraqis got their news from the internet at least a few times a month. Skype, Whatsapp, and Viber were popular online applications in both Iran and Iraq. Iraqis were prolific users of YouTube and Facebook.

News Sources

Figure 12



Television continues to be the most popular news source for both Iranians and Iraqis, with over 90.4% of Iranians and 89.7% of Iraqis getting their news from TV at least a few times a week (difference in overall frequencies between countries significant at the 0.01 level). The second most frequent news source is "friends and family", with around 69.9% of Iraqis and 73.7% of Iranians getting news from word-of-mouth at least a few times a week (difference in overall frequencies between countries not statistically significant).

Iranians, however, are more likely to get their news from more varied sources at least a few times a week, with the mosque being the third most common weekly news source (59.8%), followed by the internet (53.4%), newspapers and magazines (45.1%), and finally the radio (34.1%). The centrality of the mosque as a source of information for many Iranian respondents reflects the continued importance of communal religious practice, not just for religious beliefs, but also for political understanding and action.

Despite the gendered nature of mosque attendence, Iranian women were more likely to get their news from the mosque than were Iranian men, with 37% of Iranian women stating they received their news from the mosque daily, as opposed to only 30% of Iranian men (difference significant at 0.01 level). Similar percentages of Iranian men and women stated they got their news from friends and family regularly, though men were more likely than women to state that

they "Never" got their news from friends and family, at 23% of men and only 14% of women (difference between rates of "never" significant at the 0.01 level). Once controlling for other factors in a regression men were also less likely to get their news from the internet and more likely to get thier news from newspapers and magazines (both significant at the 0.01 levels).

In **IRAN**, once controlling for other factors in the regression, age and education were correlated with different types of news consumption, while income and religiosity held less explanatory power. Older Iranian respondents were more likely to get thier news from the TV, friends and family, and the mosque, and less likely from the internet. More educated respondents were more likely to get their news from the internet and newspapers or magazines (significant at the 0.01 levels).

For **IRAQIS**, "friends and family" or the TV were the predominant sources of news for the majority of respondents. These two primary sources were followed by the internet (48.5%) and the mosque (27.2%), with the radio (8.4%), as well as newspapers and magazines (9.5%), being less popular news sources.

Iraqi women were less likely to get news from friends and family, with 47% of women and 59% of men stating they got news from friends and family "daily" (significant at the 0.01 level). Consistant with their lower attendence levels, Iraqi women were also significantly less likely to get news from the mosque, with only 7% of Iraqi women stating that they got news from the mosque "daily," as opposed to 25% of Iraqi men (significant at the 0.01 level).

In **IRAQ**, once controlling for other factors in the regression, apart from gender, age provided the most explanatory power for choices of news source, with education and income also being correlated with the use of certain news sources. As in Iran, older respondents were increasingly more likely to get their news from the TV and less likely to get news from the internet (both significant at the 0.01 level). Those over fifty were also more likely to regularly use newspapers and magazines (significant at the 0.01 level). More educated respondents were more likely to get their news from the internet (significant at the 0.01 level), while those with a primary and middle school education were more likely than those with no education to get their news from friends and family (significant at the 0.01 level). Wealthier respondents were also more likely to get their news from friends and family (significant at the 0.01 level).

	News Sources (Iran)					
	TV	Radio	Friends or Family	Mosque	Internet	Newspaper or Magazine
Male	−0.036 (0.072)	−0.045 (0.079)	−0.416*** (0.112)	−0.362*** (0.111)	−0.268*** (0.076)	0.434*** (0.082)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.087 (0.168)	−0.179 (0.152)	0.188 (0.215)	0.173 (0.201)	−0.002 (0.157)	0.236 (0.158)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.012 (0.163)	0.076 (0.150)	0.288 (0.206)	0.494** (0.195)	0.119 (0.157)	0.118 (0.153)
Income: Saved	0.077 (0.166)	0.030 (0.162)	0.508** (0.217)	0.863*** (0.208)	0.324* (0.168)	−0.052 (0.167)
Edu: Primary	0.136 (0.167)	0.024 (0.167)	0.399 (0.273)	0.673** (0.266)	0.077 (0.116)	0.005 (0.163)
Edu: Middle School	−0.014 (0.161)	0.055 (0.155)	0.456* (0.240)	0.405* (0.238)	0.267** (0.131)	0.233 (0.160)
Edu: High School	0.015 (0.156)	−0.027 (0.140)	0.125 (0.221)	−0.024 (0.221)	0.361*** (0.119)	0.549*** (0.145)
Edu: College and Above	−0.138 (0.165)	0.080 (0.152)	0.122 (0.237)	0.085 (0.235)	0.515*** (0.132)	0.733*** (0.158)
Age: 30-50	0.222*** (0.076)	0.227** (0.088)	0.202* (0.109)	0.164 (0.110)	−0.376*** (0.082)	−0.012 (0.088)
Age: 50+	0.251** (0.103)	0.116 (0.137)	0.573*** (0.168)	0.796*** (0.163)	−0.370*** (0.112)	−0.055 (0.129)
Religiosity	−0.011 (0.019)	−0.007 (0.022)	0.013 (0.029)	−0.001 (0.029)	−0.004 (0.020)	−0.016 (0.022)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	8.26***	5.77***	7.97***	5.79***	97.57***	28.32***
Observations	1,017	1,017	1,000	1,004	1,017	1,017
R^2	0.383	0.208	0.114	0.162	0.664	0.445
Adjusted R^2	0.354	0.171	0.073	0.123	0.648	0.420
Residual Std. Error	0.956 (df = 971)	1.183 (df = 971)	1.523 (df = 954)	1.495 (df = 958)	1.046 (df = 971)	1.173 (df = 971)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Five Levels: 0 = Never to 4 = Daily

	News Sources (Iraq)					
	TV	Radio	Friends or Family	Mosque	Internet	Newspaper or Magazine
Male	0.126 (0.094)	0.101 (0.077)	0.663*** (0.127)	1.183*** (0.127)	0.241*** (0.076)	0.070 (0.072)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.125 (0.132)	0.053 (0.082)	0.538*** (0.174)	0.256 (0.159)	−0.051 (0.096)	0.002 (0.071)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.060 (0.126)	0.107 (0.085)	0.646*** (0.168)	0.094 (0.147)	−0.093 (0.093)	0.130* (0.075)
Income: Saved	−0.156 (0.178)	−0.044 (0.139)	1.002*** (0.218)	0.184 (0.227)	0.113 (0.149)	0.153 (0.117)
Edu: Primary	0.038 (0.132)	0.039 (0.084)	0.356** (0.170)	−0.035 (0.156)	0.111 (0.086)	0.050 (0.067)
Edu: Middle School	0.108 (0.138)	−0.031 (0.091)	0.376** (0.170)	−0.138 (0.167)	0.126 (0.097)	0.245*** (0.084)
Edu: High School	0.011 (0.154)	0.046 (0.111)	0.304 (0.201)	−0.078 (0.190)	0.324*** (0.120)	0.173* (0.099)
Edu: College and Above	0.111 (0.206)	0.193 (0.270)	0.185 (0.290)	−0.693** (0.303)	0.405** (0.175)	0.840*** (0.238)
Age: 30-50	0.480*** (0.107)	0.226*** (0.082)	0.083 (0.129)	0.194 (0.122)	−0.257*** (0.080)	0.025 (0.067)
Age: 50+	0.574*** (0.130)	0.118 (0.099)	−0.271 (0.181)	0.174 (0.159)	−0.323*** (0.096)	0.229*** (0.086)
Religiosity	−0.045 (0.033)	−0.014 (0.024)	−0.014 (0.043)	−0.066 (0.042)	0.002 (0.026)	−0.026 (0.023)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	8.43***	4.68***	14.16***	13.44***	260.49***	5.45***
Observations	751	751	746	723	751	751
R^2	0.247	0.282	0.195	0.250	0.766	0.235
Adjusted R^2	0.217	0.253	0.163	0.218	0.756	0.205
Residual Std. Error	1.162 (df = 721)	0.907 (df = 721)	1.529 (df = 716)	1.424 (df = 693)	0.894 (df = 721)	0.790 (df = 721)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Five Levels: 0 = Never to 4 = Daily

Figure 13



When asked about their news sources for specific issue areas, TV remained the dominant news source in both Iran and Iraq. As in the overall news results, Iranians got their issue-specific news from more varied sources than Iraqis. Both Iranians and Iraqis stated that the mosque was an important news source for religion. However, the TV remained the dominant news source even in this issue area.

When asked about specific issue areas, **Iranians** stated that the internet was the second most important news source across all issue areas except religion. Religion was associated with the most diverse news sources, with nearly 50% stating that the internet was important.

Iraqis got the majority of their news across issue areas from the TV, followed by friends and family and the internet. Less than 5% of respondents stated they got their news from the radio, newspapers or magazines, or the mosque for any topics except religion.

Figure 14



Online Application Use

Person-to-person communication apps—such as

Skype, Viber, and Whatsapp—were highly popular in both Iran and Iraq, with 54% of Iranians and 49% of Iraqis stating that they use them. For Iraqis, Youtube (22% of Iranians and 56% of Iraqis) and Facebook (24% of Iranians and 52% of Iraqis) were also popular.

IRANIANS were most likely to use Skype, Viber, or Whatsapp (54%) and email (42%). There was a significant gender divide, with men being much more likely than women to use online applications (significant at the 0.01 level). 24% of Iranians stated that they used Facebook, despite government censorship.

IRAQIS were most likely to use Facebook (53%), followed by Skype, Viber, or Whatsapp (49%), then YouTube (43%), and finally email (26%). While there were gender divisions, with men being more likely than women to use most applications (significant at the 0.01 level), the gender gap was smaller in Iraq than in Iran.

.....

ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

I'm now going to read to you a list of types of associations and organizations. Please indicate for each type of organization whether you are member.

Figure 15



Iranians were more likely to be involved in all types of organizations than Iraqis (difference for each organization significant at 0.01 level). 30% of **IRANIANS** were members of humanitarian organizations, about 25% were members of family or tribal organizations, and about 15% were members of cooperative, civil society, and other professional organizations. Over fifty percent of Iranian respondents are members of youth, cultural, and sports organizations, as opposed to only 7% of Iraqi respondents.

About 15% of **IRAQI** respondents are members of humanitarian organizations, and about 10% are members of family or tribal organizations. Union and professional organization membership is virtually non-existent.

With whom do you discuss conflict, domestic politics, and regional politics?

Figure 16



While **IRANIANS** are most likely to discuss any issue with friends or family, about 10% to 20% of respondents on each topic say they also discuss the given topic with their imam, on the internet, or at the mosque. Religion shows the most diversity, as Iranians are more likely to discuss religion at the mosque, rather than directly with their imam.

IRAQIS are most likely to discuss all topics with friends and family, and about 15% discuss on the internet. In contrast to Iranians, virtually no Iraqis discuss conflict or domestic/regional politics at the mosque or with their imam—among the roughly 15% of respondents that discuss contemporary issues in these contexts, discussions are largely limited to religious issues.

News Sources and the Internet: Results from Regressions

Throughout the report, we examine the relationship between information sources and beliefs. Research in the social sciences in a wide variety of contexts has found that information access and sources have a significant effect on individual attitudes on a wide range of topics, from the United States (i.e. Bartels 1993; Valentino et al 2013) to Afghanistan (Lyall et al 2013). We address this claim through the inclusion of covariates for news interest and internet usage in our regression, including an interaction term between the two (see Appendix A for a more detailed discussion). Instead of reporting these findings with the rest of the statistically significant covariates throughout the report, we organize and provide initial interpretations of the findings on internet and news here (full heterogeneity of each question by news source is available Appendix E).

We find that news sources play fundamentally different roles in Iran and Iraq, reflective of the different media environments in the two countries.

In Iran, newspapers and journalists are not free to publish articles that "endanger the Islamic Republic, "offend the Supreme Leader, or "disseminate false information.[45] While the Iranian government engages in a sophisticated internet censorship regime, many Iranians work around these constraints, making the internet the primary source of non-government approved news and communication.

Individuals who choose to access either only traditional news sources or both the internet and traditional news sources in Iran are more likely to state preferences in line with official government policy. Individuals who gain their news primarily from the internet, however, are more likely to have less traditional preferencesindicating that they are possibly getting their news from non-traditional sources on the internet. This plays out across topic areas, including religion, gender and womens issues, democracy and human rights, and national and regional politics. Surprisingly, however, internet usage had less of an impact on attitudes about democracy and sectarianism.

Iraq, on the other hand, does not have official constraints on free media, yet the ongoing violence and conflict inhibit the distribution of information. The government often targets news outlets for being "sectarian or "not neutral, and uses lack of official licensing as an excuse to close news outlets across Iraq.[46] In addition, during the ongoing conflict both pro- and anti-government militias have targeted journalists, making the country a hostile environment for the gathering and dissemination of information.

Among Iraqi respondents, we see a weaker correlation between news sources and attitudes than we do in Iran, and differences between respondents based on their news sources are both substantively smaller and less likely to be statistically significant. In line with the idea of traditional news sources as a source of government-approved information, respondents who got their news only from traditional sources indicated more pro-government views, in addition to slightly more positive attitudes toward United States intervention. Respondents who access

[45] 1986 media law, amended in 2000 and 2009 to include online publications.
[46] Reporters without Borders Iraq country report: *https://rsf.org/en/iraq*

more media types, as proxied by their use of both traditional news sources and the internet, have more cosmopolitan responses, including more friends of other sects, more liberal gender preferences, and less traditional religious views. Unlike Iran, respondents who got their news primarily from the internet were often more conservativeperhaps using the internet to access more sectarian-oriented content online,

Below, we summarize findings based on the regressions found throughout this report.[47] We only report results below that were statistically significant in regressions after controlling for age, gender, income, religiosity, and education at the 0.01 and 0.05 level.

IRAN: INTERNET USERS

On questions of sectarianism, internet usage alone showed little correlation with the questions at hand. In terms of religiosity, Iranians who received their news only from the internet were more likely to embrace non-traditional beliefs by differences as large as thirty percentage points, even after controlling for age, income, and education. Internet users were less likely to believe that emulation was obligatory, that the manuals of practice were important to their everyday life, that political fatwas were binding, that the Marjayiya played an important role in Iraq, or that clerics need manuals of practice and the endorsement of other clerics to practice.

On issues of gender, internet users were more likely to take more liberal stances once controlling for other factors, differences that ranged between ten and twenty percentage points. They were less likely to believe a woman needed her husbands permission to work, more likely to believe that jobs helped women be independent, and more likely to believe a woman should have the same rights as men. They were also suggestively more likely to favor only a headcover and modest dress (the least conservative hijab option) and less likely to favor the Iraqi Abaya or Chador (the most conservative hijab option).

Internet using respondents were significantly less supportive of the current Iranian regime and its foreign policy. Respondents who were internet users were less likely to vote, to believe that the most recent elections were free and fair, that only Khamenei was the proper leader of Iran, that they could criticize the system without fear, differences with non-internet users that ranged from ten to twenty-five percentage points. They were however more likely to want to emigrate. Across the board, they were less likely to want to offer financial assistance to Iranian-supported groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi, the Houthis in Yemen, the opposition in Bahrain, and the Syrian government army) by around ten percentage points. They were also less likely to believe that Irans interventions in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza, Bahrain, and Afghanistan had been positive and to believe that Irans primary policy goal was a stable Middle East. This highlights greater disillusionment among this group with Irans foreign policy as a whole, either resulting from or driving them to alternate online news sources. They were less likely to favor Irans pursuit of nuclear energy, a difference of thirty percentage points with non-internet users, and more likely to incorrectly believe that Khamenei stated that nuclear weapons were Irans right indicating that this group was possibly less reliant on official religious teachings regarding political topics.

[47] These findings are based on a binary variable indicating frequent internet usage, a binary variable indicating news consumption outside the internet, and an interaction term between the two. For a full explanation of regressions, see the Appendix.

Internet users indicated more nuanced beliefs on Iranian-US relations. They were more likely to state the US had a negative role in a variety of conflicts, departing from the average response which was that the US had no effect across conflicts. They were also less likely to see US interactions with Shiite allies, including Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as dishonest and unfair.

Iran: Traditional News Sources

Iranian respondents who received their news from traditional sources, either with or without the internet, were more likely to hold conservative and pro-government views in the realms of religion, gender, national, and regional politics.

Iranians who received some of their news from non-internet sources were more likely to hold absolutist or traditional religious beliefs, with differences between internet and traditional news source users that were as large as thirty percentage points. In the realm of Shiite religious practice, they were more likely to believe that emulation was obligatory, more likely to state that the manuals of practice were very important to them, more likely to pay khoms to and emulate Khamenei, to believe they must obey all fatwas of their source of emulation and that clerics must have manuals of practice and be endorses by other clerics. They were also more likely to accept the union of religion and politics, as they were suggestively more likely to believe that religion should inform government decisions, that democracy contradicts Islam, that a marjahs political fatwas are as binding as his other fatwas, and that the Marjiiyah plays an important role in Iraq.

Respondents who got their news *only* from other sources than the internet were around ten to twenty percentage points more likely to hold conservative gender preferences, though this finding was not statistically significant for all questions. They were statistically significantly more likely to believe that men were better leaders and less likely to believe a woman should have the same rights as men. Respondents who got their news from both the internet and other sources were more likely to believe that a woman needed her husbands permission to work, less likely to believe that a job was the best way for a woman to be an independent person, and less likely to believe a woman should have the same rights as men. The one non-conservative finding was that respondents who both used the internet and other sources were more likely to believe that university was equally important for men and womenperhaps indicating the importance of education across the Iranian ideological spectrum.

Respondents who accessed traditional news sources, with or without the internet, were slightly more likely to have voted in the last election and around twenty five percentage points more likely to believe that the removal of sanctions would have a smaller effect.

Those with access to both the internet and other sourcesour urbanized government-supporterswere about seven percentage points more likely to believe that the most recent elections were free and fair and nearly twenty percentage points more likely to believe they could criticize the system without fear than internet users. They were also more likely to support financial assistance to Hamas and the Syrian government army, as well as more likely to support Irans development of nuclear energy.

Those who accessed only traditional news sources were more likely to hold traditional government preferences and argue that only Khamenei was suitable to lead Iran. These traditional preferences and lack of exposure to outside news sources is highlighted by their greater likelihood to believe that Iran was integrated in the international community and argue

that Iran should strive to achieve economic self-sufficiency over trade.[48] They were also more likely to support financial assistance to Hamas, but surprisingly about twenty five percentage points less likely to favor nuclear weapons than internet users. They were also likely to believe that the US was honest with Iraq, Iran, and Syria, or other traditional Shiite allies.

Responses on sectarianism among respondents who accessed traditional media were more nuanced. They were ten percentage points more likely to favor Sunni-Shia dialogue. Once controlling for other factors, they were also more likely to believe that Sunni-Shia tensions were a big problem, as compared to those who did not access the internet at all.

Iraq: Internet and Other Sources

In Iraq, Respondents who access more media types, as proxied by their use of both traditional news sources and the internet, have more cosmopolitan responses, including more friends of other sects, more liberal gender preferences, and less traditional religious views.

In the realm of sectarianism, Iraqi respondents who use a variety of news sources, including both traditional news sources and the internet are more likely to have Sunni friends, a difference of thirty percentage points with non-internet users, yet simultaneously more likely to argue that Sunnis and Shia have different interpretations of violence in Islam.

Respondents who used the internet as well as other news sources were less likely to support Hashd al Shaabi. They were also around six percentage points less likely to believe that the elections were free and fair.

Iraq: Internet Users Only

Unlike Iran, respondents who got their news primarily from the internet were often more conservativeperhaps using the internet to access more sectarian-oriented content online. This group was more likely to be younger, wealthier, more educated, and male, but regressions that control for these outcomes isolate the correlation with internet usage alone, once controlling for these other possible explanatory factors.

Those who access news primarily through the internet are between five and ten percentage points more likely to believe that clerics need manuals of practice and endorsement and that emulation is obligatory , indicating their overall more conservative preferences in terms of religion.

Those who used primarily the internet were around five percentage points more likely to believe that men make better leaders and more likely to believe that a woman needs her husbands permission to work.

Iraq: Traditional News Sources and the Internet

Iraqi respondents who use both traditional news sources and the internet indicated less conservative religious preferences than solely internet users, with difference around five percentage points. They are less likely to believe that emulation is obligatory, that clerics need

[48]The absolute differences here were small, between three and five percentage points, yet they became statistically significant once controlling for other factors.

manuals of practice and endorsement and that political fatwas are as binding as non-political fatwas.

Iraqi respondents who use both traditional news sources and the internet also indicated more liberal gender preferences by around five percentage points. They were less likely to believe that men make better leaders than women, that a woman needs her husbands permission to work, that a job is the best way for a woman to be independent, and that when a woman works her children suffer.

Iraq: Traditional News Sources

Iraqis who used only traditional news sources tended to have more traditional views, though not across all topics.

They were around seven percentage points less likely to believe that emulation is obligatory and that you must obey all fatwas of a chosen ayatollah or that political fatwas are as binding as non-political fatwas.

Those who accessed the news primarily through non-internet sources were around five percentage points more likely to believe you can sacrifice human rights for, to support US involvement in Iraq, and to support the development of a Kurdish independent state, while less likely to believe that no parties were suitable to lead Iraq.

4 SECTARIANISM

HIGHLIGHTS

- This survey looks at both latent and overt attitudes toward sectarianism among Shi'a in Iran and Iraq, using a combination of experimental and non-experimental questions. Focusing on the attitudes of Shiite pilgrims from both Iran and Iraq allows us to distinguish sectarian attitudes that are shared by Shi'a across national boundaries from other attitudes that are nation-specific. Beyond this, we analyze the role of contact and information sources in shaping individual attitudes toward other sects.
- The majority of Iranians and Iraqis, when asked directly, were supportive of Sunni-Shi'a dialogue (87% and 92% respectively), but thought that Sunnis and Shiites have different interpretations of violence in Islam (67% Iranians, 79% Iraqis). These mixed results indicate a potential sensitivity to the topic and a certain degree of social desirability bias in the Sunni-Shi'a dialogue response. We probe this further through survey experiments.
- Specifically, when asked using conjoint analysis to choose whether or not they would like a Sunni neighbor, they are more likely to exhibit bias against Sunnis (see Conjoint Analysis, Appendix C). This indicates an acceptance of official policies that encourage positive Sunni-Shi'a relations, but also highlights the fact that these official policies often mask underlying personal bias.
- There is a significant gender gap in both countries on the extent of sectarianism. Iranian women hold harder line views than do their male counterparts, whereas this relationship is reversed in Iraq. In general, Iranians are less accepting of Sunnis than Iraqis—despite, or perhaps as a result of, the differing levels of contact between the two groups.

Background

The sectarian differences between Shi'a and Sunni, though primarily defined through theological doctrine, are also manifested in the political, economic and social context, rendering sect as a form of ethnic identity.[49]

Sectarian tensions are understood differently in Iran and Iraq. In Iran, Shi'a are the overwhelming majority and concerns about Sunni extremism are not internal to Iran but mostly related to its neighbors. Yet this does not mean that sectarian concerns are irrelevant. To the contrary, concerns over Wahabism-related Sunni supremacy from Saudi Arabia, or sectarian tensions in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain remain central to Iran's understanding of their place in the world. Since Iran sees itself as the protector of Shi'a Islam, it is directly or indirectly involved in several of these ongoing sectarian conflicts.

Iraqi Shi'a, despite being the largest group in Iraq, have confronted exclusionary state practices since the Ottomans, who promoted their co-sectarian Sunni Iraqis over the Shi'a. These discriminatory practices continued with the British invasion of Iraq that installed Faisal bin Ali al-Hashimi as King of Iraq, a Sunni leader born in Mecca that had served as an Ottoman administrator.[50] Competition and Sunni-Shi'a rivalry continued during Saddam's regime where Baathist ideology, along with increased oil revenues and urbanization, led to the further marginalization of Iraqi Shi'a.

Saddam's removal in 2003 brought Iraqi Shi'a to power, allowing them to openly express their presence and reassert their identity also through the practice of Shiite rituals. This status reversal placed the Shi'a above the Arab Sunnis who had been dominant for decades, creating a grievance narrative that has often turned violent. Specifically, the Sunnis feel they are the victims of outright vengeance, discrimination and persecution at the hands of Iraqi Shi'a, whom they often portray as more Persian than Arab due to their shared sectarian affiliation and allegedly aligned political interests with Iran.

Sectarian violence started soon after the collapse of the Baathist regime, and culminated in 2006-2008, when Sunni and Shi'a militias cleansed entire Baghdad neighborhoods in an effort to create homogenous pockets. Starting in 2009, the sectarian dynamic moved more prominently in the political arena through politics that have been characterized as exclusionary and sectarian.

Sectarian conflict continues today, with ISIS openly targeting Shi'a and the Iraqi government and its armed forces. While ISIS lacks the support of most Sunni Iraqis, it is considered to have some former Baathist elements in its midst, adding further complexity to a sensitive history of sectarian co-existence.

[49] "Sectarianism is not a religion; rather it is a form of tribal belonging to a sect or a particular person. When a sectarian person expresses solidarity [yata'assab] to a sect he does not concern himself with the moral and spiritual principles of that sect. All that concerns him is loyalty to the group and enmity to the other. In other words, he views his sect as a Bedouin views his tribe."Ali Al-Wardi, Lamahat Ijtima'iya min Tarikh al-Iraq al-Hadeeth (Social Aspects from Iraq's Modern History), Second Edition, vol. 2, (Beirut: Dar al-Rashid, 2005), cited in Fanar Haddad (2011). *Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity*. Oxford University Press, p. 25.

[50] The British also largely kept the Ottoman administrative and military apparatus in place. For more on sectarianism in Iraq during the Ottoman Empire, see Ussama Makdisi(2000). *The Culture of Sectarianism*, University of California Press.

Do you support Sunni-Shi'a dialogue to mitigate tensions and sectarian conflict?

The vast majority of individuals support Sunni-Shi'a dialogue.

The vast majority of Iranians and Iraqis state that they support Sunni-Shi'a dialogue to mitigate sectarian tensions (87% and 92% respectively, difference significant at the 0.01 level). This support remains high even among those who stated that that Sunnis and Shi'a have different interpretations of violence in Islam, as well as among those who argue that the majority of Sunnis support ISIS. Mirroring responses to other sectarianism questions, Iranian women—despite indicating overall high levels of support—were relatively less supportive of Sunni-Shi'a dialogue than Iranian men or Iraqi men or women, with 81% of Iranian women supporting Sunni-Shi'a dialogue, followed by 91% of both Iranian and Iraqi men, and 93% of Iraqi women (differences across countries and genders significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively).

Figure 17



	OLS: Sunni-Shi'a Dialogue	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.070*** (0.025)	−0.062** (0.025)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.036 (0.052)	0.012 (0.034)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.050 (0.050)	0.043 (0.031)
Income: Saved	0.015 (0.054)	−0.014 (0.049)
Edu: Primary	−0.055 (0.067)	0.033 (0.034)
Edu: Middle School	−0.017 (0.062)	0.096*** (0.030)
Edu: High School	0.025 (0.058)	−0.005 (0.041)
Edu: College and Above	0.067 (0.060)	0.055 (0.060)
Age: 30-50	0.059** (0.025)	−0.013 (0.026)
Age: 50+	0.078* (0.042)	0.037 (0.030)
Religiosity	0.007 (0.006)	0.002 (0.008)
Internet User	−0.055 (0.045)	0.019 (0.030)
News Interest	0.082** (0.032)	0.051 (0.036)
News Interest*Internet User	0.109*** (0.038)	−0.030 (0.033)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	2.82***	1.67**
Observations	994	744
R^2	0.088	0.050
Adjusted R^2	0.045	0.011
Residual Std. Error	0.329 (df = 948)	0.287 (df = 714)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	
	Analysis with two levels: 0=No, 1=Yes	

IRANIAN respondents between the ages of 18 and 30 were less likely to support Sunni-Shi'a dialogue than those between the ages of 30 and 50 and those older than 50 (83% as opposed to 90% and 88% respectively, differences significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response for this question was 3.7% for men and 7.6% for women.

IRAQI respondents with a middle school education were slightly more likely to support dialogue than those with no education at all (94% vs 89%, difference significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was significantly below average, especially for sectarian questions, at 0.06% for men and 3.1% for women, suggesting possible social desirability bias.

Can a politician from a different sect represent your interests? (Iraq only)

The majority of Iraqis report that a politician from a different sect can accurately represent their interests.

72% of **IRAQIS** stated that a politician from a different sect could accurately reflect their interests. There was a notable gender difference, with 76% of Iraqi women believing that a politician of a different sect could accurately represent their interests, as opposed to 67% of Iraqi men (significant at the 0.01 level).

More educated Iraqis were more likely to believe a politician of a different sect could represent their interests, with only 61% of respondents with no education believing this was the case, as opposed to 83% of those with a college education (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was low, particularly for a sectarianism question, at 0.54% for men and 2.4% for women, hinting at potential social desirability bias.

Figure 18



	OLS: Politician Another Sect Represent Interests (Iraq)
Male	−0.481*** (0.101)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.097 (0.132)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.226* (0.130)
Income: Saved	−0.336* (0.185)
Edu: Primary	0.138 (0.127)
Edu: Middle School	0.091 (0.136)
Edu: High School	0.280* (0.158)
Edu: College and Above	0.815*** (0.256)
Age: 30-50	0.031 (0.105)
Age: 50+	−0.006 (0.137)
Religiosity	−0.024 (0.034)
Internet User	−0.016 (0.131)
News Interest*Internet User	0.027 (0.136)
News Interest	−0.262 (0.211)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	18.33***
Observations	745
R^2	0.092
Adjusted R^2	0.056
Residual Std. Error	1.209 (df = 715)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Analysis with four levels: 0=Disagree to 3=Agree

Do you have friends from the other sect? (Iraq only)

Less than half of Iraqis had friends from the other sect.

Overall, 42% of **IRAQIS** reported having friends from the other sect. Iraqi women were considerably less likely to have cross-sect friends than Iraqi men (31% as compared to 55%, difference significant at the 0.01 level). More educated respondents were more likely to have friends from the other sect, with 22% of those with no formal education reporting so, as compared to 39% of those with a primary education, 41% of those with a middle school education, 46% of those with a high school education, and 69% of those with a college education. Relative to the no-education baseline, all differences are significant at the 0.01 level.

Non-response for this question was extremely low, at 0% for men and 0.01% for women.

Figure 19



	OLS: Friends Other Sects
	(Iraq)
Male	0.219*** (0.037)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.041 (0.048)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.038 (0.047)
Income: Saved	0.046 (0.067)
Edu: Primary	0.176*** (0.046)
Edu: Middle School	0.158*** (0.049)
Edu: High School	0.256*** (0.057)
Edu: College and Above	0.470*** (0.093)
Age: 30-50	−0.057 (0.038)
Age: 50+	0.00002 (0.050)
Religiosity	0.011 (0.012)
Internet User	−0.012 (0.047)
News Interest*Internet User	0.144*** (0.049)
News Interest	−0.091 (0.076)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	18.33***
Observations	747
R^2	0.239
Adjusted R^2	0.209
Residual Std. Error	0.438 (df = 717)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Two levels: 0=No, 1=Yes

Should Sunni and Shi'a Pray Together? (Iraq only)

An overwhelming majority of Iranians and Iraqis support Sunni and Shi'a praying together, regardless of who supports the initiative.

Mayor Prime: "If your mayor supported it..."
Imam Prime: "If your imam supported it..."
Base Question: "Would you support an initiative that brought Shi'a and Sunni together at your mosque to pray side-by-side?"

For this question, we asked respondents whether they would support Sunni and Shi'a praying together, and randomly varied who we stated endorsed this, either stating their mayor endorsed it, their imam endorsed it, or giving no endorsement. Absolute levels of support were extremely high, with around 90% of respondents coming in favor of the initiative regardless of prime. This may partially reflect social desirability bias, since respondents want to be perceived as open-minded and following official religious teaching, which embraces the religious unity of Sunni and Shi'a. These findings contrast with experimental results from conjoint analysis, discussed in detail below, that indicate respondents are biased against Sunni neighbors and potential Sunni spouses.

Figure 20



	OLS: Sunni Shia Pray Together		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prime: Imam	0.022 (0.014)	0.056*** (0.018)	0.046* (0.028)
Prime: Mayor	−0.006 (0.015)	0.024 (0.019)	0.036 (0.029)
Prime Imam * Male		−0.072*** (0.027)	−0.115** (0.045)
Prime Mayor * Male		−0.066** (0.029)	−0.096** (0.046)
Male		0.022 (0.020)	0.014 (0.033)
Income: Some Difficulty			0.017 (0.029)
Income: No Notable Difficulty			0.021 (0.028)
Income: Saved			0.035 (0.037)
Religiosity			−0.003 (0.007)
Edu: Primary			0.022 (0.028)
Edu: Middle School			0.029 (0.028)
Edu: High School			0.051* (0.028)
Edu: College and Above			0.032 (0.042)
Age: 30-50			0.037* (0.022)
Age: 50+			0.043 (0.027)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	28132.93***	2720.48***	1.99**
Observations	2,392	2,392	901
R^2	0.015	0.021	0.030
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.012	0.014
Residual Std. Error	0.276 (df = 2373)	0.275 (df = 2370)	0.275 (df = 885)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
			Two levels: 0 = No, 1 = Yes

Reflecting the overall frustration with authority found in other parts of the survey, **IRAQI** men were more likely to not support the initiative when it was endorsed by either the imam or the mayor. Only 7.6% of men did not endorse given the base prime, but this rose to 9.5% when given the imam prime (significant at the 0.05 level), and even higher to 11.7% given the mayor prime (significant at the 0.05 level). Women were not

significantly sensitive to the mayor prime, but were more likely to support the initiative given the imam prime (7.6% not supporting with imam, versus 10% with base; significant at the 0.01 level without controls). Non-response was extremely low, at 0% for men and 0.03% for women.

In your opinion, how big of a problem are tensions between Sunni and Shi'a in Iraq?

The majority of Iranians and Iraqis see Sunni–Shi'a tensions in Iraq to be a significant problem. This number appears to have increased since the rise of ISIS and the resurgence of sectarian violence in Iraq.

While 48% of both Iranians and Iraqis agreed that Sunni-Shi'a tensions in Iraq are a big problem, 17.5% of Iraqis and 11.5% of Iranians didn't consider them as such. In Iran, older respondents were less concerned about sectarian tensions. In contrast, news interest and internet usage were the strongest predictors of responses in Iraq, with better-informed respondents more likely to see tensions as a problem. As with many sectarian questions, gender functioned differently in Iran and Iraq: Iranian women were more concerned about sectarian tensions than Iranian men, while the reverse was true in Iraq.

Only 41% of **Iranians** over the age of fifty saw sectarian tensions as a big problem, as opposed to 47% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 30 (significant at the 0.05 level). Individuals with primary education were more likely to see Sunni-Shi'a tensions as an issue as compared to those with no education (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response was 11.9% for women and 8.7% for men.

51% of **Iraqi** men saw sectarian tensions as a big problem as opposed to 45% of Iraqi women (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response was notably lower than that of Iranians at 4.3% for women and 0.6% for men.

Figure 21



	OLS: Sunni-Shi'a Tensions	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.326*** (0.075)	0.251*** (0.095)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.169 (0.139)	0.081 (0.123)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.127 (0.136)	−0.112 (0.121)
Income: Saved	0.141 (0.147)	0.061 (0.176)
Edu: Primary	0.402** (0.199)	−0.098 (0.121)
Edu: Middle School	0.183 (0.183)	−0.090 (0.127)
Edu: High School	0.173 (0.171)	0.008 (0.149)
Edu: College and Above	0.034 (0.179)	−0.238 (0.237)
Age: 30-50	−0.023 (0.079)	−0.070 (0.099)
Age: 50+	−0.305** (0.119)	0.012 (0.128)
Religiosity	0.016 (0.021)	0.025 (0.032)
Internet User	0.020 (0.115)	0.099 (0.129)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.038 (0.098)	−0.166 (0.127)
News Interest	0.247** (0.118)	0.235 (0.194)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	2.69***	10.21***
Observations	964	736
R^2	0.083	0.068
Adjusted R^2	0.039	0.030
Residual Std. Error	1.028 (df = 918)	1.122 (df = 706)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0=Not a problem to 3=Big Problem

Do Sunni and Shi'a have different interpretations of violence in Islam?

Most respondents argue that Sunni and Shi'a have very different interpretations of violence in Islam.

Whether or not Sunni and Shi'a have different interpretations of violence is a recurring debate in which parties from both sects seek to place the blame for regional violence on the other group. While the majority of Iranians and Iraqis argue that Sunni and Shi'a have very different interpretations of violence in Islam, the numbers were significantly lower among Iranians (67%) than Iraqis (79%). Three factors drove this view among Iranians: lower-income respondents, those interested in news, and internet users were more likely to endorse this belief. Meanwhile, among Iraqis, better-educated respondents were less likely to associate views on violence with sect.

Around 70% of middle income **IRANIANS** stated that Sunni and Shi'a had different interpretations of violence in Islam (significant at the 0.01 level), as opposed to 57% of the poorest respondents and 60% of the wealthiest respondents. Non-response was 3.9% for Iranian men and 7.6% for Iranian women.

Among **IRAQIS**, 67% of respondents with a college education stated that Sunni and Shi'a had different interpretations of violence in Islam, as opposed to 79% with no education (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response for Iraqi respondents was extremely high for men and women, at 50% for men and 53% for women, highlighting the high sensitivity of this topic for Iraqis. There are no correlations between non-response and education, age, or income.

Figure 22



	OLS: Violence in Islam	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.032 (0.034)	−0.079 (0.054)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.188*** (0.064)	0.101 (0.073)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.177*** (0.062)	0.111 (0.069)
Income: Saved	0.086 (0.068)	0.148 (0.106)
Edu: Primary	−0.015 (0.079)	−0.004 (0.062)
Edu: Middle School	−0.071 (0.074)	−0.067 (0.066)
Edu: High School	0.025 (0.066)	−0.140* (0.080)
Edu: College and Above	0.011 (0.069)	−0.334** (0.155)
Age: 30-50	−0.011 (0.034)	0.088* (0.052)
Age: 50+	0.044 (0.051)	0.053 (0.066)
Religiosity	−0.010 (0.009)	−0.001 (0.017)
Internet User	−0.033 (0.050)	0.087 (0.068)
News Interest*Internet User	0.008 (0.045)	0.136** (0.068)
News Interest	0.094* (0.049)	0.018 (0.116)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	9.55***	3.83***
Observations	997	353
R^2	0.091	0.083
Adjusted R^2	0.048	0.003
Residual Std. Error	0.452 (df = 951)	0.415 (df = 324)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Two levels: 0=Similar to 1=Different	

How many Sunnis support ISIS?

Iraqis are more likely than Iranians to think that "most" Sunnis support ISIS.

There is more variation among responses to the question of Sunni support for ISIS than to other questions on sectarianism, highlighting the contentious and current nature of the topic. While 37% of Iraqis stated that most Sunnis supported ISIS, only 22% of Iranians stated the same (difference significant at the 0.01 level), indicative of the different levels of sectarian contact across the two countries.

Unlike other sectarian questions, the views of Iraqi women and men were in agreement: relative to Iranians of the same gender, Iraqis were more likely to state that "most" Sunnis supported ISIS". Gender and age were correlated with responses for Iranians, while gender, income, education, and news and internet usage predicted responses for Iraqis.

21% of **IRANIAN** men and 23% of Iranian women stated that most Sunnis supported ISIS (significant at the 0.05 level). Younger Iranian respondents were more likely to espouse this belief: Only 20% of individuals over the age of 50 stated that most Sunnis supported ISIS, as opposed to 26% of those aged 18–30 (significant at the 0.01 level). In Iran, non-response for this question was high, at 24% for women and 17% for men, suggesting the sensitive nature of this question.

IRAQIS were far more likely to link Sunnis to ISIS. 41% of men stated that most Sunnis supported ISIS, as opposed to only 32% of women, a substantively as well as statistically significant gap (at the 0.01 level). These

Figure 23



	OLS: Sunnis Support IS	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.157** (0.063)	0.351*** (0.072)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.011 (0.113)	−0.099 (0.091)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.034 (0.106)	−0.236*** (0.089)
Income: Saved	−0.049 (0.117)	−0.214* (0.123)
Edu: Primary	−0.272* (0.148)	−0.009 (0.087)
Edu: Middle School	−0.088 (0.146)	−0.202** (0.093)
Edu: High School	−0.088 (0.136)	−0.140 (0.110)
Edu: College and Above	−0.185 (0.143)	−0.497*** (0.179)
Age: 30-50	−0.068 (0.063)	−0.130* (0.072)
Age: 50+	−0.256*** (0.096)	−0.044 (0.096)
Religiosity	0.010 (0.016)	0.018 (0.023)
Internet User	0.089 (0.096)	0.075 (0.089)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.102 (0.084)	−0.081 (0.093)
News Interest	−0.014 (0.092)	0.163 (0.149)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	3.01***	3.59***
Observations	873	704
R^2	0.059	0.116
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.078
Residual Std. Error	0.778 (df = 827)	0.803 (df = 674)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Three levels: 0=Small Minority to 2=Most

views varied substantially with socioeconomic class. Nearly half (46%) of those experiencing severe financial difficulty stated that most Sunnis supported ISIS. This dropped to 39% of those with "some difficulty", 33% of those who with "no notable difficulty" (significant at the 0.01 level), and 30% of those who were able to save (significant at the 0.1 level). Education showed similar variation—while 44% of respondents with no formal education stated that most Sunni supported ISIS, only 38% of those with a middle school education argued this was the case (significant at the 0.05 level), and 21% of those with a college education or above (significant at the 0.01 level). In Iraq, non-response for this question was 4.8% for men and 12% for women.

Trials or Summary Executions for ISIS Collaborators?

Experimental evidence indicates that individuals do not vary their preferences for access to the justice system between Sunni and Shia victims.

> **In the area around Mosul, the Islamic State killed several [VICTIM] who were not willing to collaborate with them. Recently, the [CAPTURER] captured the area and arrested men who they suspect participated in these killings. [ENDORSER] say that these people should be tried by a tribunal in Baghdad. What do you think?**

In order to analyze whether or not individuals supported the rule of law in the ongoing conflict against ISIS, respondents were asked to respond to a scenario that had them decide whether an alleged war criminal should be tried by a tribunal or be summarily executed. We randomly varied whether (1) the victim of the crime was Sunni or Shi'a; (2) if the authority endorsing trial over execution was a member of the Iraqi government, a Shi'a politician, a Shi'a religious leader, a Sunni politician, or a Sunni religious leader; and (3) whether the capturer was the Iraqi army alone or the army with Iranian support. We find that respondents had no statistically significant difference in support for the tribunal in response to experimental manipulation of the endorser, victim, or capturer. Overall, both Iranians and Iraqis supported the tribunal over the summary execution, irrespective of the victims' sect.

Iranian men were more likely to believe that the killer should have access to a trial, with 55% of Iranian men supporting the tribunal as opposed to 45% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response in Iran was near average, at 9.9% for women and 7.7% for men.

Figure 24



	OLS Experiment: Execute without Trial	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Capturer: The Iraqi Army	−0.023 (0.026)	−0.005 (0.021)
Endorser: Shia politicians		0.007 (0.037)
Endorser: Shia religious leaders		0.038 (0.037)
Endorser: Sunni politicians		0.011 (0.037)
Endorser: Sunni religious leaders	−0.018 (0.026)	0.046 (0.032)
Victim: Sunnis	−0.038 (0.026)	0.005 (0.021)
Constant	1.604*** (0.025)	1.533*** (0.030)
F Statistic	0.37	1.95
Observations	1,470	2,182
R^2	0.002	0.002
Adjusted R^2	0.0003	−0.001
Residual Std. Error	0.496 (df = 1466)	0.497 (df = 2175)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

	OLS: Trial versus Tribunal	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.179*** (0.035)	0.029 (0.040)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.061 (0.064)	−0.073 (0.053)
Income: No Notable Difficulties	−0.090 (0.062)	−0.023 (0.052)
Income: Saved	−0.087 (0.067)	−0.091 (0.074)
Edu: Primary	−0.090 (0.085)	0.109** (0.051)
Eddu: Middle School	−0.061 (0.078)	0.101* (0.054)
Edu: High School	−0.031 (0.072)	0.141** (0.063)
Edu: College and Above	−0.048 (0.075)	0.198* (0.103)
Age: 30-50	0.067* (0.036)	−0.035 (0.042)
Age: 50+	0.089 (0.055)	−0.027 (0.055)
Religiosity:	0.009 (0.009)	−0.004 (0.013)
News Interest	0.108*** (0.036)	−0.035 (0.050)
Internet User	0.018 (0.073)	0.008 (0.078)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.047 (0.040)	0.018 (0.057)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	733	983
R^2	0.084	0.104
Adjusted R^2	0.046	0.061
Residual Std. Error	0.478 (df = 703)	0.481 (df = 937)
F Statistic	2.230*** (df = 29; 703)	2.427*** (df = 45; 937)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Two levels: 0=Executed to 1=Tribunal

More educated **IRAQI** respondents were more likely to believe that a killer should have access to a tribunal, with 7.4% of respondents with no education favoring a trial (base), followed by 8.2% of respondents with a primary education (significant at the 0.05 level), 12.1% of respondents with a middle school education (significant at the 0.1 level), 45% of respondents with a high school education (significant at the 0.05 level), and 27.3% of respondents with a college education (significant at the 0.1 level). Non-response for Iraqi respondents was below average, at 1.7% for men and 5.5% for women.

Conjoint Analysis

Conjoint analysis is a method to ascertain ranked preferences of individuals, through having people make a series of choices between realistic trade-offs (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014).

As a way to probe further into latent attitudes towards sectarianism, we use conjoint analysis to analyze individuals' preferences regarding their neighbors, daughter-in-laws, and politicians. Individuals are faced with a series of choices between two candidate neighbors, potential spouses for their son, or politicians (see example below). They are given information on a few attributes of those individuals, such as religiosity, or political experience. The attributes that each politician has are *randomly varied*. Asking a respondent to rank their preferences for all combinations of attributes would be impossible, so by giving a respondent a limited number of examples with randomly assigned attributes allows us to aggregate the results from all respondents and come up with the expected change in probability of choosing one of the two individuals that a specific characteristic provides.

Figure 25

	Politician 1	**Politician 2**
Religiosity:	moderate religious beliefs	moderate religious beliefs
Experience:	newly elected politican	has been a politician for 20 years
Trade policy:	increase trade with Russia	increase trade with China
Security policy:	deepen security ties with China	deepen security ties with China

This analysis is especially useful when trying to disaggregate potential roots of preferences. For our purposes, asking about race, sect, socioeconomic status and morality, for example, allows us to test whether sect is important independent of the implications it might have about race, socioeconomic status, or morality.

We asked three questions concerning respondents' preferences about the attributes of their neighbors, their son's wife, and regional politicians. For neighbors, we analyzed people's preferences based on neighbor's moral habits, employment, race, and sect; for the son's wife, we analyzed preferences based on the wife's religiosity, education, former marital status, race, sect, and wealth. For politicians, we asked about preferences based on the politician's religiosity, experience, security ties, and trade policies (see an example of the latter in the figure above).[51]

[51] The options for each of the attributes can be found in the appendix.

Because a key element of any strong experimental analysis is to make the situation as realistic as possible, we were limited in what we could ask Iranians about sect—since the likelihood of them having a Sunni or Kurdish neighbor or potential daughter-in-law were limited. Thus, questions about potential neighbors and sons' spouses were only shown to Iraqis, whereas both Iranians and Iraqis received conjoint questions about politicians.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Personal Relations: Neighbors and Potential Partners

Asking about personal acquaintances, we find that sect has overwhelming importance. Among Iraqis, only alcoholism was viewed more negatively (as a neighbor's trait) than non-Shiite identity, with respondents 20% more likely to choose a proposed neighbor who was Shi'a rather than Sunni and 30% more likely to choose a proposed spouse who was Shi'a, regardless of other attributes. Sectarian identity was even more important than devoutness or race, with both corresponding to a 20% increase in preferences for wives and 10% increase in preferences for neighbors (race only). This highlights the fact that the importance of sect goes beyond these traditionally prominent considerations.

Education, wealth, and employment, all signs of socioeconomic status, are not viewed as important as sect, race, and religiosity. Respondents preferred an educated wife by only 7%, and a wealthy wife by only 3%; there was virtually no effect of a neighbor's employment. This indicates that external social status is seen as less important than remaining within kin groups.

Specifically, when asking Iraqi respondents about attribute preferences for **neighbors**, we found that individuals were most concerned about a neighbor's habit of alcoholism, which has both moral and practical implications. This was followed by preferences for Shi'a neighbors, then Arabs (over Kurds), and finally job preferences, which had little influence of expected outcomes. Women saw alcoholism as a more severe negative factor. Women showed no statistically significant preference for Sunnis over Christians, but men were 7% more likely to choose a Christian neighbor over a Sunni neighbor—possibly because men have been more directly threatened by the sectarian fighting plaguing Iraq. A detailed description of these findings can be found in Appendix C.

When asking Iraqi respondents about their preferences for their **son's wife**, we found that respondents were most concerned about the wife's sect, followed by religiosity, marital history, race, wealth, and education. Shi'a spouses were preferred, as expected. Yet in contrast to their neighbor preferences, respondents chose Sunnis over Christians for their son's potential spouse. For racial preferences, individuals preferred Iraqi Arabs and Kurds over Iranians, despite their high support for Iranian regional involvement indicated in other parts of the survey. Race was more important for women than for men, with women preferring Iraqi Arabs by about 20% over Iranians and about 10% over Kurds, and similar preferences among men (16% and 13%, respectively).

Political Preferences: Regional Politicians

While religiosity was found to be an important character trait on a personal level, in contrast, it was seen as the least important attribute for a politician, with Iraqis showing a 10% preference for new politicians. This mirrors findings on other questions in this survey that discuss the role

of religion in the state—even among this religious group, there is a complicated and nuanced relationship between religiosity and the state. In fact, Iranian and Iraqi respondents indicated a slight preference for moderate over conservative politicians.

Signaling the primacy of security concerns in the region, Iranian and Iraqi respondents prioritized a politician's security policies, followed by trade policies, experience, and finally religiosity. We asked about potential security and trade alliances with four regional and global super powers: China, Russia, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. Iraqi and Iranian respondents demonstrated deep antipathy toward Saudi Arabia, the traditional Shiite enemy, on issues of both trade and security, with a 25% decrease in probability of support for a politician that supported ties with Saudi Arabia compared to the United States. Russia and China were both preferred to the US for trade and security, by 20% and 10% respectively. However, the US' regional involvement was viewed more negatively for security issues in comparison to Russia and China than for trade issues, with respondents probability of preferring China by only 10% and Russia by 16%, likely a result of the instability wracking the region in the years after the US intervention.

Overall non-response for Iraqis throughout the conjoint questions was 8.7% among women and 3.7% among men. For Iranians, non-response was lower, at 5.7% for women and 2.1% for men.

5 RELIGION

HIGHLIGHTS

- Shi'a in Iran and Iraq exist in very different social and political spaces.[52] In Iran, official state practice is dominated by religious dogma, whereas in Iraq, Shi'a have experienced over a decade of shifting power structures.
- The vast majority of respondents were very religious and held conservative religious views. 99% of respondents prayed daily, about 65% read the Quran or Du'aa daily,[53] 80% listened to religious programs at least once a week, and about 70% of respondents attended mosque at least once a week.
- Iranians engage in more communal religious practices, with religious Iranian women being significantly more engaged than their Iraqi counterparts.
- Emulation, the practice of following the rules and practices interpreted by a certain Grand Ayatollah in spiritual and religious matters, constitutes an important part of Shiite religious practice. The vast majority of Iranians stated that they emulate Sayyed Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, while the vast majority of Iraqis stated that they emulate Sayyed Ali al-Sistani, a renowned and moderate Shiite cleric. Iranians were more likely to allow for alternate sources of emulation than Iraqis.
- Respondents showed significant variation in their answers to questions about religion and the state. While Iranians favored more religious involvement than Iraqis, both groups showed responses to these questions that did not break down across traditional boundaries of socioeconomic status, education, or age.

[52] While precise numbers are difficult to uncover, recent studies have noted that over 99% of Iranians classify themselves as Shi'a, whereas only 51% of Iraqis do so. *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, Pew Research Center, October 2009.

[53] Du'aa refers to prayer books that contain collections of prayers of the Prophet, imams, scholars, or sages.

Religious Practice

Figure 26



While we would expect all pilgrims to exhibit a certain level of religiosity, detailed questions on religious practice allow us to uncover the variation that exists within Shiite pilgrims from Iran and Iraq.

Among respondents, the most common form of religious practice is daily prayer, followed by reading the Quran or Du'aa, then listening to religious programs, and attending mosque. 99% of sample respondents pray daily. About 65% of respondents read the Quran or Du'aa daily. About 80% of respondents listen to religious programs at least once a week, and about 70% of respondents attend mosque at least once a week. The least common form of religious practice is attending religious lessons, which only about 30% of respondents attend at least once a week. Yet there is significant variation in religious practice between countries and across gender.

In general, the Iranian respondents appear to engage in significantly more communal religious practice, while Iraqis are more likely to engage in the solitary religious practices of reading the Quran or Dua and listening to religious programs. Iranians are more likely to attend mosque, Friday prayer, and religious lessons with more frequency. The Iraqi respondents show a bimodal tendancy. About thirty percent of Iraqi male respondents say they "never" attend

Friday prayer, and fifty percent "never" attend religious lessons, indicating that a portion of the Iraqi sample might be less religious than might be assumed from their going on the pilgrimage. This is likely due to the cultural and identity aspects associated with the Arba'een pilgrimage for Iraqis, as well as the lower opportunity cost of attendance for those who live nearby.

In Iran, income stability appears to be positively associated with religious practice. Wealthier individuals are more likely to attend religious lessons daily (35% lowest income stability versus 58% highest income stability, significant at the 0.01 level), attend Friday prayer (never attend: 27% lowest income stability versus 19% highest, significant at the 0.05 level), read the Quran or Du'aa daily (46% lowest versus 62% highest, significant at the 0.01 level), pray daily (88% lowest income versus 95% highest income, significant at the 0.05 level), and watch religious programs (30% lowest versus 15% highest, significant at the 0.01 level).

In both Iran and Iraq, older respondents are increasingly more likely to engage in regular religious practice. This mirrors increasing religiosity in older respondents found in other religions and regional contexts (e.g. Argue et al 1999 and Norris & Inglehart 2011). Younger Iranians are less likely to engage in Friday prayer (25% of those aged 18–30 never attend, versus 9% of those aged 50+, significant at the 0.01 level), attend religious lessons (23% versus 12%, significant at the 0.01 level), pray daily (94% those aged 18–30 versus 99% of those aged 50+, significant at the 0.05 level), and read the Quran or Du'aa daily (56% versus 79%, significant at the 0.01 level). Younger Iraqis are also less likely to attend Friday prayer (51% vs 41% never attend, significant at the 0.01 level), pray daily (96% versus 100%, significant at the 0.05 level), and read the Quran or Du'aa (57% versus 75%, significant at the 0.01 level).

.....

Gender, Nation, Practice

Shiite religious practice has an obviously gendered component. Women are not required to attend communal prayer, and many mosques do not have a place for women to attend. In general, Iranians were much more likely to engage in communal religious practice than Iraqis—reflecting an overall cultural propensity toward communal behavior, as captured in other questions. However, Iranian women were more likely to engage in communal religious practice than Iranian men, despite the gendered nature of that practice, whereas Iraqi women were less likely to engage in communal religious practice than Iraqi men. This may also be related to an underlying selection effect associated with Iranian women on pilgrimage: only the more devout among them make the pilgrimage, and there is a lower threshold to go on pilgrimage for Iranian men than for Iranian women. This may also be in part driven by socioeconomic factors.

Iranian women in our sample are less likely to state that they never attend Friday prayer, with only 9% stating this is the case, as opposed to 27% for Iranian men. Iraqi women, however, were much less likely to attend Friday prayer, with 68% stating they never attended, as opposed to only 29% of Iraqi men (all differences significant at the 0.01 level). Religious lessons, another form of communal religious practice, are also more common in Iran—where only 20% of respondents never attend religious lessons—than in Iraq, where 57% never attend religious lessons (significant at the 0.01 level). While the gender gap was less pronounced, Iranian women were still less likely to never attend religious lessons than Iranian men (16%

versus 22% respectively, significant at the 0.01 level), with the relationship reversed for Iraqi women and men (63% versus 51%, respectively, significant at the 0.01 level).

In non-communal religious practice, Iraqi and Iranian women outperformed their male counterparts. While men and women in both countries were equally likely to pray daily, women were more likely to watch religious programs and read the Koran or Du'aa, despite gendered disparities in literacy. Specifically, 55% of Iranian women watched religious programs daily, as opposed to 42% of Iranian men. 50% of Iraqi women watched the programs daily, versus 40% of Iraqi men. 68% of Iranian women read the Koran or Du'aa daily, as opposed to 60% of Iranian men. 69% of Iraqi women read the Quran or Du'aa daily, as opposed to 58% of Iraqi men (all differences significant at the 0.01 level).

While non-response for women was higher, as throughout the rest of the survey, the gap between male and female non-response was less significant than in other portions of the survey, highlighting the comfort that male and female respondents felt in discussing their religiosity during this religious event. For Iranian respondents, non-response ranged between 2.1% and 2.7% for men and 4.1% to 5.3% for women. For Iraqi respondents, non-response ranged between 0.3% and 0.5% for men and 1.3% to 1.9% for women.

Travel to Other Pilgrimage Sites

The majority of pilgrims had traveled to other pilgrimage sites before, with most having visited pilgrimage sites close to their region of origin. Only a small number of respondents had gone on the Hajj.

IRAQI AND IRANIAN respondents were most likely to have traveled to pilgrimage sites within their respective countries, highlighting the importance of pilgrimage as a shared religious experience.

96% of **IRAQI** respondents had travelled to Karbala before, with the largest majority having visited for Arba'een. Yet 80% had also visited on other holidays, including 62% for Sha'abaniya and 40% for Ashoura. They were most likely to have gone on other pilgrimages to Imam shrines in Iraq, including Baghdad's neighborhood of Kadhimiya (81%), as well as to the Iraqi cities of Najaf (96%), and Samarra (60%). Roughly 30% of Iraqi respondents had also visited pilgrimage sites in Iran, such as Masshad and Qom.

IRANIANS were much less likely to have visited Karbala before, with 50% having traveled for Arba'een, 26% on other holidays, 10% for Ashoura, and only 5% for Sha'abaniya. They were much more likely to have visited other pilgrimage sites located in Iran, such as Mashhad (83%) and Qom (83%), and notably less likely to have visited more distant pilgrimage sites.

Figure 27



Indeed, despite its importance in Islam, only 4% of Iraqis and 13% of Iranians had gone on the Hajj. This further underscores the importance of pilgrimage sites like Karbala for observant Shi'a in Iran and Iraq.

Non-response for these questions was near average, ranging between 8.4% and 13.5% for Iranian women, 4.3% to 6.5% for Iranian men, 1.5% to 2.3% for Iraqi women, and 0.9% to 3.2% for Iraqi men.

Figure 28



The most common reason for attending the pilgrimage was out of religious duty (40–45% of Iranian and Iraqi respondents). Iranian women were more likely to attend for other reasons (significant at the 0.01 level), primarily to thank the Imam (19%) and because they enjoyed the religious ceremonies (35%). Non-response was low, at 2% for Iranian men, 4.5% for Iranian women, 0.2% for Iraqi men, and 0.7% for Iraqi women.

Many respondents traveled with their family, though this was much more common in Iraq (80%) than in Iran (47%, difference significant at the 0.01 level). Iranians were more likely to travel with their friends (40%) than were Iraqis (35%, difference significant at the 0.05 level). Pilgrims traveling with family and friends from Iran were more often than not part of a larger travel group; these responses are recorded as "family" or "friends". The responses for those traveling as individuals within a larger travel group are coded as "travel group".

EMULATION

HIGHLIGHTS

- Responses indicate that emulation, the practice of following the rules and practices as interpreted by a certain Grand Ayatollah in spiritual and religious matters, continues to be a salient part of religious and political life in Iran and Iraq.
- Most Iranians stated that they emulated the Supreme Leader Sayed Ali Khamenei (60.4% of Iranians), and most Iraqis stated that they emulated Sayed Ali al-Sistani (80.3% of Iraqis).

BACKGROUND

Shi'a doctrine includes the concept of resolving questions through independent judgment known as *ijtihad*.[54] Typical Shiite believers do not have the requisite training to carry out *ijtihad* on their own, so they turn to a learned religious scholar (marjah) to seek guidance through practicing emulation (*taqlid*) of the marjah. Each marjah has a collection of rulings on an array of everyday matters known as *risalah*. Whom one chooses to emulate is considered to be a very personal decision that has been linked to nationality, education, age and other social and political factors.[55]

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Said al-Hakim, Grand Ayatollah Bashir Hussein al-Najafi, and Grand Ayatollah Ishaq al-Fayyad are the top four Shi'a scholars that constitute the supreme religious authority in Iraq, known as the marji'iyyah. Their fatwas are very influential in providing answers and guidance to their Shi'a followers.[56] They are all associated with Hawza al-Ilmiya, the Islamic seminary in Najaf, which is the leading Iraqi religious institution in Iraq, comparable to Qom in Iran.[57] The seminary is a very decentralized institution with over 20 distinct schools, each supported by a senior cleric who is respected for his religious knowledge. Financially, it does not have a formal budget, but rather runs on religious tithes (known as *khoms*) and on donations.[58]

There is no actual data on the size of followings for the different marjah. However, Ayatollah Sistani is considered to collect the most religious tithes from followers than any other marjah

[54] Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai. *Shiite Islam*, translated by S. H. Nasr (1975). State University of New York Press, pp. 11-12. Also cited in Augustus Richard Norton, "Al-Najaf: Its Resurgence as a Religious and University Center," *Middle East Policy Council*, Spring 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 1.

[55] "I know Shi'a families in Lebanon where the husband is a muqallid (or follower) of one ayatollah, while the wife follows a different marji, and the teenage children may follow yet another." Quote from: Augustus Richard Norton, "Al-Najaf: Its Resurgence as a Religious and University Center," *Middle East Policy Council*, Spring 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 1.

[56] For more see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Al-Najaf: Its Resurgence as a Religious And University Center," *Middle East Policy Council*, Spring 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 1.

[57] Hawzah generally refers to a religious school but in the context of Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran it refers to seminaries that are considered university level.

[58] Nakash, Yitzhak. *The Shiis of Iraq*. New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1994, pp.242-254; Augustus Richard Norton, "Al-Najaf: Its Resurgence as a Religious and University Center," *Middle East Policy Council*, Spring 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 1.

in Iraq, a clear measure of his popularity.[59] As such, he is the first among equals in the Najaf seminary.[60] In Iran, existing qualitative accounts indicate that Supreme leader Ali Khamenei maintains the largest following.

During the US invasion of Iraq, the political influence of these scholars become evident. Proponents of the US invasion underestimated the degree of religiosity among the Shi'a and the influence of their religious scholars. Sistani's influence in particular became evident in several instances including his fatwa calling for a general election in June 2003 and the one on the formation of popular mobilization forces against ISIS in June 2014.

The marji'iyyah accept theocracy in Iran, where religion and politics are fused, however, they do not support the institution of the Supreme Leader as a model of governance for Iraq.[61] Rather, they wield political power by serving as advisors to politicians and by offering guidance on the interpretation of the law.[62] Grand ayatollahs may stay above party politics, but other senior clerics in Iraq often become directly involved. Despite their institutional ties, clerics do not always share a consistent rhetoric. There are many different voices among them with differential influence on the underlying political dynamics. Thus, despite the absence of Iranian-style theocracy, the question of separation of powers remains a salient issue in contemporary Iraq.

In the context of the pilgrimage, the marji'iyyah is a state within a state. Law 19 on the "Administration of the Holy Shrines and the Noble Shiite Pilgrimage Sites Law" (passed in 2005) appoints directors for Iraq's shrines, approved by the marji'iyyah.[63] These directors maintain close control of the pilgrimage, issuing instructions on ritual as well as on safety, hygiene and security.[64] Since the pilgrimage was reinstated after the fall of Saddam in 2003, there has been an increase in Iranian influence on Iraq, as well as increased traction of Iraqi clerics over Iranian pilgrims, highlighting the power of the pilgrimage as a method for encouraging Shiite unity.

[59] Ali Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (Yale University Press, 2007), p. 311.
[60] For more see: Nathaniel Rabkin, "The Iraqi Shiite Challenge to Tehran's Mullahs," *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2014, Volume 21: Number 1.
[61] Mehdi Khalaji, "The Iranian Clergy's Silence," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, July 12, 2010.
[62] Fore more see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Al-Najaf: Its Resurgence as a Religious and University Center," *Middle East Policy Council*, Spring 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 1.
[63] Law 19, art. 4, Iraq Local Governance Law Library, 2005.
[64] For more see: Nathaniel Rabkin, "The Iraqi Shiite Challenge to Tehran's Mullahs," *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2014, Volume 21: Number 1.

Sources of Emulation

The vast majority of individuals stated that they emulated and paid their khoms (Shi'a religious tithe) to Sistani (Iraq) or Khamenei (Iran).

Figure 29



60% of Iranians stated that they emulate Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, with 20% emulating Shirazi and another 15% emulating Sistani. In contrast, 80% of Iraqis state that they emulate Sistani, with a small minority emulating Sadr. Khoms payments lined up almost exactly with individual sources of emulation.

Emulation of Khamenei, almost entirely among Iranians, was consistent across income and age. Men were slightly less likely to state that they emulated Khamenei than were women (41% men versus 42% women, significant 0.01 level). Once controlling for other factors, respondents with an elementary education were slightly more likely to emulate Khamenei than those with no education (significant 0.05 level).

80% of Iraqis and 15% of Iranians emulated Sistani. Among Iraqis, support for Sistani was consistent across genders, income, education, and religiosity. The greatest heterogeneity was based on age, with 79% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 30 supporting Sistani, as opposed to 87% of those over the age of fifty (significant at the 0.05 level).

While emulation of Sistani was less universal in Iran, he was the third most emulated Ayatollah after Khamenei, and very close to the second, Ayatollah Shirazi. Iranian women were suggestively more likely to emulate Sistani (significant only at the 0.1 level) and also more likely to pay khoms (significant , as were both elementary and college educated respondents (also significant only at the 0.1 level).

22% of Iranian respondents paid their khoms to Khamenei, with 11% paying to Sistani and 9% to Shirazi. 46% of Iraqis paid their khoms to Sistani, with only 4% paying khoms to Sadr. In Iran, wealthier, more educated, and older respondents were more likely to pay khoms to Khamenei (significant at the 0.01 level). In Iraq, the wealthiest respondents were also more likely to pay khoms than the poorest (significant at the 0.01 level). Middle aged respondents in Iraq were also more likely to pay khoms than those between the ages of 18 and 30 (significant at the 0.01 level). Iraqi men were also less likely to state they paid khoms than Iraqi women (significant at the 0.01 level).

Figure 30



For emulation, non-response was at 7% for Iraqi women and 5% for Iraqi men. It was notably higher at 19% for Iranian women and 17% for Iranian men. For khoms payment, non-response was among the highest in the sample with 52% of Iraqis men and 56% of Iraqi women not responding, and 48% of Iranian men and 50% of Iranian women not responding. There was no particular demographic pattern to non-responders in terms of area of origin, levels of religiosity, education or income levels. We only find that those not responding to this question were more likely to be people who use the internet. There is undoubtedly bias in our findings based on this non-response– individuals who emulated or paid khoms to less socially acceptable clerics, or didn't pay khoms at all, would likely be less prone to respond.

	Emulate		
	Khamenei (Iran)	Sistani (Iran)	Sistani (Iraq)
Male	−0.074** (0.035)	−0.044* (0.025)	−0.012 (0.034)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.117* (0.062)	−0.040 (0.049)	0.040 (0.044)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.080 (0.060)	0.006 (0.049)	0.057 (0.043)
Income: Saved	0.065 (0.066)	−0.034 (0.051)	0.080 (0.058)
Edu: Primary	0.079 (0.087)	0.113* (0.059)	−0.028 (0.040)
Edu: Middle School	−0.047 (0.079)	0.054 (0.049)	−0.017 (0.043)
Edu: High School	0.011 (0.074)	0.054 (0.045)	−0.036 (0.051)
Edu: College and Above	−0.044 (0.077)	0.083* (0.048)	0.009 (0.075)
Age: 30-50	−0.006 (0.036)	0.035 (0.025)	−0.020 (0.034)
Age: 50+	−0.016 (0.055)	0.062 (0.039)	0.079** (0.039)
Religiosity	−0.003 (0.010)	−0.001 (0.007)	0.005 (0.011)
Internet User	−0.044 (0.053)	−0.022 (0.040)	−0.004 (0.044)
News Interest * Internet User	0.167*** (0.047)	0.016 (0.034)	0.071* (0.043)
News Interest	0.127** (0.056)	−0.075** (0.038)	−0.088 (0.076)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	15.32***	3.66***	5.31***
Observations	1,017	1,017	751
R^2	0.094	0.171	0.056
Adjusted R^2	0.052	0.133	0.018
Residual Std. Error	0.486 (df = 971)	0.341 (df = 971)	0.381 (df = 721)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Binary variable: 1 = Emulate Khamenei or Sistani (see header)

	Khoms		
	Khamenei (Iran)	Sistani (Iran)	Sistani (Iraq)
Male	0.054* (0.028)	−0.087*** (0.024)	−0.162*** (0.041)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.127*** (0.045)	−0.006 (0.038)	0.101* (0.052)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.070* (0.041)	0.069* (0.039)	0.084* (0.051)
Income: Saved	0.078 (0.047)	0.047 (0.042)	0.228*** (0.074)
Edu: Primary	0.239*** (0.066)	0.055 (0.059)	−0.020 (0.051)
Edu: Middle School	0.164*** (0.055)	0.048 (0.051)	−0.070 (0.054)
Edu: High School	0.157*** (0.048)	0.047 (0.048)	−0.082 (0.065)
Edu: College and Above	0.209*** (0.052)	0.045 (0.050)	−0.056 (0.095)
Age: 30-50	0.099*** (0.030)	0.019 (0.023)	0.110*** (0.042)
Age: 50+	0.188*** (0.048)	0.075** (0.037)	0.067 (0.057)
Religiosity	0.008 (0.008)	−0.002 (0.006)	0.003 (0.014)
Internet	−0.033 (0.040)	−0.005 (0.035)	0.048 (0.052)
News Interest * Internet User	0.128*** (0.035)	0.012 (0.031)	0.076 (0.055)
News Interest	−0.015 (0.046)	−0.057* (0.033)	−0.006 (0.088)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	4.73***	3.07***	3.04***
Observations	1,017	1,017	751
R^2	0.115	0.114	0.082
Adjusted R^2	0.074	0.073	0.045
Residual Std. Error	0.409 (df = 971)	0.306 (df = 971)	0.488 (df = 721)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Binary variable: 1 = Khoms Khamenei or Sistani (see header)

Is it obligatory to have a source of emulation?

Nearly all respondents agree that it is obligatory to have a source of emulation.

90% of respondents stated that it was obligatory to have a source of emulation, i.e. a certain Grand Ayatollah whose guidance you follow in spiritual and religious matters. This was consistent in both Iran and Iraq with no statistically significant difference between the two countries

73% of **IRANIANS** with the highest income stability strongly agreed that emulation was obligatory, as opposed to 62% in the lowest bracket (significant at the 0.05 level). There is a curvilinear relationship between education and belief in the importance of emulation, with 68% of respondents with either a high school, college education, or no education strongly agreeing that emulation was obligatory versus 79% of those with a primary or middle school education (difference significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively). Non-response for Iranians was above average but not gendered at 11% for men and 11.4% for women.

IRAQI males were less likely to think that emulation was obligatory (significant at the 0.05 level).[65] 69% of respondents with a primary education believed emulation was obligatory, as opposed to 62% of those with no education (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response for Iraqi men was low at 2.8% and higher for women at 8.7%.

Figure 31



	OLS: Emulation Obligatory	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.049 (0.043)	−0.100** (0.050)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.123 (0.089)	0.036 (0.064)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.137 (0.087)	−0.114* (0.067)
Income: Saved	0.209** (0.095)	−0.020 (0.094)
Edu: Primary	0.145* (0.086)	0.150** (0.058)
Edu: Middle School	0.162** (0.082)	0.005 (0.062)
Edu: High School	0.010 (0.081)	0.050 (0.072)
Edu: College and Above	−0.005 (0.087)	−0.236 (0.173)
Age: 30-50	0.055 (0.047)	0.054 (0.047)
Age: 50+	0.088 (0.061)	0.023 (0.061)
Religiosity	−0.020 (0.012)	0.015 (0.017)
Internet User	−0.252*** (0.071)	0.166*** (0.054)
News Interest*Internet User	0.267*** (0.068)	−0.139** (0.057)
News Interest	0.146*** (0.052)	−0.097 (0.098)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	3.26***	5.45***
Observations	990	724
R^2	0.102	0.147
Adjusted R^2	0.059	0.111
Residual Std. Error	0.581 (df = 944)	0.555 (df = 694)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3=Strongly Agree

[65] Absolute levels of support between Iraqi men and women were similar, with 65% of women and 66% of men "strongly agreeing" with the statement. Once controlling for other factors in the regression this difference becomes statistically significant.

How important are the manuals of practice in determining how you practice religion in your everyday life?

Manuals of practice are very important in daily religious practice for the majority of Iranians and Iraqis.

80% percent of Iraqis and 75% of Iranians stated that the manuals of practice were very important (significant at the 0.01 level).

75% of **Iranian** men agreed that the manuals of practice were very important, compared to 85% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.05 level). Younger respondents were relatively less likely to see the manuals of practice as very important, with 72% of those ages 18–30, 79% of those ages 31–50, and 88% of those over age 50 (significant at the 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively). Non-response for Iranians was below average, and unlike other questions non-response for women was lower than for men, at 3.2% versus 5.6%.

92% of **Iraqis** in the wealthiest income-stability bracket stated that the manuals of practice were very important, as opposed to 88% of those with lower income stability (significant at the 0.01 level). However, education was associated with lower support for this view: Only 64% of respondents with a college education saw the manuals of practice as very important, as opposed to 95% of respondents with no education (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for Iraqis was below average, with women at 0.45% and men at 0.77%.

Figure 32



	OLS: Importance Manuals of Practice	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.117** (0.058)	0.049 (0.042)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.018 (0.115)	0.094* (0.056)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.054 (0.111)	0.118** (0.057)
Income: Saved	0.137 (0.119)	0.138 (0.090)
Edu: Primary	0.032 (0.099)	0.007 (0.051)
Edu: Middle School	−0.062 (0.110)	−0.001 (0.051)
Edu: High School	−0.179* (0.096)	−0.064 (0.069)
Edu: College and Above	−0.110 (0.101)	−0.439*** (0.149)
Age: 30-50	0.140** (0.065)	0.026 (0.040)
Age: 50+	0.164* (0.090)	0.046 (0.050)
Religiosity	−0.019 (0.016)	−0.016 (0.013)
Internet User	−0.320*** (0.099)	−0.036 (0.058)
News Interest*Internet User	0.356*** (0.087)	0.032 (0.058)
News Interest	0.090 (0.089)	−0.035 (0.080)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	3.94***	2.08***
Observations	1,009	751
R^2	0.093	0.077
Adjusted R^2	0.051	0.040
Residual Std. Error	0.822 (df = 963)	0.491 (df = 721)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Not Important to 3= Very Important

You can rely on a marjah to make appropriate religious decisions and you do not need to evaluate the rulings yourself

Most individuals believe that they do not have to evaluate the rulings of a marjah themselves.

Over 80% of respondents rely solely on the directions of a marjah for their religious decisions. This highlights the importance of Ayatollahs in dictating religious practice. Iranians are more likely to believe that they should also evaluate a marjah's decisions themselves, with 23% disagreeing with the statement as compared to only 10% of Iraqis (difference significant at the 0.01 level).

Only 43% of **IRANIAN** men stongly agreed, as compared to 55% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). More affluent Iranians were more likely to accept religious direction. 37% of respondents who had "significant difficulty" meeting their financial needs strongly agreed, as opposed to 44% of respondents who had "some difficulty", 47% who had "no notable difficulty", and 59% of those who saved (significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively). There was a curvilinear relationship between education and belief in reliance on the marjah, with 47% of respondents with no education stating that they could rely only on the marjah, as opposed to 54% of respondents with a middle school education (significant at the 0.01 level) and 42% with a college or above education (not significantly different with linear relationship). Non-response for Iranians was slightly above average, at 13.1% for men and 13.8% for women.

IRAQI men were less likely than women to say that they could rely solely on the marjah's decisions

Figure 33



	OLS: Rely only on Marjah's Decisions	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.295*** (0.064)	−0.192*** (0.065)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.194* (0.117)	0.183** (0.090)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.247** (0.112)	0.154* (0.088)
Income: Saved	0.530*** (0.118)	0.132 (0.125)
Edu: Primary	0.228 (0.147)	0.090 (0.071)
Edu: Middle School	0.341*** (0.128)	−0.110 (0.083)
Edu: High School	0.153 (0.120)	−0.106 (0.096)
Edu: College and Above	0.055 (0.127)	−0.258 (0.172)
Age: 30-50	0.019 (0.067)	0.173*** (0.064)
Age: 50+	0.087 (0.095)	0.174** (0.082)
Religiosity	−0.008 (0.017)	−0.008 (0.020)
Internet User	−0.081 (0.090)	0.127 (0.084)
News Interest*Internet User	0.120 (0.080)	−0.070 (0.087)
News Interest	0.179* (0.103)	−0.078 (0.107)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	3.89***	2.66***
Observations	983	733
R^2	0.116	0.088
Adjusted R^2	0.074	0.050
Residual Std. Error	0.863 (df = 937)	0.727 (df = 703)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

(significant at the 0.01 level).[66] 50% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 30 strongly agreed, as compared to 55% between ages 31-50 and 59% over the age of 50 (significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively). Non-response differed significantly between genders, at 2.4% for men and 10.2% for women.

[66]The absolute difference is small, with 55% of women and 54% of men strongly agreeing with the statement. This difference, however, is statistically significant once we control for other factors, such as education and age, in the regression.

How do you primarily get news about the practices of your source of emulation?

Mirroring the higher levels of communal practice in Iran, Iranians are more likely to get information about their source of emulation from the mosque, while Iraqis from family and friends.

We find that Iranians are more likely to learn about their source of emulation from their mosque, whereas Iraqis from family and friends. These results follow previous findings about differences in communal and mosque-oriented religious practice between Iraq and Iran. They could also be reflective of the effect of years of upheaval in Iraq that has torn apart pre-existing community structures, and forced individuals to rely solely on their family unit rather than the community as a whole. Interestingly, 19% of Iranians and 17% of Iraqis learn about their sources of emulation from the internet—roughly the same proportion as those who learn about them from religious classes.

Figure 34



Iranians are more likely to learn about their source of emulation from the mosque, (32% of Iranians and 19% of Iraqis, difference significant 0.01 level). **Iraqis** are more likely to learn about their source of emulation from friends and family (24% of Iranians and 38% of Iraqis, difference significant 0.01 level). Religious gatherings or classes were less popular, at 15% for Iranians and 19% for Iraqis (difference significant 0.01 level). Non-response for Iranians was 8% for men and 13% for women; for Iraqis, it was 5% for men and 8% for women.

Multiple sources of emulation

Most respondents believe that one must follow only one ayatollah and obey all his fatwas.

> **You are not allowed to emulate more than one living ayatollah.**
>
> **When you decide to emulate an ayatollah, you must obey all his fatwas and not turn to another source of emulation.**

Official Shiite teaching obligates individuals to follow the source of emulation that is the most knowledgeable on any given topic. However, only a portion of Iranian and Iraqi respondents believe that they can vary their source of emulation or emulate more than one ayatollah. Iraqis are significantly more likely than Iranians to believe that you can emulate only one ayatollah or that you must obey all his fatwas, with only 44% of Iranians strongly agreeing you can emulate only one ayatollah, as opposed to 61% of Iraqis, and only 48% of Iranians strongly agreeing that you have to obey all the fatwas of an ayatollah, as opposed to 59% of Iraqis (all differences significant at the 0.01 level).

Only 33% of IRANIAN males strongly agreed that you could only emulate one ayatollah, as opposed to 59% of Iranian females, a substantively significant gender divide (significant at the 0.01 level). There was a slightly smaller, but still significant, gender gap in beliefs about obeying all the fatwas of an ayatollah, with only 43% of Iranian men believing this was the case, as opposed to 56% of Iranian women. Non-response for Iranians was slightly above average, at 11.5% for men and 12% for women for multiple sources of emulation, and 12.6% for men and 12.5% for women for obeying all fatwas.

Figure 35



	OLS: More than 1 Ayatollah		OLS: Must Obey all Fatwas	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.698*** (0.067)	−0.158*** (0.052)	−0.343*** (0.062)	−0.053 (0.052)
Income: Some difficulty	0.018 (0.123)	0.006 (0.069)	0.048 (0.114)	−0.035 (0.068)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.055 (0.119)	−0.120* (0.068)	0.038 (0.110)	−0.116* (0.067)
Income: Saved	0.091 (0.128)	−0.026 (0.098)	0.133 (0.118)	−0.067 (0.097)
Edu: Primary	0.079 (0.161)	0.084 (0.067)	0.142 (0.149)	0.058 (0.066)
Edu: Middle School	0.187 (0.147)	−0.023 (0.072)	0.160 (0.136)	−0.128* (0.071)
Edu: High School	−0.075 (0.135)	−0.030 (0.084)	0.056 (0.125)	−0.084 (0.082)
Edu: College and Above	−0.112 (0.142)	−0.244* (0.137)	−0.125 (0.131)	−0.417*** (0.139)
Age: 30-50	−0.108 (0.068)	0.085 (0.055)	−0.027 (0.062)	0.030 (0.055)
Age: 50+	−0.043 (0.106)	0.052 (0.072)	−0.033 (0.097)	0.048 (0.071)
Religiosity	0.012 (0.018)	0.002 (0.018)	0.013 (0.016)	−0.020 (0.017)
News Interest	0.023 (0.068)	−0.177*** (0.062)	0.139** (0.063)	−0.122** (0.061)
Internet User	−0.102 (0.139)	0.116 (0.102)	−0.246* (0.129)	−0.012 (0.100)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.004 (0.076)	0.082 (0.073)	0.019 (0.070)	0.061 (0.072)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	986	732	983	731
R^2	0.179	0.084	0.121	0.069
Adjusted R^2	0.139	0.046	0.079	0.031
Residual Std. Error	0.913 (df = 940)	0.629 (df = 702)	0.839 (df = 937)	0.621 (df = 701)
F Statistic	4.543*** (df = 45; 940)	2.207*** (df = 29; 702)	2.864*** (df = 45; 937)	1.799*** (df = 29; 701)

Similar to Iran, **IRAQI** men were less likely to state that an individual could emulate more than one ayatollah as compared to Iraqi women (43% of Iraqi men strongly agreed, as opposed to 56% of Iraqi women, significant at the 0.01 level), however there was no gender gap in beliefs about whether or not an individual had to obey all of an ayatollah's fatwas. Respondents who had a college education were less likely to agree that individuals had to obey all of an ayatollah's fatwas, with only 40% strongly agreeing, as opposed to 59% of those with no education (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response was below average, at 2.7% for women and 0.8% for men for multiple sources of emulation, and 2.4% for men versus 8.4% for women for obeying all fatwas. Non-response levels suggest that this was a notably more sensitive question for Iranians than Iraqis.

A cleric must have Manuals of Practice and be endorsed by other clerics to be a source of emulation

The vast majority of Iranians and Iraqis believe that clerics must have Manuals of Practice and be endorsed by other clerics.

Despite the proliferation of extremist Shiite clerics in recent years, who are often not endorsed by other clerics, 82% of Iranians and 93% of Iraqis agreed or strongly agreed that a cleric must have Manuals of Practice and be endorsed by other clerics to be a source of emulation (difference significant at the 0.01 level).

Non-response for this question was above average at .

Among **IRAQIS**, wealthier respondents were less likely than the poorest respondents to agree that clerics needed manuals of practice and endorsement (significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels).[67] Respondents with a middle school or high school education were also less likely to believe that clerics needed manuals of practice and endorsement than those with no education at all (significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively).

Non-response for this question was 13.1% for Iranian women and 13.2% for Iranian men. It was lower for Iraqis and gendered, at 3% for men and 10% for women.

Figure 36



	OLS: Need Man. Prac. and Endorsement	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.048 (0.059)	0.239*** (0.064)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.115 (0.116)	−0.210** (0.088)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.087 (0.111)	−0.339*** (0.083)
Income: Saved	0.225* (0.115)	−0.311** (0.122)
Edu: Primary	0.029 (0.155)	−0.167* (0.092)
Edu: Middle School	0.128 (0.113)	−0.228** (0.090)
Edu: High School	0.177* (0.105)	−0.418*** (0.123)
Edu: College and Above	0.095 (0.114)	−0.055 (0.161)
Age: 30-50	0.029 (0.052)	−0.024 (0.076)
Age: 50+	−0.004 (0.083)	−0.043 (0.097)
Religiosity	0.004 (0.013)	−0.026 (0.020)
Internet User	−0.239*** (0.086)	0.464*** (0.099)
News Interest*Internet User	0.211*** (0.079)	−0.257*** (0.080)
News Interest	0.081 (0.082)	0.166 (0.117)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	4.76***	20.06***
Observations	791	490
R^2	0.089	0.224
Adjusted R^2	0.034	0.175
Residual Std. Error	0.639 (df = 745)	0.675 (df = 460)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

[67] Absolute levels are 64% of those with significant difficulty strongly agreeing, 64% of those with some difficulty, 61% of those with no notable difficulty, and 69% of those who saved strongly agreeing.

Religious Teachings

People who belong to a different faith are not as moral as those who belong to mine

Iranians are more likely to believe that people who belong to a different faith are less moral than they are.

There exists a significant gap between Iranians and Iraqis on beliefs about whether "people who belong to a different faith are not as moral as those who belong to mine." 40% of Iranian respondents either agree or strongly agree with the statement, as opposed to only 23% of Iraqi respondents (difference significant at the 0.01 level).

Iranian men were less extreme in this view: only 13% strongly agreed that people of different faiths were less moral, as opposed to 37% of Iranian females. Mirroring other questions about religion and morality, wealthier Iranians were more likely to agree with the statement—only 18% of respondents with "significant difficulty" strongly agreed, as opposed to 30% of those who were able to save (significant at the 0.01 level).

However, educated respondents were less likely to agree, with 29% of those with no education and 32% of those with a primary (significant at the 0.05 level) or middle school education (both significant at the 0.05 levels) strongly agreeing, as opposed to only 22% of those with a high school education and 17% of those with a college education or greater. Non-response for this question was above average, at 12.9% for men and 15.9% for women.

Gender patterns were reversed in Iraq, with only 7% of **Iraqi** women agreeing that people of different faiths

Figure 37



	OLS: Different Faiths Less Moral	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.485*** (0.075)	0.376*** (0.073)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.040 (0.129)	0.025 (0.108)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.332*** (0.124)	0.025 (0.104)
Income: Saved	0.576*** (0.134)	−0.061 (0.133)
Edu: Primary	0.339** (0.164)	−0.209** (0.098)
Edu: Middle School	0.368** (0.154)	−0.241** (0.102)
Edu: High School	0.068 (0.139)	−0.368*** (0.119)
Edu: College and Above	−0.036 (0.146)	−0.656*** (0.175)
Age: 30-50	0.041 (0.069)	0.009 (0.074)
Age: 50+	−0.051 (0.107)	0.152 (0.108)
Religiosity	−0.008 (0.018)	−0.013 (0.024)
Internet User	0.096 (0.107)	0.058 (0.104)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.208** (0.098)	0.174* (0.103)
News Interest	−0.163 (0.114)	0.185 (0.148)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	24.27***	5.09***
Observations	1,017	751
R^2	0.180	0.111
Adjusted R^2	0.142	0.075
Residual Std. Error	0.952 (df = 971)	0.904 (df = 721)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

were less moral, versus 16% of Iraqi men (significant at the 0.01 level). Once controlling for other factors, more educated individuals were increasingly less likely to agree, with 13% of those with no education strongly agreeing, as compared to 14% of those with a primary education (significant at the 0.05 level), 11% of those with a middle school education (significant at the 0.05 level), 12% of those with a high school education (significant at the 0.01 level), and only 4% of those with a college education (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was below average, at 2.8% for men and 6.8% for women, suggesting that this question was more sensitive for Iranian than Iraqi respondents.

Banks charging interest is a practice that contradicts the teachings of Islam

The majority of respondents believe that banks charging interest is a practice that contradicts the teachings of Islam.

68% of **IRANIANS** and 70% of **IRAQIS** believe that banks charging interest is a practice that contradicts the teachings of Islam.

IRANIANS had non-response slightly above average, at 12.4% for men and 15.2% for women. There were no statistically significant sources of heterogeneity.

IRAQIS who were wealthier were slightly less likely to argue that interest contradicts the teachings of Islam, with 43% of respondents with significant difficulty meeting their needs strongly agreeing that interest contradicts the teachings of Islam, as opposed to 38% of those with no notable difficulties (significant at the 0.05 level). Older people were also more likely to see bank interest as contradicting the teachings of Islam, with 37% of those between the ages of 18 and 30 agreeing, as opposed to 42% of those between ages 30 and 50 and 43% of those over the age of fifty (significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels). Non-response for this question was slightly above average, at 5.8% for men and 12.3% for women.

Figure 38



	OLS: Interest Contradicts Islam	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.050 (0.067)	0.021 (0.081)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.174 (0.114)	0.097 (0.103)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.033 (0.111)	−0.219** (0.102)
Income: Saved	−0.075 (0.125)	−0.266* (0.145)
Edu: Primary	0.094 (0.162)	0.034 (0.102)
Edu: Middle School	0.080 (0.152)	−0.012 (0.107)
Edu: High School	0.178 (0.138)	0.051 (0.128)
Edu: College and Above	0.111 (0.147)	−0.109 (0.207)
Age: 30-50	−0.084 (0.068)	0.248*** (0.085)
Age: 50+	−0.056 (0.107)	0.267** (0.109)
Religiosity	−0.0001 (0.017)	−0.013 (0.025)
Internet User	−0.137 (0.101)	0.034 (0.116)
News Interest*Internet User	0.015 (0.090)	−0.012 (0.115)
News Interest	0.148 (0.104)	0.319** (0.132)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	2.42***	6.26***
Observations	1,017	751
R^2	0.075	0.069
Adjusted R^2	0.032	0.032
Residual Std. Error	0.921 (df = 971)	0.965 (df = 721)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

Religion and Politics

Religion should inform all political decisions the government makes

Most respondents believe that religion should play an important role in political decision making.

Though the majority of Iranian and Iraqi respondents believed that religion should inform all political decisions, Iranians were more emphatic in this view: 51% of Iranians strongly agreed with this statement, as compared to 29% of Iraqis (difference significant at the 0.01 level). The differences in levels of support by age and income levels as discussed below, highlight the closer relationship between religion and politics in Iran than in Iraq.

43% of **Iranian** men strongly agreed with this statement, as opposed to 62% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). Wealthier respondents were more likely to support a role for religion in politics, with 55% of respondents who were able to save strongly agreeing, as opposed to only 44% of those who had significant difficulty meeting their needs (significant at the 0.01 level). Only 48% of respondents ages 18 to 30 strongly agreed, as opposed to 57% of those over age fifty (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response for this question was slightly above average, at 11.7% for men and 12% for Iranian women.

More educated **Iraqis** were less likely to argue that religion should inform government decisions, with 37% of those with no education strongly agreeing, as opposed to 33% of those with a primary education (significant at the 0.05 level), 29% of those with a middle school education,

Figure 39



	OLS: Religion Should Inform Gov't Decisions	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.291*** (0.062)	−0.107 (0.086)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.156 (0.126)	0.057 (0.113)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.182 (0.122)	0.152 (0.108)
Income: Saved	0.351*** (0.128)	0.103 (0.161)
Edu: Primary	0.099 (0.140)	−0.242** (0.104)
Edu: Middle School	−0.128 (0.127)	−0.295*** (0.111)
Edu: High School	−0.050 (0.111)	−0.454*** (0.131)
Edu: College and Above	−0.019 (0.119)	−1.135*** (0.210)
Age: 30-50	0.115* (0.065)	0.197** (0.087)
Age: 50+	0.213** (0.091)	0.419*** (0.112)
Religiosity	−0.020 (0.016)	0.007 (0.027)
Internet User	−0.169* (0.097)	0.150 (0.113)
News Interest*Internet User	0.151* (0.087)	−0.102 (0.119)
News Interest	0.150 (0.096)	0.222 (0.168)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	2.98***	5.62***
Observations	995	739
R^2	0.098	0.092
Adjusted R^2	0.055	0.055
Residual Std. Error	0.874 (df = 949)	0.997 (df = 709)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree	

30% of those with a high school education, and 15% of those with a college education (all differences significant at the 0.01 level). Older respondents were less likely to strongly agree, with 48% of those between the ages of 18 and 30, as opposed to 51% of those between the ages of 30 and 50, and 57% of those over the age of fifty (significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively). Non-response was 2.8% for men and 7.2% for women.

Democracy is a system that contradicts the teachings of Islam

There is notable variation on beliefs about the compatibility of democracy and Islam.

There is significant variation both between and within Iran and Iraq on beliefs about whether democracy is a system that contradicts the teachings of Islam. Despite the tumultuous experience that democracy has brought to Iraq, 59% of Iraqis believe that democracy is compatible with the teachings of Islam. Only 40% of Iranians believe that this is the case (difference significant at 0.01 level)

24% of **Iranian** men strongly agreed that democracy contradicts the teachings of Islam, as opposed to 43% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question among Iranians, like other questions on democracy, was notably high, at 19.2% for men and 21.2% for women.

Only 7% of **Iraqis** who had a college education strongly agreed that democracy contradicts the teachings of Islam, as opposed to 22% of Iraqis with no education (significant at the 0.01 level). 22% of those who were over the age of fifty strongly agreed with the statement, as opposed to 17% of those between the ages of 18 and 30 (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was around average for Iraqis but gendered, at 5.6% for men and 9.8% for women.

Figure 40



	OLS: Democracy Contradicts Islam	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.336*** (0.070)	0.075 (0.083)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.030 (0.120)	0.084 (0.118)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.090 (0.115)	0.087 (0.110)
Income: Saved	0.202 (0.125)	−0.057 (0.152)
Edu: Primary	0.351** (0.156)	−0.050 (0.104)
Edu: Middle School	0.130 (0.144)	−0.083 (0.113)
Edu: High School	0.122 (0.137)	−0.240* (0.130)
Edu: College and Above	−0.038 (0.144)	−0.760*** (0.188)
Age: 30-50	−0.114 (0.070)	0.051 (0.085)
Age: 50+	−0.150 (0.108)	0.341*** (0.112)
Religiosity	−0.020 (0.019)	0.024 (0.027)
Internet User	−0.086 (0.104)	0.074 (0.116)
News Interest*Internet User	0.104 (0.094)	0.101 (0.119)
News Interest	0.236** (0.115)	0.052 (0.172)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	17.23***	3.72***
Observations	930	724
R^2	0.095	0.066
Adjusted R^2	0.049	0.027
Residual Std. Error	0.928 (df = 884)	0.983 (df = 694)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

A marjah's political fatwas are as binding as his fatwas on religious practice

Most respondents believe that ayatollahs exert influence in both the religious and political realms.

The majority of Iranians and Iraqis agree that ayatollahs exert influence in both the political and religious realms, though Iranians believe so more strongly. Specifically, 62% of Iranians strongly agreed that a marjah's political fatwas are as binding as his fatwas on religious practice, as compared to 49% of Iraqis (difference significant at the 0.01 level).

57% of **Iranian** men strongly agreed that political fatwas were just as binding, as opposed to 68% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). Wealthier people were increasingly more likely to believe that political fatwas were as binding. Non-response for Iranian respondents was slightly above average at 11.6% for men and 11.9% for women.

Iraqis who reported some difficulty meeting their needs were more likely to agree that political fatwas were as binding as fatwas on religious practice (significant at the 0.05 level).[68] Only 30% of respondents with a college education strongly agreed, as opposed to 51% of those with no education (significant 0.05 level). Non-response for Iraqi respondents was significantly gendered, at 4.1% for men and 10.3% for women.

Figure 41



	OLS: Political Fatwas Binding	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.322*** (0.059)	−0.037 (0.058)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.048 (0.108)	−0.036 (0.069)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.049 (0.104)	−0.111 (0.071)
Income: Saved	0.140 (0.114)	−0.059 (0.104)
Edu: Primary	0.145 (0.134)	0.050 (0.057)
Edu: Middle School	0.164 (0.125)	−0.132* (0.069)
Edu: High School	0.057 (0.114)	−0.085 (0.079)
Edu: College and Above	−0.107 (0.121)	−0.399** (0.189)
Age: 30-50	−0.028 (0.064)	0.024 (0.057)
Age: 50+	−0.037 (0.092)	0.036 (0.066)
Religiosity	0.011 (0.017)	−0.018 (0.018)
Internet User	−0.217** (0.090)	0.078 (0.066)
News Interest*Internet User	0.251*** (0.081)	−0.185** (0.075)
News Interest	0.213** (0.090)	−0.225** (0.108)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	7.99***	1.98***
Observations	983	731
R^2	0.111	0.076
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.037
Residual Std. Error	0.844 (df = 937)	0.619 (df = 701)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

[68] The absolute difference between those who have some difficulty meeting their needs and those who have notable difficulty meeting their needs is small, at 52% versus 51% respectively, but statistically significant once controlling for other factors.

How important is the marji'iyyah's role in influencing political events in Iraq?

Almost all respondents believe that the marji'iyyah plays an important role in influencing political events in Iraq.

81% of Iranian respondents and 93% of Iraqi respondents felt that the marji'iyyah had a "very important" role in guiding political events in Iraq (significant at the 0.01 level).

Wealthier **IRANIANS** were more likely to see the marji'iyyah's role in Iraq as important. 71% of those with significant difficulty meeting their needs stated it was very important, as compared to 85% of those who saved (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was below average, but gendered, at 2.8% for men and 7.1% for women.

An overwhelming number of **IRAQIS** recognized the importance of the marji'iyyah in Iraqi politics. Specifically, 95% of **IRAQI** men and 91% of Iraqi women saw the marji'iyyah's role in politics as very important, (difference significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was very low, at 0.018% for men and 0.84% for women.

Figure 42



	OLS: Marjiiyyah Role Iraq	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.018 (0.040)	0.072*** (0.027)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.113 (0.086)	0.024 (0.035)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.156* (0.081)	0.010 (0.034)
Income: Saved	0.197** (0.090)	0.023 (0.062)
Edu: Primary	0.104 (0.083)	0.016 (0.036)
Edu: Middle School	0.037 (0.097)	0.025 (0.043)
Edu: High School	0.019 (0.088)	−0.025 (0.054)
Edu: College and Above	0.061 (0.093)	−0.206* (0.118)
Age: 30-50	0.058 (0.047)	−0.005 (0.032)
Age: 50+	0.026 (0.068)	−0.014 (0.040)
Religiosity	0.002 (0.011)	−0.008 (0.010)
Internet User	−0.324*** (0.075)	−0.050 (0.041)
News Interest*Internet User	0.303*** (0.064)	−0.026 (0.045)
News Interest	0.016 (0.062)	−0.062 (0.064)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	4.17***	1.85***
Observations	1,006	751
R^2	0.088	0.064
Adjusted R^2	0.045	0.026
Residual Std. Error	0.581 (df = 960)	0.363 (df = 721)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Not Important to 3= Very Important

Changing Views: Religion

Now think of how a member of your family from an older generation, such as your father, would answer these questions when he was your age. How strongly would he agree or disagree with each of the statements below?

Figure 43



Respondents were asked how a member of their family from an older generation would have answered the same religious questions when they were their age.

Iraqis stated that, on average, their parents were slightly more conservative than they were across all questions except that regarding political fatwas. For the question on political fatwas, they argued that their parents were actually *less* likely to respect political fatwas, perhaps indicating the growing importance of the marji'iyyah as a political force in the post-Saddam era. Iranians, on the other hand, tended to think that their parents were *less* conservative than they were themselves on every question except whether or not it was obligatory to have a source of emulation (for which they responded similarly) perhaps reflecting their parents' coming of age in the years under the Shah and before the Iranian Revolution.

Non-response for both Iranians and Iraqis was very high for this line of questions, with Iranians having non-response levels between 33.5% and 35.1% and Iraqis having even higher non-response, between 44.9% and 46.3%. Yet this section had a much higher rate of respondents stating that they "did not know," rather than simply refusing to respond– indicating that this high level of non-response was primarily due to a lack of knowledge about parents' preferences when they were younger or a discomfort with presuming to be knowledgeable on the topic.

6 GENDER AND WOMEN'S ISSUES

HIGHLIGHTS

- Three quarters of respondents in Iraq and Iran believed that women should have the same rights and opportunities as men, and 60% of Iranians and 63% of Iraqis believed that university education was equally important for men and women (difference significant at the 0.01 level). Almost all respondents believed that a woman should be able to choose whom she wanted to marry, with 95% of Iranians and 90% of Iraqis agreeing (difference significant at the 0.01 level).
- Male and female respondents were, however, less liberal on topics relating to family structure. Over 75% of Iranians and Iraqis believed that when a mother works for pay, her children suffer. Nearly all respondents believed that a married woman needs her husband's permission to work outside the home (96% of Iranians and 95% of Iraqis). Iraqis were much more liberal in their beliefs about women's right to work than their Iranian counterparts, with 64% of Iraqis agreeing, as opposed to only 43% of Iranians (difference significant at the 0.01 level).
- In the political realm, individuals also held conservative gender views. More than 75% of respondents believed that men made better political leaders than women.
- For every question except whether a married woman needed her husband's permission to work, men were significantly more likely to have more conservative preferences—a gender gap in conservative views that ranged from 4–23 percentage points for Iranians and 10–19 points for Iraqis (significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels).[69]
- 53% of Iranians and 65% of Iraqis stated that an appropriate head covering were the all enveloping black shrouds in the form of Iranian chador or the Iraqi abaya. However, a larger proportion of Iranian respondents were accepting of a less conservative form of dress—that being modest dress with a headcover.

[69] Based on men and women "strongly agreeing" with the statement.

On the whole, men make better political leaders than women

More than three quarters of respondents agreed that men made better political leaders than women.

78% of Iranians and 63% of Iraqis agreed or strongly agreed that men make better political leaders than women (difference significant at the 0.01 level).

52% of **IRANIAN** men strongly agreed with this statement, as compared to 48% of women (difference significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response was 8.6% for men and 9.2% for women.

45% of **IRAQI** men strongly agreed that men made better leaders, as opposed to 35% of Iraqi women (significant at the 0.05 level). These conservative views were less common among better-educated respondents. 46% of those with no education strongly agreed that men made better political leaders, as opposed to 38% of those with a middle school education, 37% of those with a high school education, and 10% of those with a college education (significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively). 36% of respondents ages 18 to 30 strongly agreed, versus 44% of those over the age of fifty (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response for Iraqi men was 3.1% and for Iraqi women was 5.1%, lower than that of Iranians.

Figure 44



	OLS: Men Better Leaders	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.261*** (0.063)	0.216** (0.084)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.015 (0.107)	−0.067 (0.113)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.131 (0.102)	−0.070 (0.106)
Income: Saved	0.075 (0.112)	−0.053 (0.165)
Edu: Primary	−0.103 (0.139)	0.047 (0.102)
Edu: Middle School	−0.038 (0.122)	−0.442*** (0.111)
Edu: High School	−0.086 (0.109)	−0.305** (0.129)
Edu: College and Above	−0.107 (0.116)	−0.968*** (0.215)
Age: 30-50	−0.105* (0.063)	0.087 (0.086)
Age: 50+	−0.113 (0.088)	0.219** (0.105)
Religiosity	0.017 (0.016)	0.020 (0.025)
Internet User	0.016 (0.093)	0.322*** (0.105)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.117 (0.083)	−0.276** (0.111)
News Interest	0.185** (0.089)	0.084 (0.172)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	2.35***	4.55***
Observations	986	732
R^2	0.083	0.132
Adjusted R^2	0.039	0.096
Residual Std. Error	0.824 (df = 940)	0.960 (df = 702)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

University education is more important for a man than for a woman

Iranians and Iraqis were divided on the role of university education, with Iranian women being particularly polarized on the issue.

40% of Iranians and 37% of Iraqis agreed or strongly agreed that university education was more important for a man than for a woman (difference significant at the 0.01 level).

IRANIAN women were polarized on the question, more likely to strongly agree or strongly disagree, relative to men who had more neutral views. 25% of Iranian men strongly agreed that university education was more important for a man than a woman, versus 32% of Iranian women; 11% of Iranian men strongly disagreed, versus 19% of women. Overall women were more likely than men to disagree (significant at the 0.01 level). Respondents over the age of fifty were more likely to agree than those aged 18 to 30 (significant 0.05 level). Respondents who were interested in the news and used the internet were less likely to agree than those who were not interested in the news and did not use the internet (20% versus 30% respectively, significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response was 7.7% for men and 8.5% for women.

29% of **IRAQI** men strongly agreed that university education was more important for a man than a woman, versus only 12% of Iraqi women (significant at the 0.01 level). More educated individuals were less likely to hold this belief, with 23% of those with no education strongly agreeing, versus 16% of those with a high school education (significant at the 0.01 level) and 6% of those with a college education (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response was low at 2.8% for both Iraqi men and women.

Figure 45



	OLS: Uni more Important for a Man	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.179** (0.076)	0.589*** (0.081)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.203 (0.142)	0.013 (0.116)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.064 (0.139)	0.029 (0.112)
Income: Saved	0.006 (0.148)	−0.163 (0.145)
Edu: Primary	−0.009 (0.167)	−0.106 (0.108)
Edu: Middle School	0.106 (0.157)	−0.198* (0.113)
Edu: High School	−0.172 (0.142)	−0.467*** (0.126)
Edu: College and Above	−0.116 (0.150)	−0.875*** (0.209)
Age: 30-50	0.005 (0.073)	0.125 (0.086)
Age: 50+	0.219** (0.110)	0.210* (0.111)
Religiosity	0.031 (0.019)	−0.029 (0.027)
Internet User	−0.013 (0.109)	0.027 (0.116)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.215** (0.099)	0.057 (0.116)
News Interest	0.060 (0.118)	0.093 (0.167)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	2.83***	18.01***
Observations	997	744
R^2	0.101	0.158
Adjusted R^2	0.059	0.124
Residual Std. Error	0.999 (df = 951)	0.972 (df = 714)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

A married woman needs her husband's permission to work outside the home

The majority of Iranians and Iraqis felt that a woman needed her husband's permission to work outside the home.

96% of Iranians and 95% of Iraqis argued that a married woman needs her husband's permission to work outside the home.

Wealthier **IRANIANS** were more likely to agree with this statement. This is in line with the tendency of wealthier Iranians to espouse conservative views in other areas. 71% of those with significant difficulty meeting basic needs strongly agreed, as opposed to 78% of those who saved (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response was 6.1% for men and 7.9% for women.

75% of **IRAQIS** who had significant difficulty meeting their needs agreed, versus 65% of those who had no notable difficulty (significant at the 0.01 level). Respondents who attended college were also less likely to agree, with only 49% agreeing versus 71% of those who had no education (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response was low at 1.4% for men and 2.5% for women.

Figure 46



	OLS: Husband's Permission to Work	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.057 (0.042)	−0.021 (0.048)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.157* (0.089)	−0.059 (0.059)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.167* (0.086)	−0.158*** (0.058)
Income: Saved	0.214** (0.091)	−0.129 (0.102)
Edu: Primary	0.106 (0.092)	0.108** (0.051)
Edu: Middle School	0.137 (0.084)	−0.090 (0.063)
Edu: High School	0.038 (0.080)	−0.052 (0.069)
Edu: College and Above	0.037 (0.082)	−0.370** (0.156)
Age: 30-50	0.013 (0.040)	0.079* (0.047)
Age: 50+	−0.005 (0.058)	0.020 (0.064)
Religiosity	−0.004 (0.010)	−0.009 (0.015)
Internet User	−0.204*** (0.067)	0.172*** (0.056)
News Interest*Internet User	0.197*** (0.061)	−0.255*** (0.061)
News Interest	−0.002 (0.057)	−0.074 (0.108)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	5.6***	3.47***
Observations	1,001	742
R^2	0.064	0.104
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.068
Residual Std. Error	0.526 (df = 955)	0.556 (df = 712)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

Having a job is the best way for a woman to be independent

Iranian and Iraqi women were both more likely than men to think that a job was the best way for a woman to be independent.

23% of Iranians and 36% of Iraqis strongly agreed with this liberal statement, mirroring the more conservative perspectives of Iranians in this context.

13% of **IRANIAN** men strongly agreed that a job was the best way for a woman to be independent, versus 36% of Iranian women, indicative of the less conservative stance that Iranian women have on gender issues (significant at the 0.01 level). Wealthier Iranians were again more conservative: 22% of respondents who had significant difficulty meeting their needs strongly agreed with this statement, versus 33% of those who were able to save (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for men was 9.2% and for women 8.2%.

26% of **IRAQI** men strongly agreed with this statement, as opposed to 45% of Iraqi women (significant at the 0.01 level). Wealthier respondents were also less likely to agree , with 41% of those who had no difficulty meeting their needs strongly agreeing, versus 37% of those who had some difficulty, 34% of those with no notable difficulty, and 35% of those who had significant difficulty meeting their needs (significant at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively). Non-response was 3.2% for men and 3.6% for women.

Figure 47



	OLS: Job Woman Independent	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.653*** (0.072)	−0.358*** (0.076)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.001 (0.123)	−0.229** (0.099)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.153 (0.119)	−0.312*** (0.095)
Income: Saved	0.482*** (0.131)	−0.336** (0.141)
Edu: Primary	0.215 (0.162)	−0.037 (0.096)
Edu: Middle School	−0.073 (0.154)	−0.040 (0.101)
Edu: High School	−0.122 (0.141)	−0.016 (0.122)
Edu: College and Above	−0.217 (0.147)	−0.172 (0.204)
Age: 30-50	−0.035 (0.070)	−0.131 (0.083)
Age: 50+	0.038 (0.104)	0.032 (0.103)
Religiosity	0.004 (0.017)	0.015 (0.024)
Internet User	0.224** (0.106)	0.127 (0.108)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.189** (0.095)	−0.224** (0.105)
News Interest	−0.193* (0.107)	0.220 (0.143)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	8.81***	4.97***
Observations	991	735
R^2	0.217	0.089
Adjusted R^2	0.180	0.052
Residual Std. Error	0.920 (df = 945)	0.907 (df = 705)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

A woman should be allowed to choose whom she wants to marry

The vast majority of Iranians and Iraqis believed that women should be able to choose whom they want to marry.

95% of Iranians and 90% of Iraqis believed that a woman should be allowed to choose whom she wants to marry (difference significant at the 0.01 level).

Iranians exhibited a gender gap in their responses, with 78% of women strongly agreeing versus 64% of men (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response was 6.5% for men and 8.1% for women.

73% of **Iraqi** women strongly agreed versus 54% of men (significant at the 0.01 level). Wealthier respondents were more likely to agree that a woman should be able to choose her spouse, with 69% of those able to save agreeing versus 65% of those who had significant difficulty meeting their needs (significant at the 0.01 level). More educated respondents were also more likely to agree, with 57% of those with no education strongly agreeing, as opposed to 62% of those with a primary education, 66% of those with a high school education, and 76% of those with a college education (significant at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.01 levels respectively). Non-response for this question was low, at 1.5% for men and 3% for women.

Figure 48



	OLS: Women Choose Spouse	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.200*** (0.044)	−0.495*** (0.059)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.204** (0.087)	−0.064 (0.079)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.106 (0.085)	−0.170** (0.074)
Income: Saved	0.149* (0.089)	−0.355*** (0.117)
Edu: Primary	−0.040 (0.120)	0.166** (0.080)
Edu: Middle School	0.087 (0.096)	0.126 (0.084)
Edu: High School	0.080 (0.089)	0.244*** (0.090)
Edu: College and Above	0.086 (0.093)	0.515*** (0.121)
Age: 30-50	−0.069 (0.048)	0.012 (0.057)
Age: 50+	−0.109 (0.070)	0.033 (0.079)
Religiosity	−0.009 (0.012)	0.018 (0.019)
Internet User	−0.141** (0.066)	0.134* (0.072)
News Interest*Internet User	0.060 (0.060)	−0.204** (0.080)
News Interest	0.001 (0.075)	−0.194 (0.141)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	4.01***	7.73***
Observations	999	742
R^2	0.089	0.177
Adjusted R^2	0.046	0.143
Residual Std. Error	0.611 (df = 953)	0.707 (df = 712)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

Women should have the same rights and opportunities as men

About three quarters of Iranians and Iraqis believed that women should have the same rights and opportunities as men.

35% of Iranians and 43% of Iraqis strongly agreed that women should have the same rights as men (difference significant at the 0.01 level).

IRANIAN women and men differed emphatically in their views on this question, with 48% agreeing strongly versus 25% of Iranian men (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for Iranians was 6.4% for men and 8.5% for women.

IRAQI women held similar views as their Iranian counterparts, with 49% agreeing strongly. Iraqi men were more supportive, with 36% strongly agreeing that women should have the same rights and opportunities as men (difference versus women significant at the 0.01 level). 41% of respondents who had no notable financial difficulty strongly agreed, versus 47% of those who had significant difficulty (significant at the 0.05 level). 53% of respondents with at least a college education strongly agreed, as opposed to 44% with no education (significant 0.05 level). Non-response was 1.8% for men and 5.6% for women.

Figure 49



	OLS: Women Same Rights	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.415*** (0.066)	−0.423*** (0.070)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.174 (0.135)	−0.085 (0.096)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.016 (0.130)	−0.211** (0.092)
Income: Saved	0.259* (0.138)	−0.135 (0.126)
Edu: Primary	−0.065 (0.163)	−0.044 (0.088)
Edu: Middle School	−0.147 (0.150)	−0.051 (0.092)
Edu: High School	−0.118 (0.132)	0.015 (0.110)
Edu: College and Above	−0.090 (0.138)	0.349** (0.167)
Age: 30-50	0.079 (0.066)	0.022 (0.074)
Age: 50+	−0.045 (0.101)	0.104 (0.092)
Religiosity	0.017 (0.017)	−0.018 (0.022)
Internet User	0.308*** (0.095)	−0.053 (0.099)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.273*** (0.083)	0.047 (0.099)
News Interest	−0.330*** (0.115)	0.129 (0.123)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	5.59***	5.84***
Observations	998	743
R^2	0.155	0.115
Adjusted R^2	0.115	0.078
Residual Std. Error	0.919 (df = 952)	0.833 (df = 713)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

When a mother works for pay, her children suffer

Over three quarters of Iranian and Iraqi respondents believed that when a mother works for pay, her children suffer.

79% of Iranians and 78% of Iraqis agreed or strongly agreed that when a mother works for pay, her children suffer.

44% of **IRANIAN** women versus 46% of Iranian men agreed with the statement (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response for men was higher than that for women, at 11.5% for Iranian men and 9.9% for Iranian women.

37% of **IRAQI** women strongly agreed with the statement, as opposed to 53% of Iraqi men (significant at the 0.01 level). While 49% of respondents without any education strongly agreed, only 15% of those with a college educated strongly agreed (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was low among Iraqis, at 1.9% for men and 4.1% for women.

Figure 50



	OLS: Mother Works Children Suffer	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.155** (0.062)	0.369*** (0.068)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.080 (0.113)	−0.051 (0.093)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.065 (0.109)	0.045 (0.087)
Income: Saved	0.086 (0.121)	−0.081 (0.131)
Edu: Primary	−0.020 (0.142)	0.059 (0.090)
Edu: Middle School	−0.059 (0.129)	−0.178* (0.100)
Edu: High School	−0.025 (0.121)	−0.058 (0.112)
Edu: College and Above	−0.036 (0.128)	−0.596*** (0.171)
Age: 30-50	−0.140** (0.062)	0.017 (0.073)
Age: 50+	−0.123 (0.088)	0.133 (0.092)
Religiosity	−0.002 (0.016)	0.008 (0.022)
Internet User	−0.111 (0.096)	0.176* (0.090)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.075 (0.081)	−0.221** (0.090)
News Interest	0.092 (0.089)	−0.222 (0.164)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	15.63***	3.87***
Observations	969	746
R^2	0.093	0.116
Adjusted R^2	0.048	0.081
Residual Std. Error	0.804 (df = 923)	0.833 (df = 716)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

What is an appropriate hijab in your view?

Most Iranians and Iraqis favored a headcover and Iraqi abaya, yet Iranians were more likely to prefer only a headcover and modest dress than were Iraqis.

Figure 51



Unlike for other questions, Iranians were less conservative than Iraqis when it came to headcoverings. The most liberal option offered was a headcover only, followed by headcover and modest dress, then headcover and Islamic Abaya, headcover and Iraqi Abaya/full chador, and finally the niqab and chador. The majority of Iranian and Iraqi respondents favored a headcover and Iraqi abaya, or full chador, with 53% of Iranians preferring this versus 65% of Iraqis (significant at the 0.01 level). The second most preferred hijab was a headcover and modest dress, which was significantly more popular in Iran than Iraq, with 37% of Iranians in support as opposed to 17% of Iraqis (significant at the 0.01 level). Surprisingly, there was no statistically significant gender difference in preferences for the Iraqi abaya/full chador.

IRANIANS who were more religious were less likely to favor the chador, and more likely to favor headcover and modest dress (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response for Iranians was 4.1% for men and 5.8% for women.

IRAQI men were significantly less likely to favor headcover and modest dress only than Iraqi women (significant at the 0.01 level). Iraqis with a college education were less likely to favor the full Iraqi abaya and more likely to favor headcover and modest dress (significant at the 0.01 level). Respondents between 18 and 30 were also less likely to favor the full Iraqi abaya than those between the ages of 30 and 50 (significant at the 0.01 level) and those over the age of 50 (significant at the 0.1 level). Non-response for Iraqis was 0.4% for men and 0.8% for women.

	OLS: Abaya/Chador		OLS: Headcover & Modest Dress	
	(Iraq)	(Iran)	(Iraq)	(Iran)
Male	0.055 (0.036)	0.058 (0.035)	−0.162*** (0.024)	−0.030 (0.035)
Income: Some difficulty	−0.014 (0.048)	0.045 (0.065)	0.039 (0.031)	−0.004 (0.064)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	−0.009 (0.047)	0.088 (0.063)	0.022 (0.030)	−0.035 (0.062)
Income: Saved	−0.091 (0.067)	0.062 (0.068)	0.147*** (0.044)	−0.024 (0.066)
Edu: Primary	0.030 (0.046)	−0.038 (0.084)	0.026 (0.030)	0.050 (0.083)
Edu: Middle School	−0.008 (0.050)	0.054 (0.077)	0.043 (0.032)	−0.050 (0.076)
Edu: High School	−0.016 (0.058)	0.025 (0.071)	0.098*** (0.037)	0.008 (0.070)
Edu: College and Above	−0.489*** (0.094)	0.063 (0.074)	0.281*** (0.061)	−0.059 (0.073)
Age: 30-50	0.138*** (0.038)	0.005 (0.036)	−0.087*** (0.025)	0.011 (0.035)
Age: 50+	0.088* (0.050)	0.059 (0.055)	−0.079** (0.032)	−0.034 (0.054)
Religiosity	−0.004 (0.012)	−0.019** (0.009)	0.018** (0.008)	0.010 (0.009)
News Interest	−0.003 (0.043)	0.070* (0.036)	−0.007 (0.028)	−0.036 (0.035)
Internet User	0.008 (0.070)	−0.138* (0.073)	−0.025 (0.046)	0.128* (0.072)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.004 (0.050)	−0.023 (0.040)	0.024 (0.033)	−0.002 (0.039)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

CHANGING VIEWS: WOMEN'S ISSUES

Figure 52



Besides asking respondents how they viewed certain gender issues (results above), we also asked them how a family member from an older generation might have perceived these issues when they were the respondent's current age. Iraqis generally perceived their responses to be more liberal than those of their parents'. The generational shift among Iranians was mixed: while they were generally more liberal, Iranian respondents looked upon working mothers more unfavorably than their parents.

Both Iraqis and Iranians argued that their parents would have been less supportive of a woman choosing her own spouse. There was a larger gap between the average view of Iraqis and that of their parents: 62% of Iraqis strongly agreed with free choice, versus only 24% of their parents being perceived as pro-free-choice (significant at the 0.01 level). In Iran, 64% of respondents agreed, versus only 40% of their parents (significant at the 0.01 level).

Iraqis and Iranians believed they were about 10% more likely than their parents to support equal rights and opportunities for both genders.

Iraqis noted a clear difference between their and their parents' generation on whether a woman's children suffer when she works, with 30% strongly agreeing as opposed to 43% of

their fathers. However, Iranians were on average more conservative on this issue than their parents, with 40% strongly agreeing versus only 35% of their fathers, perhaps highlighting the liberalism of the pre-revolutionary era.

For both Iranians and Iraqis, there was only a small difference between survey respondents and their parents' beliefs on whether or not a job was the best way to gain a woman's independence. Respondents were also nearly identical to their parents in the (near-universal) belief that a woman needed her husband's permission to work.

Both Iranians and Iraqis were slightly more likely to support women's education and political leadership. Relative to their own parents' views on gender equality in education, slightly fewer current respondents believed that a university education mattered more to men (Strongly agree Iraq: 16% current, 19% father; Strongly agree Iran: 25% current, 29% father; differences significant at the 0.01 level), as well as whether or not men made better leaders than women (Strongly agree Iraq: 28% current, 36% father; Strongly agree Iran: 31% current, 45% father; differences significant at the 0.01 level).

Non-response in this section was very high. However, respondents were significantly more likely to state that they "Do not know" than in other sections of the survey. This indicates high non-response rates were not due to the sensitivity of the question but rather an understandable lack of knowledge about the norms that their father might have embraced during his youth. Average responses of "Do not know" were 18% as opposed to 2% average in the sample as a whole.

7 Democracy and Human Rights

Highlights

- Respondents from both Iran and Iraq were extremely divided on issues of democracy and human rights, with about half of respondents in each country viewing different aspects of democracy at least somewhat negatively.
- Iranians were more critical of the economic and political aspects of democracy, while Iraqis were more critical of its social aspects.
- 57% of Iranians argued that a lack of respect for human rights is justified for security purposes, as opposed to only 29% of Iraqis.
- Wealthier Iranians were more likely to view democracy negatively, while more educated Iraqis were more likely to favor democratic norms.

Lack of human rights can be justified in order to maintain security

Iranians were more willing to sacrifice human rights for security purposes.

57% of Iranians supported sacrificing human rights for security, versus 29% of Iraqis (significant at the 0.01 level).

53% of **Iranian** men supported sacrificing human rights for security, versus 63% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). Wealthier respondents were more likely to support such a violation, with 35% of those who were able to save being in favor, as opposed to only 20% of those who faced significant difficulty (significant at the 0.01 level). 35% of respondents with a primary education were also highly supportive, as opposed to 27% of those with no education (significant 0.05 level). Non-response was much higher than average, at 16.8% for men and 25.8% for women.

33% of **Iraqi** men agreed that human rights could be sacrificed, as opposed to 25% of women. After adjusting for other factors, however—particularly education, income, and news interest—men were actually less likely to agree with the statement (significant at the 0.01 level). Higher levels of education were associated with decreasing willingness to sacrifice human rights for security purposes, with 19% of respondents with no education agreeing, 19% of those with a primary school education, 13% of those with a middle school education, 17% of those with a high school education, and 8% of those with a college education (significant at the 0.05, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.01 levels respectively). Non-response was around average, but gendered, at 2.8% for men and 10.1% for women.

Figure 53



	OLS: Sacrifice Human Rights for Security	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.244*** (0.083)	−0.269*** (0.082)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.096 (0.152)	0.192 (0.117)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.222 (0.147)	0.211* (0.115)
Income: Saved	0.478*** (0.154)	0.158 (0.160)
Edu: Primary	0.396** (0.176)	−0.194* (0.113)
Edu: Middle School	0.022 (0.169)	−0.248** (0.119)
Edu: High School	0.014 (0.147)	−0.328** (0.140)
Edu: College and Above	−0.137 (0.157)	−0.604*** (0.227)
Age: 30-50	−0.141* (0.077)	0.087 (0.090)
Age: 50+	−0.237* (0.124)	0.162 (0.123)
Religiosity	−0.018 (0.021)	0.024 (0.028)
Internet User	−0.013 (0.115)	−0.033 (0.117)
News Interest*Internet User	0.028 (0.105)	0.160 (0.113)
News Interest	0.046 (0.125)	0.391** (0.165)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	2.22***	2.04***
Observations	930	730
R^2	0.085	0.069
Adjusted R^2	0.038	0.030
Residual Std. Error	1.046 (df = 884)	1.012 (df = 700)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

Under a democratic system, the country's economic performance is weak

Though there was significant variation in views among Iranians and Iraqis, Iranians were as a whole more likely to say that democracy has a negative effect on economic growth.

Reflecting their relative isolation, Iranians were more likely to report that democracy leads to weaker economic growth, with 58% of Iranians agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement, versus 48% of Iraqis (difference significant 0.01 level).

Only 18% of **IRANIAN** men strongly agreed with the statement, as opposed to 42% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response was very high, at 26.0% for men and 31.9% of women.

While absolute levels were similar between **IRAQI** men and women, with 49% of men agreeing and 48% of women agreeing, this becomes statistically significant (at the 0.01 level) after controlling for other factors. 15% of respondents with a college education strongly agreed with the statement, as compared to 26% of those with a high school education and 33% of those with no education (significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively). Non-response for this question was above average, at 10.3% for men and 18.1% for women.

Figure 54



	OLS: In Democracy Econ is Weak	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.385*** (0.073)	−0.354*** (0.084)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.143 (0.145)	0.136 (0.116)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.010 (0.138)	0.049 (0.114)
Income: Saved	0.167 (0.145)	−0.022 (0.163)
Edu: Primary	0.152 (0.177)	−0.051 (0.109)
Edu: Middle School	0.294* (0.157)	−0.180 (0.110)
Edu: High School	0.189 (0.145)	−0.314** (0.134)
Edu: College and Above	0.114 (0.151)	−0.945*** (0.215)
Age: 30-50	−0.023 (0.069)	−0.118 (0.090)
Age: 50+	0.089 (0.109)	0.054 (0.116)
Religiosity	0.012 (0.020)	0.051* (0.028)
Internet User	−0.132 (0.099)	0.073 (0.113)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.131 (0.084)	−0.045 (0.118)
News Interest	−0.052 (0.125)	−0.060 (0.168)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	6.98***	4.69***
Observations	839	689
R^2	0.131	0.104
Adjusted R^2	0.081	0.065
Residual Std. Error	0.898 (df = 793)	0.976 (df = 659)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

Democracy negatively affects social and ethical values

Iraqis were more likely to agree that democracy negatively affects social and ethical values, but there was variation within both countries.

The majority of both Iranians and Iraqis agreed that democracy negatively affects social and ethical values, but Iraqis were more likely to espouse this view—probably because of their more direct experience with a difficult democratic transition.

27% of **IRANIAN** men stated that democracy negatively affects social and ethical values, as compared to 43% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was high, at 18% for men and 28% for women.

Wealthier **IRAQIS** were more likely to believe that democracy had a negative effect on social and ethical values, with 39% who had significant difficulty meeting their needs strongly agreeing. Similar respondents with higher income stability were more likely to agree (significant at the 0.05 level), although these results are partially offset by higher education rates among this group. More educated individuals were less convinced that democracy had these adverse effects, with 47% of those with no education strongly agreeing, as opposed to 42% of those with a high school education (significant at the 0.05 level) and 13% of those with a college education (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was slightly below average, at 2.5% for men and 7.8% for women.

Figure 55



	OLS: Dem. Neg. Affects Social and Ethical Values	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.206*** (0.074)	−0.084 (0.080)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.021 (0.143)	0.247** (0.105)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.067 (0.138)	0.316*** (0.103)
Income: Saved	0.071 (0.145)	0.220 (0.161)
Edu: Primary	0.239 (0.170)	−0.031 (0.093)
Edu: Middle School	0.253 (0.162)	−0.163 (0.100)
Edu: High School	0.139 (0.147)	−0.266** (0.123)
Edu: College and Above	−0.136 (0.153)	−1.203*** (0.214)
Age: 30-50	−0.128* (0.070)	0.117 (0.078)
Age: 50+	−0.032 (0.107)	0.123 (0.103)
Religiosity	0.001 (0.020)	0.020 (0.025)
Internet User	−0.092 (0.107)	0.116 (0.102)
News Interest*Internet User	0.072 (0.094)	−0.185* (0.107)
News Interest	0.212* (0.115)	−0.242 (0.164)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	2.25***	3.27***
Observations	904	729
R^2	0.087	0.118
Adjusted R^2	0.039	0.082
Residual Std. Error	0.927 (df = 858)	0.908 (df = 699)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

Democratic regimes are not effective at maintaining order and stability

Both countries were almost evenly divided on whether democratic regimes promote instability.

Over half of Iranians and Iraqis believed that democracies cannot maintain order and stability, with 28% of both Iranians and Iraqis strongly agreeing with this statement on democracy ineffectiveness. However, among those who disagreed with this statement, Iraqis were more emphatic in their rejection, with significantly larger proportion of strong disagreement.

20% of **IRANIAN** men strongly agreed that democratic regimes were ineffective at maintaining order and stability, versus 43% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was very high, at 25.8% for men and 34.4% for women.

59% of **IRAQI** men agreed with this statement, versus 54% of Iraqi women (significant at the 0.05 level). Only 12% of respondents with a college education agreed, as opposed to 34% of those with no education (significant 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was heavily gendered, at 5.3% for men and 15.8% for women, though notably lower than that of Iranians.

Figure 56



	OLS: Dem. Neg. Affects Order and Stability	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.378*** (0.074)	−0.212** (0.083)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.060 (0.143)	0.189* (0.113)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.002 (0.135)	0.122 (0.109)
Income: Saved	0.245* (0.145)	0.046 (0.156)
Edu: Primary	0.189 (0.167)	0.118 (0.105)
Edu: Middle School	0.117 (0.160)	−0.174 (0.111)
Edu: High School	−0.028 (0.146)	−0.071 (0.126)
Edu: College and Above	−0.213 (0.152)	−0.966*** (0.183)
Age: 30-50	−0.125* (0.072)	−0.071 (0.084)
Age: 50+	−0.005 (0.111)	0.059 (0.108)
Religiosity	−0.003 (0.020)	0.005 (0.025)
Internet User	−0.045 (0.102)	0.100 (0.110)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.064 (0.094)	−0.117 (0.109)
News Interest	0.068 (0.120)	−0.064 (0.167)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	3.33***	3.16***
Observations	837	707
R^2	0.128	0.096
Adjusted R^2	0.078	0.058
Residual Std. Error	0.914 (df = 791)	0.940 (df = 677)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Four levels: 0= Strongly Disagree to 3= Strongly Agree

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE: Memory Primes, Human Rights, and Democracy

For Iraqis, religious memory primes triggered more negative views of democracy's stability and compatibility with Islam. Similarly, for Iranians, religious primes made respondents more likely to sacrifice human rights for stability. In contrast, reminders of corruption made Iranian participants more supportive of democracy: they were less likely to state that democracy was anti-Islam, that it made the economy weak, or that it had negative social and ethical implications.

Prior to asking respondents the four primary questions on human rights and democracy, each respondent was asked to elaborate on a memory, which would serve as a prime for that question. Prime categories for Iraqis and Iranians overlapped where relevant (any memory, religious memory, memory of corruption) but were also modified to suit realistic experiences in each country (sectarianism in Iraq, financial hardship due to sanctions in Iran).

IRANIANS were least sensitive to the hardship prime. When given a religious prime, however, respondents became more willing to sacrifice human rights for security purposes (significant at the 0.05 level). When given a corruption prime, respondents were more likely to *disagree* that democracy was anti-Islam (significant at the 0.05 level), that democracy made the economy weak (significant at the 0.05 level), or that democracy had a negative impact on social and ethical values (significant at the 0.1 level). This underscores the fact that while respondents state overwhelmingly positive views of the current Iranian regime, there are underlying frustrations with corruption.

IRAQIS were sensitive to the religious prime. When given a religious prime, respondents were more likely to agree that democracy was unstable and that it was anti-Islam (both significant at the 0.05 level).

Figure 57



	OLS: Democracy Primes (Iran)				
	Dem Unstable	Dem Anti Islam	Dem Econ Weak	Dem Neg Soc Eth	Sac HR for Sec
Prime: Religious	−0.080 (0.080)	−0.054 (0.074)	−0.085 (0.077)	−0.047 (0.074)	0.207** (0.082)
Prime: Corrupt	−0.058 (0.081)	−0.177** (0.075)	−0.185** (0.079)	−0.147* (0.076)	0.054 (0.082)
Prime: Hardship	−0.033 (0.077)	−0.098 (0.073)	−0.127* (0.074)	−0.107 (0.073)	0.045 (0.081)
Constant	2.805*** (0.057)	2.915*** (0.051)	2.858*** (0.054)	2.947*** (0.052)	2.610*** (0.057)
Province FE	No	No	No	No	No
F Statistic	0.37	1.95	1.99	1.47	2.36*
Observations	1,186	1,326	1,189	1,286	1,323
R^2	0.001	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.005
Adjusted R^2	−0.002	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.003
Residual Std. Error	0.960 (df = 1182)	0.969 (df = 1322)	0.938 (df = 1185)	0.948 (df = 1282)	1.055 (df = 1319)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

	OLS: Democracy Primes (Iraq)				
	Dem Unstable	Dem Anti Islam	Dem Econ Weak	Dem Neg Soc Eth	Sac HR for Sec
Prime: Sect Pleasant	0.073 (0.070)	0.014 (0.069)	0.007 (0.073)	0.088 (0.070)	−0.076 (0.071)
Prime: Any	0.003 (0.068)	−0.029 (0.067)	−0.071 (0.070)	0.015 (0.067)	−0.022 (0.069)
Prime: Religious	0.157** (0.067)	0.112 (0.069)	−0.079 (0.072)	0.118* (0.066)	0.030 (0.070)
Prime: Corrupt	0.045 (0.070)	0.060 (0.070)	−0.040 (0.074)	0.069 (0.070)	−0.031 (0.071)
Constant	2.679*** (0.049)	2.377*** (0.048)	2.606*** (0.050)	2.882*** (0.048)	2.100*** (0.050)
Province FE	No	No	No	No	No
F Statistic	1.88	1.31	0.59	1.1	0.61
Observations	2,127	2,200	2,044	2,262	2,237
R^2	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.001	−0.001	0.0001	−0.001
Residual Std. Error	1.000 (df = 2122)	1.023 (df = 2195)	1.046 (df = 2039)	1.030 (df = 2257)	1.049 (df = 2232)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

8

The State of Democracy in Iran and Iraq

Highlights

- Iranian respondents exhibited substantial faith in the current party and government system. Over 70% believed the current party was the best to lead Iran, more than half stated that they could criticize the government without fear, and over 60% saw the most recent elections as completely free and fair.
- Iraqis, on the other hand, expressed dissatisfaction with the current regime. 50% stated that there were major breaches in the most recent parliamentary elections and over 70% argued that no party was suitable to lead Iraq. Over 80%, however, stated that they were able to criticize the current regime without fear—though this appears to be primarily out of a perception of the regime's weakness, rather than out of belief in its fairness.
- While voting behavior is difficult to measure through self-reports due to a well-known tendency toward overreporting, Iranians and Iraqis in the sample appear to be more politically active than the average citizen in their respective nations.

Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections?

Around three quarters of Iranians and Iraqis in the sample said they voted, a turnout rate that was higher than that in their respective countries, though this could be due to the upward bias of self-reported voting.

88% of Iranians and 80% of Iraqis stated they voted in the last parliamentary elections. These figures are significantly more than the 60% officially reported turnout for the entire Iraqi population, and the 60% turnout for the Iranian population.[70] One possible interpretation of these results is that our population is more politically active than the countries' populations as a whole. However, over-reporting of voting behavior is common in survey contexts, and this could also be driving the high proportion of self-reported voting.

Wealthier **Iranians** were more likely to report that they voted. 79% of those who had significant difficulty meeting daily needs reported voting, as compared to 86% of those with some difficulty meeting daily needs, 89% of those with no notable difficulty , and 92% of those who saved (all significant at the 0.01 level). Older respondents were also more likely to vote, with 79% of those between 18 and 30, 92% of those between 30 and 50, and 96% of those over the age of fifty (differences significant at the 0.01 level) reporting as such. Non-response for this question was low, at 4.6% for men and 7.2% for women.

Older **Iraqis** were also more likely to vote, with 73% between the ages of 18 and 30 voting, as compared to 87% of those between 30 and 50, and 88% of those over 50 (both significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response was very low, at 0.36% for men and 0.38% for women.

Figure 58



	OLS: Voted in last Election	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.026 (0.024)	0.056* (0.032)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.085* (0.050)	0.001 (0.043)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.102** (0.049)	−0.021 (0.042)
Income: Saved	0.123** (0.051)	0.017 (0.054)
Edu: Primary	0.018 (0.044)	−0.003 (0.042)
Edu: Middle School	−0.003 (0.041)	−0.067 (0.045)
Edu: High School	−0.028 (0.039)	−0.066 (0.055)
Edu: College and Above	−0.027 (0.042)	0.084 (0.053)
Age: 30-50	0.077*** (0.023)	0.238*** (0.036)
Age: 50+	0.117*** (0.027)	0.281*** (0.042)
Religiosity	0.0002 (0.006)	−0.002 (0.011)
Internet User	−0.157*** (0.042)	0.045 (0.047)
News Interest*Internet User	0.199*** (0.040)	0.058 (0.045)
News Interest	0.073*** (0.026)	0.026 (0.064)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	2.86***	5.77***
Observations	1,005	749
R^2	0.133	0.131
Adjusted R^2	0.093	0.096
Residual Std. Error	0.306 (df = 959)	0.391 (df = 719)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Two levels: 0= No to 1= Yes	

[70] As reported by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, *www.idea.int*

How would you characterize the last parliamentary elections?

Most Iranians felt their elections were free and fair; most Iraqis felt the opposite.

70% of Iranians classified the last parliamentary elections as completely free and fair, as compared to just over 20% of Iraqis (significant at the 0.01 level). In fact, 50% of Iraqis agreed that there were "major breaches" in the most recent elections, signifying an underlying lack of confidence in the current political system.

7% of **IRANIAN** men argued that the elections had major breaches, versus 15% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was above average, at 11.3% for men and 19.6% for women.

Wealthier **IRAQIS** were more likely to argue that the elections were free and fair. 61% of those who had significant difficulty meeting their needs stated that the elections had major breaches, as compared to 49% of those who had some difficulty meeting their daily needs (significant at the 0.05 level), 48% of those with no notable difficulty (significant at the 0.1 level), and 38% of those who were able to save (significant at the 0.01 level). 10% of respondents with a college education reported that the last elections were completely free and fair, as opposed to 6% of those with no education (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was very high, at 17.1% for men and double that for women (34.4%).

Figure 59



	OLS: Elections were Free and Fair	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.255*** (0.055)	0.140* (0.073)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.076 (0.100)	0.250*** (0.093)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.016 (0.096)	0.320*** (0.092)
Income: Saved	−0.008 (0.105)	0.553*** (0.142)
Edu: Primary	−0.076 (0.107)	0.052 (0.095)
Edu: Middle School	−0.045 (0.101)	0.006 (0.101)
Edu: High School	−0.145 (0.099)	0.051 (0.116)
Edu: College and Above	−0.132 (0.103)	−0.507*** (0.142)
Age: 30-50	−0.074 (0.051)	−0.078 (0.076)
Age: 50+	0.004 (0.072)	−0.134 (0.105)
Religiosity	0.0001 (0.014)	−0.035 (0.024)
Internet User	−0.309*** (0.084)	−0.315*** (0.093)
News Interest*Internet User	0.292*** (0.077)	0.106 (0.091)
News Interest	0.027 (0.069)	−0.033 (0.168)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	3***	18.9***
Observations	922	555
R^2	0.118	0.108
Adjusted R^2	0.073	0.061
Residual Std. Error	0.637 (df = 876)	0.750 (df = 526)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Three levels: 0= Major Breaches to 2= Completely Free

Who should lead the country?

Iraqis show a significant lack of confidence in political parties in their country; Iranians largely support the ruling party.

An underlying lack of confidence in the Iraqi political system is evident by 60% of Iraqi respondents stating that "no party is suitable to lead Iraq."

70% of **IRANIAN** respondents were overwhelmingly supportive of the authority of the Supreme Leader Khamenei. The next most popular political movement were the Reformists, followed by the Fundamentalists, both supported by around 10% of respondents. Respondents over the age of fifty were more likely to support the absolute religious leadership of Khamenei than those ages 18 to 30 (significant at the 0.01 level), while internet users were less likely to support it (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was slightly below average, at 5% for men and 10.7% for women.

IRAQI men, wealthier people, and those interested in the news who did not get their news from the internet were all less likely to say there was no suitable party (all significant at the 0.01 level). More educated individuals and those over the age of fifty were also more likely to say there was no suitable party (significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively). Non-response for this question was around average, at 5.9% for men and 17.5% for women.

Figure 60



	OLS Iran: Only Khamenei	OLS Iraq: None Suitable
Male	−0.056* (0.034)	−0.113*** (0.041)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.061 (0.062)	−0.059 (0.053)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.047 (0.060)	−0.161*** (0.051)
Income: Saved	−0.004 (0.066)	−0.254*** (0.079)
Edu: Primary	−0.004 (0.070)	0.071 (0.051)
Edu: Middle School	−0.009 (0.070)	0.058 (0.057)
Edu: High School	−0.045 (0.063)	0.156** (0.064)
Edu: College and Above	−0.061 (0.067)	0.231** (0.108)
Age: 30-50	0.014 (0.035)	−0.017 (0.044)
Age: 50+	0.098** (0.048)	0.141*** (0.054)
Religiosity	0.007 (0.009)	−0.012 (0.014)
News Interest	0.057** (0.029)	−0.156*** (0.057)
News Interest * Internet User	0.006 (0.034)	0.066 (0.063)
Internet User	−0.171** (0.068)	−0.050 (0.081)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	2.9***	104.15***
Observations	967	673
R^2	0.080	0.141
Adjusted R^2	0.035	0.102
Residual Std. Error	0.447 (df = 921)	0.466 (df = 643)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Two levels Iran: 1 = Only Khamenei, 0 = Other
Two levels Iraq: 1 = None Suitable, 0 = Other

Are Islamic parties better, worse, or the same as other political parties in Iraq? (Iraq only)

Few Iraqis view Islamic parties negatively.

78% of Iraqis believed that Islamic parties were the same or better than other political parties.

IRAQIS that were less educated were more likely to argue that Islamic parties were better for Iraq, with 53% with no education arguing this was the case, as opposed to 42% of those with a primary education, 41% with a middle school education, 35% with a high school education, and only 9% with a college education (all differences significant at the 0.01 level).

Respondents who stated they had no notable difficulties meeting their needs were also less likely to prefer Islamic parties than those who had significant difficulty meeting their needs, at 34% as opposed to 38% (significant at the 0.05 level). Respondents above the age of fifty were also more likely to see Islamic parties negatively, with only 28% of those above the age of fifty arguing that Islamic parties were better, as opposed to 41% of those between the ages of 18 and 30 (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was 4.1% for men and 9.4% for women.

Figure 61



	OLS: Islamic Parties (Iraq)
Male	0.055 (0.063)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.093 (0.082)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.159** (0.080)
Income: Saved	−0.048 (0.117)
Edu: Primary	−0.244*** (0.080)
Edu: Middle School	−0.246*** (0.085)
Edu: High School	−0.393*** (0.099)
Edu: College and Above	−0.684*** (0.162)
Age: 30-50	0.001 (0.065)
Age: 50+	−0.269*** (0.085)
Religiosity	0.023 (0.021)
Internet User	0.119 (0.081)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.034 (0.084)
News Interest	0.142 (0.131)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	18.33***
Observations	713
R^2	0.103
Adjusted R^2	0.064
Residual Std. Error	0.737 (df = 683)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Three levels: 0 = Worse to 2 = Better

Can Iranian/Iraqi citizens nowadays criticize the ruling system without fear?

Iraqis felt much more comfortable than Iranians criticizing the ruling system.

As a whole, Iraqis felt much more comfortable criticizing the ruling system than Iranians, with 64% of Iranians stating they can criticize the system without fear, as opposed to 92% of Iraqis (difference significant at the 0.01 level).

68% of **IRANIAN** men believed they could criticize the system without fear, versus 57% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). 70% of respondents who were interested in the news and got their news from the internet strongly agreed, as opposed to 62% of those who were less interested in the news and did not get their news from the internet (significant 0.01 level) and 49% of those who were less interested in the news but got their news from the internet (significant 0.05 level). Non-response for this question was 5.9% for men and 10.1% for women.

93% of **IRAQI** men felt they could criticize the system without fear, as opposed to 91% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.05 level). However, men's slightly higher willingness to criticize appears to be driven primarily by demographic differences from women. Respondents with a primary school education were more likely than those with no education to agree with this statement, at 71% versus 58% respectively (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response for this question was 1.6% for men and 4.2% for women.

Figure 62



	OLS: Criticize System without Fear	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.135*** (0.035)	−0.049** (0.023)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.006 (0.067)	0.018 (0.030)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.086 (0.065)	−0.016 (0.031)
Income: Saved	0.091 (0.069)	0.006 (0.045)
Edu: Primary	0.107 (0.083)	0.061** (0.031)
Edu: Middle School	0.033 (0.079)	0.050 (0.034)
Edu: High School	−0.017 (0.072)	0.030 (0.038)
Edu: College and Above	0.010 (0.075)	0.091* (0.048)
Age: 30-50	0.062* (0.035)	−0.007 (0.026)
Age: 50+	0.077 (0.052)	0.038 (0.032)
Religiosity	0.017* (0.009)	0.003 (0.007)
Internet User	−0.135** (0.054)	0.053* (0.030)
News Interest*Internet User	0.193*** (0.048)	−0.010 (0.027)
News Interest	0.010 (0.053)	0.069* (0.037)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	12.21***	1.38*
Observations	988	739
R^2	0.117	0.056
Adjusted R^2	0.075	0.017
Residual Std. Error	0.465 (df = 942)	0.279 (df = 709)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Two levels: 0 = No to 1 = Yes	

EMIGRATION

Only around one quarter of Iranians and Iraqis had considered emigrating, with Iranian respondents citing primarily economic concerns and Iraqis citing security and economic concerns.

Only about one-quarter of Iranian or Iraqi pilgrims said they had considered emigrating.

57% of **IRANIAN** respondents had considered emigrating for economic reasons, followed by other reasons (25%), and political reasons (14%). They were unlikely to reference security concerns as a reason to emigrate (5%). Non-response was 3.9% for men and 5.7% for women.

38% of **IRAQIS** who considered emigrating did so for security reasons, followed closely by economic reasons (34%), other reasons (25%), then political reasons (22%), and finally family reasons (20%). Non-response was 0.4% for men, and 0.8% for women.

Figure 63



Figure 64



	OLS: Emigrate	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	−0.105*** (0.032)	0.010 (0.035)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.042 (0.061)	−0.023 (0.044)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.126** (0.058)	−0.069 (0.042)
Income: Saved	−0.101 (0.063)	−0.078 (0.061)
Edu: Primary	0.001 (0.060)	0.020 (0.039)
Edu: Middle School	0.068 (0.061)	0.032 (0.042)
Edu: High School	0.097* (0.057)	0.049 (0.052)
Edu: College and Above	0.066 (0.061)	0.347*** (0.097)
Age: 30-50	−0.109*** (0.032)	0.028 (0.034)
Age: 50+	−0.184*** (0.043)	−0.083** (0.039)
Religiosity	0.008 (0.008)	0.010 (0.010)
Internet User	0.124** (0.052)	0.044 (0.045)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.050 (0.047)	−0.054 (0.046)
News Interest	−0.005 (0.040)	0.120 (0.076)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	4.53***	3.26***
Observations	1,007	750
R^2	0.121	0.068
Adjusted R^2	0.080	0.031
Residual Std. Error	0.417 (df = 961)	0.394 (df = 720)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Two levels: 0 = No to 1 = Yes	

9 Regional Conflict

Highlights

- Respondents indicated high levels of support for Shiite causes throughout the Middle East. Iranians were slightly more supportive than Iraqis of these causes, though support from respondents of both countries was overwhelming.
- Around fifty percent of Iranians and forty percent of Iraqis believed that Bashar al-Assad would win the war in Syria. However, the second most predicted outcome was a negotiated settlement brokered by the international community—a somewhat unexpected show of confidence in international brokers despite their continued unsuccessful efforts to even reach a lasting ceasefire. About a quarter of Iraqis, on the other hand, said they believed the conflict in Syria would not end, indicative of their own experience with drawn out conflict and instability.
- Support among Iraqis for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Iraqi state was high. Over eighty percent opposed the establishment of an autonomous Sunni region or a separate Kurdish state.

Financial Assistance to Groups in Conflict

Iranians and Iraqis demonstrated high levels of support for Shiite causes throughout the Middle East.

Despite the high political and economic cost of involvement in conflicts in the Middle East, the vast majority of Iranians and Iraqis supported giving financial assistance to Shiite groups across the region. While they were least likely to support Hamas, with 60% of Iranians and Iraqis fully supporting them, over 75% of Iranians and Iraqis were willing to support the Houthis in Yemen, Syria's government army, Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi, the Shiite opposition in Bahrain, and Afghan Shiite groups. This illustrates the overwhelming support for Iran's policies that prop up militant groups throughout the Middle East.

Figure 65



IRANIAN men were less likely to support Hamas than their female counterparts (significant at the 0.01 level). Wealthier Iraqis were also more likely to support all groups (significant at either 0.01 or 0.05 levels), while more educated Iranians were more likely to support the Syrian Government army or Afghan Shiite groups (significant at either 0.01 or 0.05 levels). 4.4% and 10.3% for Iranian men and 6.4% and 11.4% for Iranian women.

IRAQI men were less likely to support Hamas than Iraqi women but more likely to support Hashd al Shaabi (both significant at the 0.01 level). More educated and older respondents were more likely to support the Houthis in Yemen (significant at the 0.05 level) and the opposition in Bahrain (significant at the 0.01 level). Overall, 57% of Iraqis supported Hamas, 66% Syria's government army, 68% Afghan Shiite militias, 77% the opposition in Bahrain, 79% the Houthis in Yemen, 83% Hezbollah, 99% Hashd al-Shaabi. Non-response for these questions was low, ranging from 1.5% to 11% for Iraqi men and 1.9% to 16% for Iraqi women

When asked to choose a cause, however, the majority of Iranians and the vast majority of Iraqis chose to donate to Hashd al-Shaabi, the Iraqi Shi'a volunteer groups fighting against ISIS in Iraq. These numbers averaged 37% for Iranians and 96% for Iraqis (significant at the 0.01 level).

	Financial Assistance (Iranian Respondents)						
	Hamas	Hezbollah	Hashd al Shaabi	Yemen Houthis	Bahrain Opposition	Syrian Govt Army	Afghan Shiite
Male	−0.298*** (0.067)	0.008 (0.049)	0.042 (0.059)	−0.027 (0.065)	−0.056 (0.067)	−0.010 (0.058)	0.045 (0.065)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.226 (0.141)	0.164 (0.110)	0.447*** (0.136)	0.258* (0.143)	0.265* (0.141)	0.212* (0.109)	0.268** (0.120)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.279** (0.135)	0.221** (0.106)	0.423*** (0.133)	0.354*** (0.137)	0.206 (0.141)	0.255** (0.106)	0.236** (0.116)
Income: Saved	0.289** (0.144)	0.284*** (0.109)	0.543*** (0.136)	0.426*** (0.147)	0.297** (0.147)	0.168 (0.114)	0.227* (0.126)
Edu: Primary	0.270 (0.167)	0.060 (0.114)	0.024 (0.147)	0.284* (0.157)	0.061 (0.163)	0.213 (0.139)	0.128 (0.156)
Edu: Middle School	0.165 (0.161)	−0.114 (0.119)	−0.013 (0.135)	0.054 (0.163)	0.054 (0.157)	0.191 (0.128)	0.265* (0.142)
Edu: High School	0.223 (0.148)	0.073 (0.103)	0.141 (0.120)	0.166 (0.145)	0.101 (0.141)	0.266** (0.118)	0.234* (0.131)
Edu: College and Above	0.190 (0.156)	0.101 (0.105)	0.187 (0.126)	0.294* (0.152)	0.195 (0.146)	0.272** (0.124)	0.387*** (0.137)
Age: 30-50	−0.017 (0.067)	−0.057 (0.047)	−0.005 (0.057)	0.094 (0.065)	0.122* (0.066)	0.010 (0.059)	0.099 (0.066)
Age: 50+	−0.032 (0.100)	0.005 (0.068)	−0.010 (0.085)	0.041 (0.090)	0.204** (0.093)	0.068 (0.092)	0.214** (0.101)
Religiosity:	0.011 (0.017)	−0.004 (0.011)	−0.003 (0.015)	−0.013 (0.017)	0.016 (0.017)	0.005 (0.016)	−0.006 (0.017)
Internet User	−0.343*** (0.103)	−0.168** (0.071)	−0.327*** (0.091)	−0.370*** (0.099)	−0.229** (0.102)	−0.416*** (0.090)	−0.256** (0.099)
News Interest * Internet User	0.235** (0.099)	0.047 (0.067)	0.077 (0.087)	0.092 (0.094)	0.094 (0.095)	0.264*** (0.079)	0.113 (0.088)
News Interest	0.216** (0.095)	0.022 (0.064)	−0.001 (0.070)	0.054 (0.086)	0.108 (0.089)	0.038 (0.092)	0.176* (0.101)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	2.85***	2.25***	3.45***	2.87***	2.13***	3.42***	3.61***
Observations	1,001	1,005	991	954	967	997	991
R^2	0.083	0.058	0.084	0.084	0.067	0.077	0.079
Adjusted R^2	0.040	0.014	0.041	0.039	0.021	0.033	0.035
Residual Std. Error	0.930 (df = 955)	0.622 (df = 959)	0.742 (df = 945)	0.872 (df = 908)	0.890 (df = 921)	0.796 (df = 951)	0.883 (df = 945)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
For each header, based on responses to
Four levels: 0 = Oppose to 3 = Support

	Financial Assistance (Iraq)						
	Hamas	Hezbollah	Hashd al Shaabi	Yemen Houthis	Bahrain Opposition	Syrian Govt Army	Afghan Shiite
Male	−0.948*** (0.104)	0.034 (0.052)	0.062*** (0.021)	0.073 (0.070)	0.126* (0.069)	−0.107 (0.080)	−0.022 (0.069)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.237* (0.137)	0.017 (0.062)	−0.003 (0.011)	0.038 (0.086)	0.099 (0.098)	0.061 (0.105)	0.049 (0.091)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.188 (0.134)	0.018 (0.059)	−0.044*** (0.017)	0.074 (0.081)	0.182* (0.094)	0.056 (0.103)	0.036 (0.089)
Income: Saved	0.083 (0.192)	−0.052 (0.096)	0.032 (0.022)	−0.101 (0.133)	0.073 (0.139)	−0.222 (0.147)	0.159 (0.128)
Edu: Primary	−0.056 (0.127)	0.030 (0.063)	−0.022 (0.020)	0.127 (0.098)	0.128 (0.101)	−0.115 (0.102)	0.045 (0.088)
Edu: Middle School	0.126 (0.131)	0.063 (0.064)	−0.008 (0.021)	0.346*** (0.087)	0.304*** (0.097)	0.200* (0.109)	0.084 (0.093)
Edu: High School	−0.219 (0.151)	0.003 (0.081)	−0.0001 (0.019)	0.232** (0.106)	0.176 (0.117)	0.055 (0.125)	0.024 (0.109)
Edu: College and Above	0.167 (0.239)	−0.182 (0.124)	−0.133 (0.094)	0.175 (0.138)	0.157 (0.158)	0.330 (0.202)	−0.239 (0.176)
Age: 30-50	−0.164 (0.100)	0.030 (0.046)	−0.017 (0.018)	0.195*** (0.068)	0.167** (0.068)	0.001 (0.083)	0.009 (0.072)
Age: 50+	−0.012 (0.131)	0.065 (0.056)	−0.006 (0.021)	0.355*** (0.080)	0.214** (0.095)	0.203* (0.109)	−0.008 (0.094)
Religiosity:	0.027 (0.033)	0.009 (0.016)	−0.010 (0.006)	0.016 (0.020)	0.054** (0.022)	0.028 (0.027)	0.028 (0.023)
Internet User	−0.178 (0.124)	−0.022 (0.063)	0.021 (0.017)	0.002 (0.091)	−0.040 (0.089)	0.021 (0.104)	−0.127 (0.090)
News Interest * Internet User	0.054 (0.138)	0.009 (0.065)	−0.050** (0.022)	0.092 (0.089)	−0.091 (0.092)	0.008 (0.106)	−0.003 (0.092)
News Interest	−0.110 (0.231)	−0.080 (0.101)	0.021 (0.016)	0.135 (0.107)	−0.268 (0.168)	0.090 (0.167)	−0.279** (0.142)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	8.12***	2.12***	0.38	2.74***	1.9***	2.57***	4.71***
Observations	714	736	750	719	714	724	680
R^2	0.196	0.025	0.067	0.074	0.060	0.055	0.044
Adjusted R^2	0.162	−0.015	0.029	0.035	0.020	0.016	0.001
Residual Std. Error	1.161 (df = 684)	0.537 (df = 706)	0.226 (df = 720)	0.762 (df = 689)	0.805 (df = 684)	0.946 (df = 694)	0.792 (df = 650)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
For each header, based on responses to
Four levels: 0 = Oppose to 3 = Support

How will the conflict in Syria end?

The majority of Iraqis and Iranians believe Bashar al-Assad will win the conflict in Syria.

Figure 66



While 34% of Iraqis and 48% of Iranians believed that Bashar al-Assad will win the conflict in Syria (significant at the 0.01 level), 22% of Iraqis and 11% of Iranians expressed the belief that the conflict would never end (significant at the 0.01 level), and 21% of Iranians and 19% of Iraqis believed that there would be a negotiated settlement.

Very few respondents believed that either the opposition would win (5% of Iraqis, 2% of Iranians) or terrorist groups would take control of the country (2% of Iraqis and Iranians). Iraqis were more likely than Iranians to believe the conflict in Syria would not end (significant at the 0.01 level), possibly a reflection of their own experience with ongoing conflict.

Women were more likely to believe that the conflict would not end (Iran: 18% women versus 11% men; Iraq: 36% women versus 17% men, significant at the 0.01 level). Meanwhile, in Iran, men were more likely to believe that there would be a negotiated settlement (Iran: 28% men versus 19% women, significant at the 0.01 level), while in Iraq, men were more likely to believe that Bashar al-Assad would win (35% women versus 49% men, significant at the 0.01 level).

Non-response for this question was above average, at 10.4% for Iranian men, 17.5% for Iranian women, 11.6% for Iraqi men, and 23.1% for Iraqi women.

Support for Sunni Autonomous Region and Kurdish State (Iraq only)

The vast majority of Iraqi respondents supported a united Iraq.

Figure 67



	OLS: Sunni Auto Region (Iraq)
Male	0.285*** (0.079)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.005 (0.103)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.139 (0.101)
Income: Saved	0.140 (0.144)
Edu: Primary	0.087 (0.099)
Edu: Middle School	0.184* (0.106)
Edu: High School	0.089 (0.123)
Edu: College and Above	0.147 (0.199)
Age: 30-50	0.060 (0.082)
Age: 50+	−0.048 (0.106)
Religiosity	−0.017 (0.026)
Internet User	0.165 (0.102)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.049 (0.106)
News Interest	0.302* (0.164)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	18.33***
Observations	743
R^2	0.071
Adjusted R^2	0.033
Residual Std. Error	0.939 (df = 713)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 4 levels: 0=Oppose to 3=Support

	OLS: Kurdish Ind State (Iraq)
Male	0.419*** (0.077)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.031 (0.100)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.024 (0.098)
Income: Saved	−0.035 (0.140)
Edu: Primary	0.073 (0.097)
Edu: Middle School	0.144 (0.104)
Edu: High School	0.070 (0.120)
Edu: College and Above	0.452** (0.194)
Age: 30-50	−0.124 (0.079)
Age: 50+	−0.234** (0.103)
Religiosity	−0.007 (0.025)
Internet User	0.001 (0.099)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.038 (0.103)
News Interest	0.368** (0.161)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	18.33***
Observations	742
R^2	0.099
Adjusted R^2	0.062
Residual Std. Error	0.913 (df = 712)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 4 levels: 0=Oppose to 3=Support

Over eighty percent of Iraqis did not support the establishment of any form of autonomous Sunni region, or a Kurdish independent state reflecting an overall support for the Iraqi state as it is currently structured.

Only 9% of **IRAQI** women supported the establishment of a Sunni autonomous region, versus 14% of Iraqi men (significant at the 0.01 level).

This gender gap also existed in the question on a Kurdish independent state, with 10% of women supporting its creation as compared to 14% of men (significant at the 0.01 level). Respondents with a college education were slightly more likely to support the establishment of a Kurdish state, with 16% supporting versus 14% with no education (significant at the 0.05 level). Only 7% of respondents over the age of fifty supported a Kurdish state, versus 15% of those ages 18 to 30 (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response for the question on both the Sunni and the Kurdish region was similarly low, at roughly 1% for men and 3% for women.

10 Iran: Nuclear Policy and International Relations

Highlights

- Respondents held overwhelmingly positive views of Iran's role in global affairs, indicating that among this group of pilgrims, Iran has succeeded in conveying itself as the protector of Shiite interests throughout the Middle East. These attitudes were consistent across various arenas of conflict.
- Most Iranian respondents also seemed to believe that Iran was at least somewhat integrated into the international community. However, participants primarily valued Iranian self-sufficiency, rather than integration and trade.
- There was also an understanding of the value of military and civilian cooperation with the United States, despite a recognition of the two countries' divergent interests.
- Iranian respondents, while overwhelmingly in favor of the development of nuclear energy for civilian use, were divided on whether or not Iran should develop nuclear weapons, as well as the religious implications of that decision. There were, however, clearly in favor of the successful implementation of the nuclear agreement.

Have Iran's interventions been negative or positive?

The majority of respondents thought Iran's interventions had a positive effect; Iranians were more likely to think their country's interventions had a positive effect than Iraqis.

Almost all Iranian respondents felt that Iran's interventions in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza, Bahrain, and Afghanistan were positive. Around 75% of Iraqis also felt Iran's intervention had been positive (significant at the 0.01 level).

Wealthier **IRANIANS** were more likely to prefer intervention as were older people (significant at the 0.05–0.1 and at the 0.05 level respectively). Internet users were significantly less likely to prefer intervention (significant at the 0.05 level). Overall, 58% of Iranian respondents stated that Iran's intervention in Afghanistan was positive, 63% stated that for Bahrain, 66% for Gaza, 69% for Yemen, 79% for Lebanon, 82% for Syria, and 86% for Iraq. Non-response ranged from 4.7% to 10.4% for men and 7.5% to 17% for women, with the lowest non-response for Iraq (4.7% men and 7.6% women) and Syria (4.9% men, 8.8% women), followed by Yemen (7.9% men and 14.2% women), Lebanon (5% men and 11.9% women), Gaza (7.7% men and 11.9% women), Bahrain (9.9% men and 16.2% women), and the greatest in Afghanistan (10.1 men and 16.9% women).

IRAQI males were more likely to prefer intervention (significant at the 0.01 level), as were those who only noted "some difficulty" as opposed to "significant"

Figure 68



	OLS: Iran Intervention (Overall)	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.048 (0.036)	0.249*** (0.086)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.146** (0.068)	0.237** (0.115)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.074 (0.066)	0.177 (0.111)
Income: Saved	0.135* (0.070)	0.096 (0.170)
Edu: Primary	−0.126 (0.085)	0.105 (0.113)
Edu: Middle School	−0.046 (0.079)	0.173 (0.120)
Edu: High School	−0.086 (0.072)	0.012 (0.140)
Edu: College and Above	−0.009 (0.076)	−0.110 (0.225)
Age: 30-50	0.088** (0.036)	0.277*** (0.092)
Age: 50+	0.122** (0.055)	0.267** (0.119)
Religiosity	−0.011 (0.009)	−0.040 (0.030)
News Interest	0.065* (0.035)	0.093 (0.101)
Internet User	−0.162** (0.073)	−0.022 (0.171)
News Interest * Internet User	0.019 (0.039)	−0.025 (0.119)
Province FE?	Yes	Yes
Observations	887	527
R^2	0.110	0.083
Adjusted R^2	0.062	0.031
Residual Std. Error	0.458 (df = 841)	0.882 (df = 498)
F Statistic	2.304*** (df = 45; 841)	1.604** (df = 28; 498)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Continuous Variable of average response across interventions. Range from 0 = Negative to 3 = Positive

financial difficulty meeting their daily needs (significant at the 0.05 level). Older people were also more likely to prefer intervention (significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels). 42%of Iraqis stated that Iran's intervention in Afghanistan was positive, 45% said so for Gaza and for Iraq, 54% for Bahrain and Yemen was positive, 58% stated so for Syria, and 60% for Lebanon. There was a wide range in non-response, which possibly resulted from the level of knowledge about different conflicts. There was only a 6.4% overall non-response rate for Iran's intervention in Iraq (1.3% men, 10.7% women), as opposed to 27.4% overall for Gaza (17.7% men, 35.7% women) and 31.4% overall for Afghanistan (17.7% men, 34.7% women).

What primarily motivates Iran's policy in the region?

Iranians and Iraqis had diverse views on Iran's policy motivations in the Middle East.

Iranians were most likely to think that ensuring Iran's security was its primary policy motivation in the Middle East, with 39% arguing this was their primary motivation (versus 28% of Iraqis, significant at the 0.01 level). Iraqis were most likely to think that the primary motivation was protecting vulnerable Shi'a communities, with 41% arguing this was the primary motivation (versus 27% of Iranians, significant at the 0.10 level). Iraqis were least likely to think that Iran's primary motivation was creating a more peaceful Middle East, and Iranians were least likely to think Iran's primary motivation was maximizing Iran's regional influence, highlighting the greater tendency for Iranians to see their country's role altruistically.

Figure 69



Iranian women were more likely to argue that Iran was most interested in its security or protecting Shi'a communities (56% women, 29% men; 54% women, 34% men, respectively; significant at the 0.01 level). **Iraqi** women were less likely to argue that Iran was interested in promoting a stable Middle East (12% women, 6% men; significant at the 0.01 level). More educated respondents were less likely to believe that Iran was interested in protecting vulnerable Shiite communities (Iran: 25% no education, 29% college education; Iraq: 50% no education, 27% college education; significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for Iranian respondents was 6% for men and 8.9% for women, and for Iraqi respondents 3.3% for men and 15.4% for women.

	OLS: Iran Policy Motivation (Iraqi Respondents)			
	Stable ME	Iran Security	Iran Influence	Protect Shi'a
Male	−0.066*** (0.022)	−0.089** (0.038)	0.043 (0.036)	0.112*** (0.042)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.0001 (0.032)	0.073 (0.050)	−0.081 (0.050)	0.008 (0.054)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	−0.015 (0.029)	0.065 (0.049)	−0.071 (0.050)	0.020 (0.053)
Income: Saved	0.014 (0.045)	0.179** (0.077)	−0.230*** (0.058)	0.037 (0.076)
Edu: Primary	−0.046 (0.032)	0.092* (0.050)	0.111** (0.043)	−0.158*** (0.053)
Edu: Middle School	−0.053 (0.035)	0.081 (0.053)	0.099** (0.048)	−0.127** (0.057)
Edu: High School	−0.048 (0.038)	0.102 (0.064)	0.100* (0.053)	−0.154** (0.064)
Edu: College and Above	0.046 (0.071)	−0.078 (0.098)	0.336*** (0.097)	−0.303*** (0.093)
Age: 30-50	0.031 (0.023)	−0.011 (0.042)	−0.102*** (0.038)	0.082* (0.042)
Age: 50+	0.069** (0.035)	0.018 (0.055)	−0.080 (0.050)	−0.007 (0.057)
Religiosity	0.006 (0.007)	−0.020 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)
Internet User	0.124*** (0.035)	−0.063 (0.052)	−0.038 (0.046)	−0.023 (0.053)
News Interest * Internet User	−0.096*** (0.034)	0.023 (0.051)	0.048 (0.048)	0.025 (0.056)
News Interest	−0.024 (0.031)	−0.159** (0.073)	0.073 (0.076)	0.110 (0.085)
Constant	−0.008 (0.053)	1.016*** (0.088)	0.111 (0.083)	−0.119 (0.089)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	688	688	688	688
R^2	0.082	0.066	0.072	0.089
Adjusted R^2	0.041	0.024	0.031	0.048
Residual Std. Error (df = 658)	0.266	0.454	0.420	0.474
F Statistic (df = 29; 658)	2.025***	1.592**	1.752***	2.205***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Each column represents binary variable per response, 1 = Response in heading, 0 = Other Response

	OLS: Iran Policy Motivation (Iranian Respondents)			
	Stable ME	Iran Security	Iran Influence	Protect Shi'a
Male	0.202*** (0.028)	−0.247*** (0.035)	0.026 (0.022)	0.018 (0.034)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.047 (0.058)	0.030 (0.061)	−0.010 (0.041)	0.026 (0.062)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	−0.023 (0.057)	0.005 (0.058)	0.003 (0.038)	0.015 (0.060)
Income: Saved	−0.038 (0.060)	−0.030 (0.065)	−0.006 (0.043)	0.074 (0.065)
Edu: Primary	0.050 (0.063)	−0.101 (0.078)	−0.027 (0.051)	0.078 (0.081)
Edu: Middle School	−0.006 (0.052)	−0.038 (0.074)	0.004 (0.050)	0.039 (0.074)
Edu: High School	0.065 (0.048)	−0.058 (0.068)	0.002 (0.048)	−0.009 (0.067)
Edu: College and Above	0.057 (0.053)	−0.088 (0.072)	0.005 (0.051)	0.027 (0.071)
Age: 30-50	0.050 (0.031)	−0.064* (0.034)	−0.007 (0.021)	0.021 (0.033)
Age: 50+	−0.049 (0.045)	−0.054 (0.053)	0.034 (0.036)	0.069 (0.053)
Religiosity	−0.002 (0.008)	0.013 (0.009)	−0.005 (0.006)	−0.006 (0.009)
Internet User	−0.024 (0.043)	−0.003 (0.054)	0.095** (0.038)	−0.069 (0.048)
News Interest * Internet User	0.016 (0.039)	−0.013 (0.047)	−0.070** (0.034)	0.068 (0.043)
News Interest	0.033 (0.050)	−0.088* (0.050)	−0.009 (0.032)	0.063 (0.054)
Constant	−0.028 (0.067)	0.826*** (0.129)	0.146 (0.098)	0.056 (0.109)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	993	993	993	993
R^2	0.128	0.131	0.052	0.051
Adjusted R^2	0.087	0.090	0.007	0.006
Residual Std. Error (df = 947)	0.411	0.458	0.301	0.454
F Statistic (df = 45; 947)	3.089***	3.171***	1.155	1.131

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Each column represents binary variable per response, 1 = Response in heading, 0 = Other Response

Iran's position in the international community (Iran only)

Most Iranians thought Iran was somewhat integrated into the international community.

About 40% of Iranians thought Iran was somewhat integrated into the international community, while 25% of individuals thought it was well-integrated and 20% thought that Iran stands alone.

IRANIAN women were less likely to believe that Iran was completely integrated, with only 13% of women believing Iran was completely integrated versus 20% of men. Iranians below the age of 30 were less likely to believe that Iran was integrated, perhaps because post-2006 international sanctions came during a formative time or have been in effect for a larger proportion of these respondents' lives. Only 13% of those between the ages of 18 and 30 thought that Iran was completely integrated, as opposed to 20% of those between the ages of 30 and 50 (significant at the 0.01 level).

Non-response among Iranians was higher than average, at 16% for Iranian men and 20% for Iranian women.

Figure 70



	OLS: Iran's Intnl Standing
	(Iran)
Male	0.151** (0.073)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.071 (0.135)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.127 (0.131)
Income: Saved	−0.064 (0.141)
Edu: Primary	−0.001 (0.179)
Edu: Middle School	0.079 (0.164)
Edu: High School	−0.048 (0.149)
Edu: College and Above	−0.091 (0.155)
Age: 30-50	0.263*** (0.075)
Age: 50+	0.217* (0.118)
Religiosity	−0.004 (0.020)
Internet User	−0.044 (0.111)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.015 (0.098)
News Interest	−0.229** (0.114)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	17.75***
Observations	920
R^2	0.082
Adjusted R^2	0.035
Residual Std. Error	0.968 (df = 874)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Four levels: 0=Integrated to 3=Stands Alone

Self Sufficiency or Trade? (Iran only)

Most Iranians value self sufficiency over trade.

61% of Iranians valued self-sufficiency over trade.

35% of **IRANIAN** women valued trade, versus 42% of Iranian men (significant at the 0.01 level). Other factors that might be expected to increase support of trade, like education and age, appear to have no statistically significant effect. Non-response for this question was 3.8% for men and 9.9% for women.

Figure 71



	OLS: More Supportive Trade (Iran)
Male	0.102*** (0.036)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.028 (0.067)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.008 (0.065)
Income: Saved	−0.0005 (0.070)
Edu: Primary	−0.103 (0.086)
Edu: Middle School	−0.025 (0.079)
Edu: High School	−0.036 (0.072)
Edu: College and Above	−0.040 (0.076)
Age: 30-50	0.038 (0.036)
Age: 50+	0.023 (0.056)
Religiosity	−0.012 (0.010)
Internet User	−0.072 (0.055)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.040 (0.048)
News Interest	−0.124** (0.056)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	17.75***
Observations	1,002
R^2	0.052
Adjusted R^2	0.007
Residual Std. Error	0.490 (df = 956)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Two levels: 0=Self-Sufficiency to 1=Trade

United States and Iran

- 80% of Iranian respondents saw the United States and Iran as having divergent interests. Despite this, they favored increased interaction between the two countries.
- Interaction favored by respondents included peaceful exchange on tourism, talks, journalists, and culture/sports. Beyond peaceful exchange, 65% of respondents also supported military cooperation in the fight against ISIS.
- These complex attitudes regarding the preferred interaction between the US and Iran are indicative of the desire for mutual cooperation despite the existence of divergent interests.

Do Iran and the US have convergent or divergent interests? (Iran only)

Over three quarters of Iranians believe that Iran and the United States have divergent interests.

The majority of Iranians, nearly 80%, thought that Iran and the United States had mostly divergent interests.

86% of **Iranian** men argued that the US and Iran had mostly divergent interests, as opposed to 64% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). 84% of respondents who had no notable difficulties meeting their daily needs argued that the US and Iran had mostly divergent interests, as opposed to 72% of those who had significant difficulty meeting their needs (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response was 4.2% for men and 12.9% for women.

Figure 72



	OLS: Iran and US Interests
	(Iran)
Male	0.247*** (0.028)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.052 (0.052)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.135*** (0.051)
Income: Saved	0.097* (0.054)
Edu: Primary	−0.078 (0.068)
Edu: Middle School	−0.047 (0.063)
Edu: High School	−0.095* (0.057)
Edu: College and Above	−0.085 (0.060)
Age: 30-50	0.039 (0.029)
Age: 50+	−0.068 (0.044)
Religiosity	−0.007 (0.008)
Internet User	−0.008 (0.043)
News Interest*Internet User	0.024 (0.038)
News Interest	−0.009 (0.044)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	17.75***
Observations	968
R^2	0.177
Adjusted R^2	0.137
Residual Std. Error	0.380 (df = 922)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Two levels: 0=Convergent to 1=Divergent

Do you support interaction with the United States through... (Iran only)

About half of Iranians are generally supportive of interaction with the United States.

Iranians were split between supporting and opposing interaction with the United States through increasing tourism (49.4%), talks on topics of mutual concern (54%), increased mutual access for journalists (50%), and cultural, education, and sports-related exchanges (54%).

Iranian individuals were most supportive of exchanging journalists, and least supportive of tourism (significant at the 0.01 level).

College educated individuals were significantly more likely to support interaction with the United States overall, with around 30% of college educated respondents fully supporting interaction, as opposed to only 6% of respondents with no education (significant at the 0.01 level). Respondents under age 30 were also more likely to support interaction with the United States, with about 20% fully supporting different interactions (difference with respondents aged 30-50 significant at the 0.05 level).

Non-response for these questions ranged from 2.6% to 4.3% for men and 5.3% to 7.9% for women.

Figure 73



	OLS: US Interaction
	(Iran)
Male	−0.054 (0.056)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.109* (0.066)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	−0.061 (0.064)
Income: Saved	−0.038 (0.076)
Edu: Primary	0.011 (0.071)
Edu: Middle School	0.046 (0.072)
Edu: High School	0.066 (0.073)
Edu: College and Above	0.228*** (0.083)
Age: 30-50	−0.108** (0.044)
Age: 50+	−0.110* (0.062)
Religiosity	0.008 (0.013)
News Interest	0.022 (0.046)
News Interest * Internet User	−0.080 (0.051)
Internet User	0.123 (0.085)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	284.35***
Observations	1,768
R^2	0.738
Adjusted R^2	0.729
Residual Std. Error	0.795 (df = 1705)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Continuous variable of average response
	Range from 0 = Oppose to 3 = Support

Do you support Iran and the United States working together to fight ISIS in Iraq? (Iran only)

A majority of Iranians believe that Iran and the United States should collaborate to help Iraq fight ISIS.

Question: As you may know, ISIS has brought under its control large sections of Iraq's territory. Iran and the United States have both declared that they will support the legitimate government of Iraq in order to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and counter ISIS. To what degree would you approve or disapprove Iran and the United States collaborating with one another to help the legitimate government of Iraq and counter ISIS?

Nearly 65% of respondents supported working with the United States to fight ISIS in Iraq, with 42% of them stating that they fully support such an initiative.

IRANIAN men were less supportive of working with the US, with 37% fully supporting, as opposed to 49% of women (significant at the 0.01 level). Respondents over the age of fifty were also less likely to support the US and Iran fighting ISIS together, with 40% strongly supporting as opposed to 44% of respondents aged 18 to 30 (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response for this question was 2.6% for men and 5.3% for women.

Figure 74



	OLS: US Iran Fight IS
	(Iran)
Male	−0.462*** (0.085)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.092 (0.158)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.089 (0.153)
Income: Saved	0.043 (0.165)
Edu: Primary	0.004 (0.203)
Edu: Middle School	0.048 (0.187)
Edu: High School	−0.094 (0.171)
Edu: College and Above	−0.311* (0.179)
Age: 30-50	−0.129 (0.086)
Age: 50+	−0.285** (0.133)
Religiosity	0.012 (0.023)
Internet User	0.102 (0.130)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.056 (0.115)
News Interest	0.069 (0.134)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	17.75***
Observations	1,013
R^2	0.088
Adjusted R^2	0.046
Residual Std. Error	1.174 (df = 967)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Four levels: 0=Don't Support to 3=Support

IRAN'S NUCLEAR POLICIES

- Iranian respondents were strongly in favor of the development of nuclear energy for civilian use, and split nearly equally on the development of nuclear weapons.
- Even within this religious context, however, respondents did not clearly understand existing religious declarations on this topic. While Khamenei has denounced nuclear weapons as violating the teachings of Islam, just over half of Iranian respondents (53%) believed that he was in favor of Iran's right to nuclear weapons. This highlights the ambiguity surrounding the nuclear weapons debate in Iran.
- While there remained variation, over 80% of respondents were supportive of the recent P5+1 and EU agreement with Iran and 62% were at least somewhat optimistic about its success. The majority also believed that the accompanying removal of sanctions would have a significant effect on their everyday life.

Do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, neither favor nor oppose, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the Islamic Republic of Iran developing nuclear energy for civilian use? (Iran only)

Almost all respondents favored developing nuclear energy for civilian use.

Nearly all respondents favored Iranian development of nuclear energy for civilian use, and 71% of respondents were strongly in favor.

75% of **Iranian** men strongly favored the development of nuclear energy, as opposed to 64% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.05 level). However, internet users were significantly less supportive of nuclear energy (significant at the 0.01 level). Within this group, those who followed the news were more likely to favor nuclear energy (76%, versus 50% support among those who did not follow the news). Non-response for this question was 9.6% for men and 16% for women.

Figure 75



	OLS: Nuclear Energy
	(Iran)
Male	0.107*** (0.041)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.004 (0.075)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.093 (0.072)
Income: Saved	0.130* (0.078)
Edu: Primary	0.086 (0.097)
Edu: Middle School	−0.001 (0.090)
Edu: High School	0.026 (0.082)
Edu: College and Above	0.052 (0.086)
Age: 30-50	−0.032 (0.041)
Age: 50+	0.014 (0.065)
Religiosity	0.006 (0.011)
Internet User	−0.334*** (0.062)
News Interest*Internet User	0.349*** (0.055)
News Interest	0.066 (0.064)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	17.75***
Observations	952
R^2	0.116
Adjusted R^2	0.072
Residual Std. Error	0.543 (df = 906)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Four levels: 0=Strongly Oppose to 3=Strongly Favor

Apart from nuclear energy, would you strongly favor, somewhat favor, neither favor nor oppose, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the Islamic Republic of Iran developing nuclear weapons? (Iran only)

Respondents were divided as to their opinions on nuclear weapons.

About 55% of Iranian respondents favored nuclear weapons, and about 45% opposed them, with about 15% more strongly favoring than those strongly opposing.

IRANIAN men were significantly less likely to favor nuclear weapons, with a gender difference equivalent to more than an entire move from "somewhat oppose" to "somewhat favor" once controlling for other factors (absolute difference 55% of women strongly supporting, versus 21% of men, significant at the 0.01 level). Less educated people were also more likely to favor nuclear weapons (significant at the 0.05 level). Younger respondents were significantly less likely to favor nuclear weapons (significant at the 0.01 level).

Non-response for this question was above average, at 17.5% for men and 17.6% for women, highlighting the sensitivity of the topic.

Figure 76



	OLS: Nuclear Weapons
	(Iran)
Male	−1.095*** (0.075)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.149 (0.138)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.126 (0.133)
Income: Saved	0.097 (0.144)
Edu: Primary	0.364** (0.178)
Edu: Middle School	0.181 (0.165)
Edu: High School	0.192 (0.152)
Edu: College and Above	0.063 (0.159)
Age: 30-50	−0.159** (0.075)
Age: 50+	−0.085 (0.118)
Religiosity	0.001 (0.020)
Internet User	0.183 (0.114)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.067 (0.101)
News Interest	−0.247** (0.116)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	17.75***
Observations	908
R^2	0.306
Adjusted R^2	0.270
Residual Std. Error	0.970 (df = 862)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Four levels: 0=Strongly Oppose to 3=Strongly Favor

As you may know, Ayatollah Khamenei, the Leader of the Revolution, has issued a fatwa in regards to nuclear weapons. As far as you know, what is his religious opinion? (Iran only)

Respondents were divided as to their knowledge of Khamenei's fatwa on nuclear weapons.

While in reality Khamenei has issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons, individuals were divided on their beliefs about what Khamenei had decreed. 53% of respondents incorrectly thought he said Iran had the right to have nuclear weapons.

Only 36% of **IRANIAN** men, versus 80% of Iranian women, stated that Khamenei's fatwa granted the right to nuclear weapons (significant at the 0.01 level). Respondents with no education were particularly likely to be misinformed (71%) versus only 50% of those with a high school education (significant at the 0.01 level) and 52% of those with a college education or greater (significant at the 0.05 level). 58% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 30 misstated Khamenei's fatwa, versus 46% of respondents aged 30–50 and 60% of respondents over age 50 (differences with 18 to 30 group significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively). Non-response for this question was low, at 4.9% for men and 8% for women.

Figure 77



	OLS: Khamenei: Weapons Iran's Right (Iran)
Male	−0.374*** (0.033)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.108* (0.062)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.093 (0.059)
Income: Saved	−0.063 (0.064)
Edu: Primary	−0.066 (0.079)
Edu: Middle School	−0.119* (0.072)
Edu: High School	−0.192*** (0.066)
Edu: College and Above	−0.176** (0.069)
Age: 30-50	−0.119*** (0.033)
Age: 50+	−0.099* (0.051)
Religiosity	0.010 (0.009)
Internet User	0.102** (0.050)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.077* (0.044)
News Interest	−0.065 (0.052)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	17.75***
Observations	1,002
R^2	0.220
Adjusted R^2	0.183
Residual Std. Error	0.452 (df = 956)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Two levels: 0=Anti-Islam, 1=Iran's Right

Do you think producing nuclear weapons is against the principles of Islam? (Iran only)

The majority of respondents thought nuclear weapons were against the teachings of Islam.

63% of respondents personally thought nuclear weapons were against the teachings of Islam. This is nearly 20% more than those who believed Khamenei had issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons. The disparity indicates that while the majority of respondents emulate Khamenei, there is still leeway in their interpretation of his teachings.

70% of **Iranian** men argued that nuclear weapons were against the teachings of Islam, as compared to 54% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). Income was a major predictor of these beliefs. Respondents who faced significant difficulty meeting their needs were less opposed to nuclear weapons (52%), versus 65% of those who had some difficulty meeting their daily needs, 67% of those who had no notable difficulty meeting their needs and 70% of those who saved (significant at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.01 levels respectively). Individuals aged 30 to 50 were also more likely to believe nuclear weapons were against the teachings of Islam than those under the age of 30 (57% ages 18 to 30, 69% ages 30 to 50, and 66% of those over the age of 50; all significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was 11.5% for men and 11.4% for women.

Figure 78



	OLS: Nuclear Wpns Against Islam (Iran)
Male	0.120*** (0.034)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.150** (0.063)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.165*** (0.061)
Income: Saved	0.227*** (0.066)
Edu: Primary	0.018 (0.082)
Edu: Middle School	0.006 (0.075)
Edu: High School	0.057 (0.069)
Edu: College and Above	0.058 (0.072)
Age: 30-50	0.092*** (0.035)
Age: 50+	0.031 (0.054)
Religiosity	−0.003 (0.009)
Internet User	−0.095* (0.052)
News Interest*Internet User	0.005 (0.046)
News Interest	0.042 (0.053)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	17.75***
Observations	966
R^2	0.090
Adjusted R^2	0.046
Residual Std. Error	0.460 (df = 920)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Two levels: 0 = No, 1= Yes

To what extent are you supportive of the agreement between Iran and the P5+1 and the EU over Iran's nuclear program? (Iran only)

How optimistic are you that the current agreement between Iran and the P5+1 and the EU over Iran's nuclear program will be implemented as expected? (Iran only)

Over three quarters of respondents were optimistic about and supportive of the agreement; individuals were somewhat more likely to be supportive than optimistic.

Figure 79



Over 80% of respondents were supportive of the P5+1 agreement, and 62% of respondents were optimistic about the agreement.

Non-response for these two questions was similar, at 8.6% for men and 15.0% for women for support, and 8.3% and 15.1% for optimism.

	OLS: Favor P5+1	OLS: Optimist P5+1
	(Iran)	
Male	−0.043 (0.069)	−0.136* (0.076)
Income: Some difficulty	0.128 (0.126)	0.212 (0.140)
Income: No notable difficulty	0.082 (0.122)	0.158 (0.135)
Income: Saved	0.159 (0.131)	0.270* (0.145)
Edu: Primary	0.240 (0.169)	0.231 (0.190)
Edu: Middle School	0.054 (0.154)	0.011 (0.173)
Edu: High School	−0.039 (0.140)	−0.041 (0.158)
Edu: College and Above	−0.066 (0.145)	−0.267 (0.163)
Age: 30-50	0.016 (0.068)	−0.049 (0.075)
Age: 50+	0.196* (0.106)	0.212* (0.117)
Religiosity	0.005 (0.018)	−0.009 (0.020)
News Interest	0.039 (0.070)	0.081 (0.077)
Internet User	−0.210 (0.142)	−0.044 (0.156)
News Interest*Internet User	0.094 (0.077)	0.006 (0.085)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	971	971
R^2	0.058	0.061
Adjusted R^2	0.012	0.015
Residual Std. Error (df = 925)	0.933	1.028
F Statistic (df = 45; 925)	1.263	1.333*

How big of an effect will the removal of sanctions have on your everyday life? (Iran only)

Most individuals thought the removal of sanctions would have a big impact on their everyday life.

80% of respondents thought that the removal of sanctions would have some effect on their everyday life, with 46% stating they thought it would have a "large effect."

Iranian men were less likely to think that the removal of sanctions would have an effect, with 34% arguing that the removal would have a large effect, versus 63% of women (significant at the 0.01 level). Non-response for this question was 5.7% for men and 9.4% for women.

Figure 80



	OLS: Sanction Impact (Iran)
Male	−0.618*** (0.082)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.145 (0.152)
Income: No notable difficulty	−0.116 (0.147)
Income: Saved	0.020 (0.158)
Edu: Primary	0.183 (0.199)
Edu: Middle School	0.013 (0.182)
Edu: High School	0.022 (0.167)
Edu: College and Above	−0.033 (0.175)
Age: 30-50	−0.049 (0.083)
Age: 50+	−0.044 (0.129)
Religiosity	−0.001 (0.022)
Internet User	0.224* (0.126)
News Interest*Internet User	−0.346*** (0.111)
News Interest	−0.480*** (0.129)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	17.75***
Observations	998
R^2	0.155
Adjusted R^2	0.115
Residual Std. Error	1.127 (df = 952)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Four levels: 0 = No Effect to 3 = Large Effect

11 Attitudes toward the US and International Community

Highlights

- Respondents, on average, expressed neutral attitudes toward the United States and preferred minimal involvement of the US in Middle Eastern affairs. Respondents saw the United States as favoring traditional Shiite enemies, while treating Shiite allies unfairly.
- The majority of individuals stated that they viewed the US' role in conflicts throughout the Middle East as having "no effect" and stated neutral attitudes toward the United States as a whole.
- Yet, they preferred minimal involvement of the US in Middle Eastern affairs (61% Iranians and 58% Iraqis) and Iraqi affairs in particular (76% Iranians and 68% Iraqis), even when given options of US non-military involvement.

US Role in Current Events (Iran only)

Three quarters of Iranian respondents felt the US had no effect in countries throughout the Middle East.

The majority of Iranians stated the US had no effect in current events across the Middle East. While respondents were asked about specific ongoing issues, their perceptions remained similar across all questions in this group.

About five percent of respondents felt the United States' role was positive and about 70% viewed it as having no effect. The remainder felt the United States had a negative effect.

Men were more likely to view the US role positively, as were wealthier respondents (significant at the 0.01 level). Individuals with higher levels of religious practice were also slightly more likely to view the United States' role positively (significant at the 0.05 level).

Individuals aged 30–50 viewed the United States' role most negatively (significant versus 18–30 at the 0.01 level).

Non-response for these questions ranged from 8% men and 16% women (Nuclear Iran and ISIS in Iraq) to 14% men and 22% women (Yemen) for Iranians.

Figure 81



	OLS: US Role (Sum)
	(Iran)
Male	0.483*** (0.170)
Income: Some Difficulty	0.829*** (0.311)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.930*** (0.300)
Income: Saved	0.899*** (0.323)
Edu: Primary	0.462 (0.417)
Edu: Middle School	−0.251 (0.385)
Edu: High School	−0.172 (0.354)
Edu: College and Above	0.094 (0.368)
Age: 30-50	−0.402** (0.168)
Age: 50+	0.136 (0.274)
Religiosity	0.090** (0.045)
Internet User	−0.678*** (0.257)
News Interest	0.273 (0.258)
News Interest * Internet User	0.903*** (0.223)
Province FE	Yes
F Statistic	2.46***
Observations	830
R^2	0.107
Adjusted R^2	0.056
Residual Std. Error	2.086 (df = 784)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Sum of perceived role in six conflicts,
	Each at 0 = Negative Effect to 2=Positive Effect

How honest and fair is the United States?

Respondents felt the United States was honest and fair with Shiite enemies and dishonest and unfair with Shiite allies.

Saudi Arabia and Israel, both traditional Shiite enemies, were seen to be treated honestly and fairly by the United States. Syria, Iraq, and Iran, on the other hand, were seen to be treated dishonestly and unfairly.

There is a statistically significant difference (at the 0.001 level) between how individuals viewed the US' treatment of Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Respondents in Iran perceived the US as treating their own country most unfairly, whereas they believed that Iraq received the most fair treatment. In Iraq, respondents' views were reversed. Non-response for these questions ranged between 4.5% and 7.7% for Iranians and 5% and 11.5% for Iraqis.

Figure 82



Iranian men were more likely to view the United States as less honest, but Iraqi men were more likely to view the United States as more honest (significant at the 0.01 level). There is some evidence that wealthier and more educated people also viewed the United States as more honest and fair. Older people were slightly more likely to view the United States as more honest with Israel and Saudi Arabia, and less honest with Syria, Iran and Iraq.

	OLS: US Honest (Iraqi Respondents)				
	(Iraq)	(Iran)	(Syria)	(Saudi)	(Israel)
Male	−0.123** (0.053)	−0.252*** (0.073)	−0.188*** (0.054)	0.140 (0.088)	0.190*** (0.066)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.037 (0.069)	−0.133 (0.095)	−0.070 (0.071)	0.074 (0.115)	0.019 (0.086)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	−0.119* (0.068)	−0.117 (0.093)	−0.110 (0.070)	−0.104 (0.113)	−0.059 (0.084)
Income: Saved	0.050 (0.097)	0.157 (0.135)	0.0002 (0.100)	−0.0004 (0.162)	−0.075 (0.121)
Edu: Primary	−0.096 (0.067)	−0.115 (0.093)	−0.152** (0.069)	0.244** (0.112)	0.241*** (0.083)
Edu: Middle School	−0.039 (0.072)	−0.153 (0.099)	−0.158** (0.074)	0.155 (0.120)	0.338*** (0.089)
Edu: High School	−0.058 (0.083)	−0.034 (0.114)	−0.104 (0.085)	0.240* (0.139)	0.383*** (0.103)
Edu: College and Above	0.083 (0.133)	0.196 (0.182)	0.056 (0.136)	0.212 (0.223)	0.368** (0.164)
Age: 30-50	−0.031 (0.055)	−0.115 (0.076)	−0.008 (0.056)	0.111 (0.092)	0.053 (0.068)
Age: 50+	−0.181** (0.072)	−0.198** (0.100)	−0.182** (0.075)	0.231* (0.121)	0.118 (0.090)
Religiosity	−0.011 (0.018)	0.018 (0.024)	−0.031* (0.018)	0.009 (0.029)	0.005 (0.022)
Internet User	−0.067 (0.069)	0.042 (0.095)	−0.040 (0.070)	0.039 (0.115)	−0.130 (0.085)
News Interest * Internet User	0.154** (0.071)	0.069 (0.097)	0.192*** (0.072)	0.086 (0.118)	0.134 (0.088)
News Interest	0.233** (0.109)	0.285* (0.149)	0.219** (0.111)	0.053 (0.181)	0.069 (0.134)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Each column represents perceptions of US and header country
Four levels: 0 = Dishonest and unfair to 3= Honest and fair

	OLS: US Honest (Iranian Respondents)				
	(Iraq)	(Iran)	(Syria)	(Saudi)	(Israel)
Male	−0.471*** (0.061)	−0.356*** (0.059)	−0.641*** (0.059)	−0.143* (0.073)	0.003 (0.051)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.109 (0.113)	−0.209* (0.110)	−0.040 (0.110)	0.154 (0.134)	0.190** (0.094)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.028 (0.110)	−0.024 (0.106)	0.143 (0.107)	0.194 (0.130)	0.199** (0.091)
Income: Saved	0.145 (0.118)	0.036 (0.114)	0.228** (0.115)	0.288** (0.140)	0.161 (0.098)
Edu: Primary	0.153 (0.149)	0.089 (0.143)	0.177 (0.145)	0.224 (0.176)	0.012 (0.124)
Edu: Middle School	0.213 (0.136)	0.115 (0.131)	0.195 (0.131)	0.140 (0.161)	−0.023 (0.113)
Edu: High School	0.195 (0.125)	0.182 (0.120)	0.120 (0.121)	0.104 (0.147)	−0.0004 (0.104)
Edu: College and Above	0.152 (0.132)	0.113 (0.125)	0.075 (0.127)	−0.079 (0.154)	−0.128 (0.109)
Age: 30-50	−0.056 (0.062)	−0.079 (0.060)	−0.032 (0.060)	0.011 (0.074)	−0.007 (0.052)
Age: 50+	−0.057 (0.097)	−0.009 (0.093)	0.059 (0.093)	0.155 (0.116)	0.094 (0.080)
Religiosity	−0.011 (0.016)	−0.012 (0.016)	−0.016 (0.016)	0.019 (0.019)	0.016 (0.014)
Internet User	0.203** (0.094)	0.377*** (0.091)	0.313*** (0.091)	−0.118 (0.113)	−0.012 (0.078)
News Interest * Internet User	−0.178** (0.083)	−0.349*** (0.080)	−0.272*** (0.080)	0.130 (0.099)	0.100 (0.069)
News Interest	−0.095 (0.097)	−0.147 (0.093)	−0.149 (0.093)	0.032 (0.115)	0.007 (0.080)
Constant	0.215 (0.249)	0.103 (0.238)	0.283 (0.249)	2.628*** (0.317)	2.817*** (0.213)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Each column represents perceptions of US and header country
Four levels: 0 = Dishonest and unfair to 3= Honest and fair

Which of these US policies would be most productive for the Middle East?

Respondents preferred minimal US involvement in the Middle East.

61% of Iranians and 58% of Iraqis stated that the United States should not interfere at all in the Middle East (significant at the 0.01 level). About twenty percent of Iranians and fifteen percent of Iraqis thought that the United States should work to contain ISIS and promote security as the second goal. About 10% supported solving the Arab-Israeli conflict and promoting economic development. Only 4% of Iranians and 3% of Iraqis supported promoting democracy or women's rights.

Iranian males were more likely to prefer no US involvement than Iranian women, with 48% of women and 69% of men preferring no US involvement (significant at the 0.01 level). 67% of respondents over the age of fifty preferred no US involvement, versus 57% of those ages 18 to 30 (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response was 8.9% for men and 12.3% for women.

Iraqis who were more educated were also more likely to prefer no US involvement (significant at the 0.05 level for Middle School and 0.1 level for High School). Non-response was 3.1% for men and 11.8% for women.

Figure 83



	OLS: US Policy Middle East	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.221*** (0.036)	−0.043 (0.042)
Income: Some Difficulty	−0.013 (0.063)	−0.030 (0.055)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.061 (0.060)	0.039 (0.054)
Income: Saved	−0.006 (0.065)	−0.014 (0.078)
Edu: Primary	−0.011 (0.081)	0.071 (0.053)
Edu: Middle School	−0.021 (0.074)	0.134** (0.058)
Edu: High School	−0.067 (0.069)	0.116* (0.065)
Edu: College and Above	0.003 (0.072)	−0.136 (0.107)
Age: 30-50	0.054 (0.036)	−0.029 (0.043)
Age: 50+	0.108** (0.053)	0.015 (0.057)
Religiosity	0.006 (0.009)	−0.0005 (0.014)
News Interest	0.054 (0.033)	−0.092* (0.051)
Internet User	−0.046 (0.072)	−0.147* (0.081)
News Interest * Internet User	−0.018 (0.038)	0.088 (0.059)
Province FE	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	10.24***	10.17***
Observations	967	713
R^2	0.148	0.064
Adjusted R^2	0.107	0.024
Residual Std. Error	0.463 (df = 921)	0.489 (df = 683)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Two levels: 1 = No US Involvement, 0 = Other Involvement	

What military means should the United States use in Iraq?

Respondents preferred minimal US military involvement in Iraq.

76% of Iranians and 68% of Iraqis stated that the United States should not be militarily involved in Iraq. Iraqis were significantly more likely to favor US involvement in some form. In particular, about a tenth of Iraqi respondents supported the US use of air power (significant at the 0.01 level), versus half that in Iran.

83% of **Iranian** men preferred no US involvement in Iraq, versus 66% of Iranian women (significant at the 0.01 level). 72% of respondents with significant difficulty meeting their daily needs preferred no US involvement, versus 80% of those with no notable difficulty (significant at the 0.05 level). Non-response was 5.3% for men and 8.6% for women.

75% of **Iraqi** men preferred no US involvement. The same proportion of Iraqi women voiced this view, although after adjusting for education and news interest, women were less opposed to US involvement than men. Those with a college education were also less opposed—40% of those preferred no US involvement, versus 72% of those with no education (significant at the 0.01 level). Opposition was lower among respondents who followed the news. Non-response was 0.7% for men and 8.1% for women.

Figure 84



	OLS: Prefer No US Involvement Iraq	
	(Iran)	(Iraq)
Male	0.143*** (0.030)	0.158*** (0.037)
Income: Some difficulty	0.033 (0.056)	0.025 (0.049)
Income: No Notable Difficulty	0.112** (0.054)	0.074 (0.048)
Income: Saved	0.064 (0.058)	−0.007 (0.069)
Edu: Primary	0.035 (0.072)	0.041 (0.047)
Edu: Middle School	0.029 (0.066)	−0.030 (0.051)
Edu: High School	0.027 (0.061)	−0.028 (0.059)
Edu: College and Above	0.038 (0.063)	−0.260*** (0.095)
Age: 30-50	−0.008 (0.030)	0.007 (0.039)
Age: 50+	−0.031 (0.047)	0.115** (0.051)
Religiosity	−0.004 (0.008)	0.001 (0.012)
News Interest	0.039 (0.031)	−0.093** (0.044)
Internet User	−0.034 (0.063)	−0.105 (0.072)
News Interest * Internet User	−0.034 (0.034)	0.078 (0.051)
Province FE?	Yes	Yes
Observations	967	713
R^2	0.148	0.064
Adjusted R^2	0.107	0.024
Residual Std. Error	0.463 (df = 921)	0.489 (df = 683)
F Statistic	3.560*** (df = 45; 921)	1.608** (df = 29; 683)

12 APPENDIX A: READING THE REGRESSIONS

We run two separate regressions, one for Iran and one for Iraq. Estimates for covariates are in the row corresponding to that covariate, and the number in parentheses next to the estimate is the standard error. Within the results, statistical significance is denoted with asterisks. A single asterisk (*) notes that the corresponding covariate is significant at the 0.1 level; two asterisks (**) note significance at the 0.05 level; and three asterisks (***) note significance at the 0.01 level or higher. Smaller levels of significance indicate that we are more confident that the differences within that specific source of heterogeneity are not due to random variation alone.

In the regression, we report income, education, and age as categorical variables. This allows us to forgo the assumption that the relationship between responses to a question and these covariates are linear.[71] When reading these results, the effects of these categories, given by the estimate, is the difference between the results from respondents in that category and the base term. We also include province fixed effects to ensure our results are not being driven by variation within a specific province.

An explanation of the different covariates follows:

- **Male** is the estimate of the differential response of a man from a woman (base term), holding everything else constant.
- **Income** is based on a question asking whether or not individuals felt that their income was sufficient to meet their daily needs. This, as opposed to an absolute measure of income, allows us to account for differences in purchasing power parity across the two countries. The results for each category are differences between the base term (great difficulty meeting needs) and that category, either "some difficulty," "no notable difficulty," or "no difficulty, saved."[72]
- **Education** is based on self-reported highest level of education completed. Base term is no formal education, followed by primary, middle school, high school, and college and above.[73]

[71] This is useful because, for example, we might expect individuals whose childhood or young adult life was spent during the Iran-Iraq war (respondents age 30-50) to have different views toward Iran than those who did not experience it (respondents 18-30). Similarly, we might expect those respondents with a college education to have a very different perspective on women's issues. If we used years of education as a linear variable, we might argue that education has a significant effect on attitudes towards women's issues, when really it was university education that was driving this overall effect.

[72] Full wording of the responses is as follows: Great difficulty (base term): Our household income did not cover our expenses and we faced significant difficulties meeting our needs. Some difficulty: Our household income did not cover our expenses and we faced some difficulties meeting our needs. No notable difficulty: Our household income covered our expenses without notable difficulties. Saved: Our household income covered our expenses well and we were able to save.

[73] We asked a more detailed question about education completed, and reorganized the responses to these categories to ensure comparability between Iran and Iraq.

- **Age** is based on self-reported age. The base term is respondents age 18-30; regression coefficients represent differences from this baseline for respondents aged 30-50 and 50+.[74]

- **Religiosity** is based on the first principal component of responses to questions about religious practice. The includes the measures of religious practice discussed in the "Religion" section—religious programs, mosque attendance, praying, Friday prayer, Koran or Du'aa reading, and religious lessons. Higher levels of this principal component indicate more religious practice.

- **News interest** is a binary variable based on a compilation of how regularly individuals engage with the news, both through reading and listening to it from a variety of sources, as well as how often they discuss it with others (see pages 36-40). Because this covariate is also included in an interaction term, the estimate on this covariate corresponds to the difference for individuals who are interested in the news but do not get their news from the internet.[75]

- **Internet user** is a binary variable reflecting the self-reported response to how often respondents use the internet.[76] Because there is also an interaction term (see below), the estimates corresponding to this covariate is for internet users who do not have high levels of interaction with the news.

- **News Interest*Internet User** is an interaction term for individuals who have high levels of news interest and also use the internet regularly.

The original responses are as follows: None ("No formal education, illiterate"; "no formal education but can read/write"; "incomplete primary school"); Primary ("Complete primary school"; "Incomplete middle school"); Middle School ("Incomplete general secondary school"; "Complete middle school"; "Incomplete secondary school: commercial/technical/ vocational type"; "Incomplete high school"); High School ("Incomplete pre-university"; "Complete pre-university"; "Complete secondary school: commercial/technical/ vocational type"; "Complete General Secondary School"; "Complete high school"; "Incomplete associate degree"; "Incomplete bachelor, without degree"); College and Above ("Complete bachelor, with degree"; "Masters"; "PhD"; "Complete Associate Degree")

[74] We set out to sample respondents between the ages of 18 and 60.

[75] This is actually calculated as $News \times (1 - Internet)$, allowing us to directly interpret the standard errors from the regression table.

[76] Response to this question is on 6 levels, ranging from "I do not use the internet" to "multiple times a day," converted to a binary variable for those who use the internet at least once a week and those who do not.

13 APPENDIX B: SAMPLING TABLES

Table B1: Iranian Provinces and Population Breakdown

PROVINCE	% POPULATION	% RESPONDENT
Alborz	3.21	2.15
Ardabil	1.66	1.47
Boushehr	1.37	2.08
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiyari	1.19	0.80
East Azerbaijan	4.96	2.33
Eilam	0.74	2.33
Fars	6.12	6.01
Gilan	3.30	0.55
Golestan	2.36	0.98
Hamedan	2.34	2.27
Hormozgan	2.10	0.67
Esfahan	6.49	12.51
Kerman	3.91	2.15
Kermanshah	2.59	1.29
Khouzestan	6.03	6.38
Kohkilouyeh and Boyer Ahmad	0.88	0.37
Kordistan	1.99	0.31
Lorestan	2.33	0.86
Markazi (central)	1.88	1.84
Mazandaran	4.09	1.90
Northern Khorasan	1.15	0.92
Qazvin	1.60	1.90
Qom	1.53	11.28
Razawi Khorasan	7.98	7.36
Semnan	0.84	1.23
Sistan and Balouchestan	3.37	1.04
Southern Khorasan	0.88	0.67
Tehran	16.21	19.44
West Azerbaijan	4.10	1.59
Yazd	1.43	1.59
Zanjan	1.35	2.94

Figure B1


Non−Response by Enumerator
0.15
0.10
0.00
Iraq Women
Iran Women
Iran Men
Iraq Men
0
20
40
Enumerator
Gender
Female
Male
Country
Iran
Iraq
Mean Age, Education, and Income by Enumerator
Age
Education
Income
Mean
60
50
40
30
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
0
20
40
Enumerator Number
Country
Iran
Iraq

Table B2: Iran Religious Breakdown

Religion	Percentage
Muslim	99.38
Christian	0.16
Jewish	0.01
Zoroastrian	0.03
Others	0.07
Undeclared	0.35

Table B3: Farsi Team

Name	Gender
Mohammed Abdulelah Neamah	M
Hashim Jaber Murtadha Albakaa	M
Redhwan Reyadh Majeed	M
Murtadha Badr Younus	M
Abdulmuttaleb Jaber Murtadha	M
Mohammad Kazem Mohammad Ali Hasan	M
Ahmed Mohammed Kadhim Al-Ansari	M
Hussain Rasool Aziz	M
Drgham Ali Hadi	M
Hasan Abdulelah Neamah	M
Nidhal Jameel Al-Saadi	M
Taqi Afshari	M
Iman Alaa Hassan Al-Bhadli	F
Lamis Alaa Hassan Al-Bhadli	F
Marwa Alaa Hasan Al-Bhadli	F
Fatima Badr Younus	F
Masooma Hasan Mazyed Al-Musawi	F
Fadak Hasan Mazyed Al-Musawi	F
Esraa Joudah Ibrahim	F
Ibtihal Qasim Kteo Al-Hussein	F
Marzeya Mousawi	F

Table B4: Iraq by Governorate: Shi'a Held Seats and Percentage Surveyed

GOVERNORATE	% TOTAL SHI'A HELD SEATS	% SURVEYED
Najaf	6.38	6.00
Baghdad	30.32	30.00
Missan	5.32	5.00
Basra	12.23	12.00
Dhiqar	10.11	10.00
Salahaddin	1.06	1.00
Anbar	0.00	0.00
Dhuk	0.00	0.00
Erbil	0.00	0.00
Kirkuk	0.00	0.00
Suleimania	0.00	0.00
Babil	7.98	8.00
Dewaneya	5.85	6.00
Karbala	5.85	6.00
Wasit	5.85	6.00
Diala	3.72	4.00
Muthanna	3.72	4.00
Ninewa	1.60	2.00

Table B5: Iraq Governorate Breakdown by Survey Teams

GOVERNORATE	SURVEY TEAM
Baghdad	Karbala
Ninewa	Karbala
Basra	Najaf
Dhiqar	Najaf
Babil	Karbala
Diala	Karbala
Salahaddin	Karbala
Najaf	Najaf
Wasit	Najaf
Karbala	Karbala
Dewaneya	Najaf
Missan	Najaf
Muthanna	Najaf

Table B6: Arabic Team (Najaf)

NAME	GENDER
Firas Nadhim Kadhem	M
Raed Abbas Abdulhadi	M
Ali Ayad Hussein	M
Hasan Kalif Lafta	M
Wehad Ali Muhammed	M
Zaid Razzaq Mudhaffar	M
Laith Shnawah Hasan Al-Jabiri	M
Nadir Ali Rasheed	M
Faris Najem Harram Al-Mawwashi	M
Marwa Muhsin Ghatie	F
Zahraa Adil Hasan	F
Hawraa Salah Hasan Al-Muhammedawi	F
Duaa Abdulameer Asad Khan	F
Dhuha Kareem Mizel	F
Dhuha Fahim Jabr Al-Dulaimy	F
Dhuha Muhannad Ali Al-Hamdani	F
Ikhlas Ghaly Elewy	F
Teba Ebrahim Raham	F
Dhamaier Jouda Barahan	F
Ola Imad Muhammed Jawad Alwardi	F
Ramla Nadhem Abed	F

Table B7: Arabic Team (Karbala)

NAME	GENDER
Tahseen.Ali.Hadi	M
Jasim Mohammed Khalaf	M
Ahmed Fadhil Hussein	M
Alaa Abdul Hussein Mahdi	M
Arkan Nadhim Hashi	M
Kadhimyiah Khudhair Obayes	F
Rosool Ahmed Najee	F
Noor Ata Allah Ali	F
Zahraa Amer Jasim Alameri	F

Table B8

Enumerator	Country	Gender	Resp's	Question Mean	Question StdDev	Average Age	Average Education Level	Average Income Level	Average Non-Response
1	Iraq	Male	88	0.02	0.04	35.97	2.45	2.13	0.03
2	Iraq	Male	101	0.05	0.08	32.59	2.58	2.36	0.02
3	Iraq	Female	98	-0.05	0.03	39.99	2.02	2.05	0.05
4	Iraq	Female	86	-0.07	0.04	36.58	2.45	2.30	0.04
5	Iraq	Male	113	0.05	0.03	33.18	2.29	2.32	0.03
6	Iraq	Male	109	-0.02	0.03	37.53	2.58	2.14	0.02
7	Iraq	Male	100	-0.02	0.03	33.07	2.72	3.13	0.03
8	Iraq	Female	94	0.00	0.04	33.93	2.23	3.03	0.04
9	Iraq	Female	91	0.05	0.03	34.04	2.95	2.62	0.03
10	Iran	Male	141	-0.04	0.03	32.26	3.91	2.50	0.04
11	Iran	Male	91	-0.01	0.04	38.81	3.76	2.73	0.02
12	Iran	Male	79	-0.02	0.04	39.49	3.86	2.82	0.02
13	Iran	Male	97	-0.03	0.03	36.73	3.87	3.27	0.02
14	Iran	Male	70	-0.04	0.04	33.00	4.08	2.99	0.02
15	Iran	Male	52	-0.02	0.06	35.13	3.55	2.74	0.03
16	Iran	Male	87	-0.01	0.03	33.81	4.05	3.00	0.02
17	Iran	Male	95	-0.05	0.04	45.90	3.88	3.07	0.07
18	Iran	Male	43	-0.06	0.05	38.21	3.38	2.58	0.02
19	Iran	Female	129	-0.10	0.04	38.59	3.78	3.30	0.04
20	Iran	Female	98	-0.07	0.03	38.20	3.69	2.35	0.04
21	Iran	Female	112	-0.10	0.03	38.77	2.98	2.79	0.05
22	Iran	Female	59	-0.03	0.04	36.17	3.61	2.98	0.05
23	Iran	Female	46	-0.09	0.05	32.26	3.51	2.52	0.02
24	Iran	Female	55	-0.05	0.05	50.15	3.09	2.28	0.03
25	Iran	Male	138	-0.02	0.03	38.01	3.76	2.98	0.04
26	Iran	Female	95	-0.04	0.04	31.82	3.74	2.82	0.05
30	Iraq	Female	74	-0.01	0.04	36.49	2.27	2.58	0.02
31	Iraq	Male	49	0.05	0.06	31.40	2.55	2.40	0.01
32	Iraq	Male	76	0.03	0.03	31.27	2.43	2.65	0.02
33	Iraq	Female	78	-0.00	0.03	37.00	2.20	2.15	0.04
34	Iraq	Female	70	0.06	0.04	35.76	2.93	2.47	0.03
35	Iraq	Female	70	0.07	0.04	35.57	2.28	2.36	0.02
36	Iraq	Female	73	0.04	0.05	31.00	2.43	2.14	0.04
37	Iraq	Female	76	0.08	0.04	33.00	2.20	2.47	0.04
38	Iraq	Female	71	0.13	0.05	25.00	2.39	2.63	0.02
39	Iraq	Female	74	0.09	0.05	36.00	2.96	2.30	0.04
40	Iraq	Male	75	0.01	0.04	28.86	2.40	1.84	0.03
41	Iraq	Male	69	0.03	0.06	31.21	2.12	2.35	0.01
42	Iraq	Male	80	0.10	0.06	58.00	2.41	2.70	0.01
43	Iraq	Female	68	0.12	0.05	37.52	2.37	2.09	0.03
44	Iraq	Male	63	0.02	0.06	38.50	2.41	2.15	0.01
45	Iraq	Female	77	0.03	0.04	34.03	2.06	2.47	0.03
46	Iraq	Female	71	0.10	0.04	36.12	2.80	2.92	0.02
47	Iraq	Female	81	0.14	0.05	45.00	2.36	2.80	0.05
48	Iraq	Male	60	0.11	0.05	33.36	2.86	2.19	0.03
49	Iraq	Male	75	0.08	0.05	32.86	2.55	2.80	0.02
50	Iran	Male	23	0.15	0.15	36.82	3.43	2.82	0.02
52	Iran	Female	38	0.04	0.09	33.19	4.21	3.00	0.01
53	Iran	Male	50	0.01	0.08	30.62	3.71	2.12	0.01

14 APPENDIX C: CONJOINT ANALYSIS

Conjoint: Neighbor (Iraq only)

Individuals are most sensitive to their neighbor's alcoholism, followed by sect, race, and employment, in that order.

Iraqi respondents were presented with the following question:

> "Imagine that a new person is moving to your neighborhood. In the following questions, we will describe two potential neighbors. Please read their descriptions carefully, then indicate which of the two you would prefer to have as a neighbor."



Respondents were most sensitive to **alcoholism**, considered a moral failing in Islam, as well as a habit that would likely lead to unruly conduct. This was contrasted with the habit of soccer. Individuals were nearly 40 percentage points more likely to pick the neighbor choice that had the habit of soccer rather than alcoholism. Women were more likely to see this as an important attribute than men, with soccer increasing the likelihood

of a woman choosing a profile by 45 percentage points, as opposed to only 38 percentage points for men.

The second most sensitive dimension was **sect**. Against the baseline preference of a Shi'a neighbor, individuals were 20 percentage points less likely to pick a Sunni rather than a Shi'a neighbor. Preferences between Sunni and Christian neighbors varied between men and women, with women showing no statistically significant differences in their preferences between the two sects as compared to Shi'a neighbors, but men being 7 percentage points more likely to choose the profile of a Christian neighbor over a Sunni.

The third most sensitive dimension was **race**, with respondents being about 10 percentage points more likely to choose an Iraqi Arab over an Iraqi Kurd. This result was consistent for both men and women.

The least sensitive dimension was **employment**, with the expected effect on the outcome hovering near zero. There is suggestive evidence that respondents preferred teachers, followed by military officers, then entertainers, and finally politicians, yet the effect of all these preferences are near zero, highlighting the outsized importance of perceived morality and sect in individual preferences.

Conjoint: Son's Wife (Iraq only)

Individuals are most sensitive to their son's potential wife's sect, followed by religiosity and marital history, then race, and finally education.

> Now, imagine that your son is choosing a wife. In the following questions, we will describe two potential wives. Please read their descriptions carefully, then indicate which of the two you would prefer to have as a daughter-in-law.



Individuals were most sensitive to their son's wife's **sect**. Respondents were nearly 30 percentage points more likely to prefer a Shi'a wife over a Sunni wife, with men slightly more so than women. For both men and women, however, Sunni Muslims were preferred to Christians by about 5 percentage points, which contrasts with the analysis for neighbors, where women exhibited a slight preference for Christian over Sunni neighbors. This mirrors findings from other contexts, where individuals who exhibit very limited racial bias still note racial preferences in dating and marriage.[77]

Individuals were then most likely to prefer a woman who was **devout** to one who was not devout, by about 20 percentage points. There was no statistically significant difference

[77] Fisman et al, *Racial Preferences in Dating, 2009*

for men and women in this preference, highlighting the unsurprising importance of religiosity to this religious group.

Individuals were then most sensitive to **marital status**, which was seen as nearly equally important to the woman not being devout. Interestingly, individuals did not show a statistically significant difference in preferences for divorced versus widowed women, and were about 16-18 percentage points less likely to prefer a woman who was never married.

For **racial preferences**, respondents were most likely to prefer an Iraqi Arab, followed by an Iraqi Kurd, and then an Iranian. Note that this is while holding constant the effect of sect. Despite the positive attitudes indicated toward Iran as a regional power in other parts of the survey, there is a clear personal preference for Iraqis, even of a different race or sect when it comes to marital choices. Race was more important for women than for men, with women preferring Iraqi Arabs by about 20 percentage points over Iranians and about 10 percentage points over Kurds, and men preferring Arabs by about 16 percentage points over Iranians and about 13 percentage points over Kurds.

Respondents had a 7 percentage points preference for an educated wife to an uneducated one, and this result held across genders of respondents.

The least important factor was the woman's **wealth**. Individuals indicated a slight preference for a **wealthy** spouse for their son, yet the effect was small, at around 3 percentage points for both men and women. This highlights the overwhelming importance of the racial and sectarian attributes in individual choices about who they would choose as family.

Conjoint: Politician

Individuals were most sensitive to a potential politician's security policies, followed by trade, experience, and finally, religiosity. Iranians and Iraqis had similar preferences.

> Imagine that two political leaders are presenting their vision for the future of the region. In the following questions, we will describe their proposals, then indicate which of the two you would support.



Security was the most important topic for Iranians and Iraqis, with similar importance for both despite Iraq's first-hand experience with recent insecurity. Using the United states as a baseline, respondents were most likely to prefer building ties with Russia, at about 20 percentage points, and slightly more likely to prefer developing security ties with China (by about 10 percentage points). However, they did prefer the US to Saudi Arabia, by about 20 percentage points. Iraqi females had an even greater antipathy toward Saudi Arabia, and preferred ties with the US to Saudi by about 25 percentage points.

Trade was the second most important topic. Again using the United States as a baseline, individuals indicated the same average ranking of preferences. They remained equally negative toward Saudi Arabia, preferring the politician who supported ties with the US by about 20 percentage points for both Iranians and Iraqis. However, respondents were less negative about ties with the US as compared to China and Russia, perhaps due

to the perception that economic ties with the US had historically been less damaging than military ties. Respondents were only 10 percentage points more likely to choose China over the US and about 16 percentage points more likely to choose Russia.

Experience was actually not preferred. Iranians showed an only marginally statistically significant preference for unexperienced candidates (significant at the 0.1 level), whereas Iraqis showed about a 10preference for new candidates– highlighting frustrations with current government structures. Iraqi women were even more likely to prefer new candidates than were Iraqi men.

Surprisingly for this religious group of pilgrims, **religiosity** was the candidate's least important attribute. There was a slight preference for moderate over conservative politicians overall, and this result is driven primarily by male respondents (women indicate no expected change in preference). As found in other sections, this highlights the fact that even among religious Iranians and Iraqis, religion in politics is not necessarily preferred.

APPENDIX D and APPENDIX E are online appendixes, and can be found here:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/cxk0fxnkht9g6xe/Appendices.pdf?dl=0

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